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This thesis argues that it is our very idea of progress, codified in law, 
which obstructs real progress when it comes to postcolonial 
reconciliation. This affects three discourses: (1) the academic debate on 
the rectification of historical injustice; (2) legal theory and practice in the 
fields of constitutional law, international criminal law and 
international human rights law; (3) the intensifying activist struggle for 
recognition of historically marginalised groups. Drawing on the 
methods of archival research, legal analysis and normative critique, I 
establish a comparative analysis of how different countries deal with 
their colonial past to find out why full historical reconciliation is so 
difficult to achieve. Part I searches for the origins of the globally 
dominant conception of progress and locates them firmly within the 
history of the West. Chapter 1 argues that the historical injustice 
debate is stuck because both proponents and opponents of redress 
rely on the same conception of time: Liberal Time. Chapter 2 traces 
the emergence of inherently progressive Liberal Time back to the 
impact which Christianity, the French Revolution and 
industrialisation had on European intellectual history. Chapter 3 
shows how Liberal Time spread worldwide when it became a 
justification and tool for European imperial expansion. The 
conclusion of part I is thus that the conception of time that built 
Empire also impedes its dissolution. Part II engages in a comparative 
discourse analysis of three major trials in which the liberal Western 
ideal of progress was challenged. The trials reveal a shared imaginary of 
progress, but also differences in how national timescapes shape 
historical reconciliation. Chapter 4 shows that Britain’s cult of 
continuity makes the public acknowledgement of colonial wrongs 
comparatively easy. Chapter 5 posits that France’s foundational 
revolutionary rupture makes a productive dialogue about the past 
virtually impossible. Chapter 6 suggests that the US offers a synthesis 
between rupture and continuity, when measuring American progress 
against the ideals of the American Revolution. Chapter 7 distils these 
findings into the following predicament: the Western promise of 
progress cannot be fulfilled so long as our institutions defend an idea of 
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‘Of course only a redeemed mankind is granted the fullness of its past—which is to say, only for a redeemed 
mankind has its past become citable in all its moments. Each moment it has lived becomes a citation à l'ordre 











































1 W. Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History (Berlin, 1942), thesis IX. 
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On 13 October 1884, France was furious. 41 gentlemen from the world’s leading 
nations had come together at Washington “for the purpose of fixing upon a 
meridian proper to be employed as a common zero of longitude and standard 
of time-reckoning throughout the globe” – and France had lost. Despite M. 
Lefaivre’s passionate account of his country’s “long and glorious past” in which 
France had “given sufficient proofs of her love of progress” to make Paris win 
the competition, the Prime Meridian was set at Greenwich, England.2 The 
pendulums of public buildings, the rhythms of the railway, the lunchbreaks of 
the labourers of the world were set to the clock of the island nation that had 
become a global Empire. The French showed their disdain by consistently calling 
Greenwich Mean Time “the mean time of Paris retarded by nine minutes and 21 
seconds” but had to accept defeat when they aligned with the British imperial 
metronome in 1911.3 For the delegates at this conference, time was a contested 
political issue. There was a clear link between time and power. 
135 years later, on 19 June 2019, the New York Times’ Magazine published a 
special edition starting the 1619 Project, an ongoing investigation into America’s past 
around one explosive claim: that the real story of the United States begins not in 
1620, when the Mayflower arrived with the first European pilgrims at Plymouth 
Rock, but in 1619, when the first slave ship reached Jamestown. The seemingly 




2 At the crucial vote on the British proposal, 22 nations voted in favour and 2 abstained, 
France and Brazil. International Meridian Conference Proceedings, via 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17759/17759-h/17759-h.htm, accessed 29/09/19. 
3  http://www.thegreenwichmeridian.org/tgm/articles.php?article=10 , accessed 02/10/19. 
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wide-ranging debate on America’s true founding. Could it be that instead of 
puritans fleeing the religious oppression of Old Europe to establish a new nation in 
liberty, the real Founders where slave traders and those who arrived in shackles 
– the ones who built the country in an epic struggle of suffering and exclusion? 
Was the country founded on virtue or vice? What did it mean to challenge the 
anchoring myth of such a diverse nation? The Save American History Act proposed by 
Senator Tom Cotton, who wanted to withdraw federal funding from state schools 
that taught the 1619 Project, suggests political disputes at the highest level. As in 
the case of France in 1884, the connection between time, narrative and power is 
worth exploring. All too often, we think of time as a neutral and universal 
scientific concept that is merely the background, not the object of politics. But 
that might be a mistake. 
I want to suggest that time is an inescapable feature of postcolonial struggles for 
recognition, redress and reconciliation. The increasingly intense international 
debate on the reparation of historical injustice in the last two decades is a real- life 
struggle in which we can observe the interplay between politics and time. The 
trials about historical wrongs which we will explore initially seem to bring a long-
suppressed past back into the present. But they do much more than that: the 
public controversies presented here actually allow us to rediscover past, 
present, future, and the links between them in order to assess our scheme of 
temporality as a whole. What is the right relationship between past, present and 
future? Where do we, as individuals or collectives, situate ourselves within the 
seemingly endless continuum of time? Do we get to choose our position or are 
we placed in the specific paragraph of a prefabricated story? If the latter, who 
fabricated this story and how? What, if anything, justified their doing so? 
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This thesis tries to answer such questions by investigating how the West creates, spreads 
and maintains its own temporal order for its own political benefit. I uncover this Western temporal 
order by way of analysing the historical injustice debate as a discourse implicitly 
premised on a particular conception of time. In this debate there are, of course, 
voices in favour of and voices against historical reparations. Yet the fundamental 
problem I identify is that they all base their arguments, hypotheses and 
predictions on the same notion of time: Liberal Time, crafted by our very specific 
European and imperial history. My core argument can thus be summarised as follows: 
Why do we struggle to address historical injustice in our time? Precisely because it is our time. It is the 
culturally contingent and endlessly manipulable progressive conception of time 
that we – Western academics, lawyers and politicians – work with, that impedes 
real dialogue with a plurality of pasts and a more nuanced understanding on how 
they affect the present. This is not just fascinating for historians. It matters to 
political theorists if our conception of time has harmed and continues to harm 
victims worldwide. We are now among those victims, if we are biased towards a 
temporal regime that privileges the future and hides the past. When judging the 
intertemporal disputes created by European imperialism, we should acknowledge 
that there is no single universal time. Instead, it is the contingently valid 
European product of progressive time that now obstructs our vision towards 






I will use the term “timescape” to designate a collective’s vision of time, history and 
the collective’s place in history. Like landscapes, timescapes are ecosystems 
constituted by some fixed elements (treaties, places or principles) and some 
moving parts (the stream of ideas carried forward by each new generation, the 
ruptures that occur when unexpected storms arrive). Timescapes are more than 
“regimes of historicity” (Hartog4), since they are not oriented towards the past, or 
“political temporalities” (Gokmenoglu5) since they are not merely political. 
Timescapes are social imaginaries by which a particular political, economic and 
cultural collective makes sense of its own historical experience. This means that 
within one historical system there can be multiple timescapes. As we shall see, their 
multiplicity and competition ultimately tests the strength of the larger 
(Western) temporal order. 
The use of the term “postcolonial”, too, can be controversial. The usual critique is that 
we are not yet fully past colonialism and coloniality. 6 Colonial structures persist 
wherever we look, from global investment patterns to refugee flows. And yet the 
most interesting, if generally overlooked, part of this word is arguably the syllable 
“post”. That “post” itself suggests a controlled line along which we move 
unidirectionally from past to present to future, each step being decisively “post” 




4 F. Hartog, Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expériences du temps (Paris, Seuil, 2003). 
5 B. Gokumenoglu, Temporality and Social Movements: A Political Ethnography of Activism In Contemporary Turkey 
(2016-2018), doct. diss. (London, 2019) 
6 See, for example. D. Chakabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 
‘Indian’ Pasts?’”, Representations, No. 37, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories 





Revolution, the defining feature of modern politics, is a recent dream that needs 
some explanation. Historically, revolution was synonymous with restoration. One 
would roll back to the proper state of affairs. Only from the eighteenth- 
century onwards revolution came to indicate the possibility of radically 
overhauling the establishment. The problem with this new vision, however, is 
that revolutions have two parts: liberation and foundation. The liberation of the 
enlightened individual from the oppressive forces of custom and tradition by 
abolishing old rules, on the one hand, and the construction of a new alternative 
universe, on the other hand. The trickiest part of revolutionising is moving from 
the first step to the next. In between, Arendt and radical democrats have 
suggested, is the unbridled power of modern politics.7 This revolutionary limbo can 
be dangerous – many a revolution has ended too early, in destruction rather than 
construction – but it is also the essence of revolutionary spirit. The liminal space 
between liberation and founding is the construction site of history. I mean this in a 
triple sense: first, it is the site where tangible political and social change occurs on 
the surface; second, it is the moment in which the very structure of history 
changes (Reinhart Koselleck would say that new layers and shapes are formed in 
the sediments of time8); third, it is the site in which man expresses his identity as a 
historical being capable of looking both backwards and forwards. This is why, 
for Europeans at least,9 the occurrence of revolution profoundly changed the 
way they saw both themselves as actors in (not of) history and as 
 
 
7 H. Arendt, On Revolution (London, Penguin, 2006 [1963]). 
8 R. Koselleck, Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2003). 
9 While early theorists of modern historicity like Karl Löwith or Hans Blumenberg operated 
comfortably within a framework of European references, Koselleck has already been criticsed for 
reinforcing European visions of History. See V. Ogle, “Time, Temporality and the History of 
Capitalism”, Past & Present, Vol. 243, No. 1 (2019), 312-327. 
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agents who could shape the future of the world by predicting, taming, executing, 
shaping history as they saw fit. The men of revolutions are self-made men who 
thereby also make history. Let us bear this novelty in mind as we compare 
revolution with its alternatives. 
The main alternative to revolution is “reconciliation”. This is all too often seen either 
as unduly strict punishment demanded by the overly zealous or as 
whitewashing acquiescence to the status quo in order to preserve established 
conservative interests. Catherine Lu has convincingly shown that neither of 
these two popular images do justice to the theoretical richness of reconciliation. 
She distinguishes between “three related forms of reconciliation: (1) interactional 
reconciliation, which responds to alienation arising between agents through their 
interactions; (2) structural reconciliation, which responds to the alienation that 
arises from the social and political practices and structures that mediate agents’ 
activities and relations; (3) and existential reconciliation, which responds to the 
internal or self-alienation of agents that typically accompanies some forms of 
relational and structural alienation.” Although popular narratives about 
reconciliation focus on interactional reconciliation between agents – for 
example, the displaced Cherokee tribe versus the Federal Government of the 
United States – Lu suggests that “the project of structural reconciliation is more 
normatively fundamental for addressing both interactional and existential forms of 
alienation. Reconciliation in response to political catastrophe should be 
understood as a regulative ideal […] to create a mutually affirmable and affirmed 
social/political order that can support the flourishing of nonalienated agents.”10 
Reconciliation goes beyond justice, when it becomes the opposite of alienation. 
 
 
10 C. Lu, Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics (Cambridge, CUP, 2017), esp. chapters 5 and 7. 
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This is certainly a laudable ideal. Yet in my reading of the struggle for 
postcolonial reconciliation on the ground, that dream of postcolonial 
reconciliation without alienation is still a long way off, since the liberal temporal 








My methodology is unorthodox and might require a brief explanation. First, my 
work is primarily theoretical, but mixes a variety of methods used across the 
social sciences. The historical documents which you will see are the harvest of 
original archival research at the British National Archives in Kew, the Special 
Collections of the Firestone Library at Princeton University, and the digitally 
accessible collections of the French National Library and the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.11 The more recent documents include articles published in 
newspapers, magazines, blogs, as well as radio and television broadcasts and 
some contributions on social media. They form the basis of a critical 
reconstructive analysis of the main arguments traded in the public debate on 
historical injustice. The national debates take place against the backdrop of a 
certain national historical narrative, a distinctive way of dealing with history and a 
given society’s place in it. Do all societies have their own “regime of 
historicity”? Perhaps not. Yet the societies I have selected – Britain, France and the 
United States – are defined by a firm vision of history which the powerful 
 
 
11 A full research trip Paris will have to wait until the current COVID-19 travel restrictions are 
lifted. 
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have consciously crafted (and contested) through the centuries. I try to capture its 
essence by looking at authors who have had a disproportionate impact on a 
nation’s historical imagination, not only because their works had very high 
circulation rates, but often also because they were participants in the political 
apparatus. Mill and Tocqueville, for example, were not only members of 
parliament, but members who regularly expressed their views on colonialism. 
These narratives continue to be disseminated through the public education 
system and other channels of power. 
The set of assumptions about the structure and value of time, coupled with ideas 
about the shape and ends of history and a society’s place in it – what I collectively call 
a “national timescape” – is not only taught at schools, or discussed in public. 
National timescapes are ultimately sustained by the law. That is why I have 
chosen legal case studies to reveal them. I do not look at legal records like a 
jurist, but that can be an advantage. If we ask “What is the relationship between law 
and political theory?”, one plausible answer is that legal discourse is almost 
invariably an expression of power. A country’s legal system reflects the priorities of 
the ruling class. Details such as who has access to legal discourse, how 
plaintiffs frame their case and how the court responds are often indicative of 
wider social structures. Can standardised legal processes do justice to history in all 
its complexity? Of course not. Some actors, relationships and facts will 
invariably be lost. But the way the West’s established legal procedures define and 
select what counts as evidence, who counts as a plaintiff with a credible case and 
who can be accused as a perpetrator years after an injustice occurred reveals a lot 
about the established law’s relationship to history. History is not merely the 
positive record of the past, but the wider field in which past, present and future 
form a whole. Western law is inseparable from historical consciousness. As we 
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will see, the court hearings suggest active deliberation on the respective nation’s 
history, but also on the nation’s place in (world) history, its historical character and 
its historical mission. It is at this level of analysis that public litigation at the highest 
courts becomes a way of contesting orthodox narratives about what belongs in 
a nation’s story and what doesn’t. This is important if we agree that political 
theory is “political” because it concerns itself with power in the broadest sense. The 
analysis of legal discourse offers a springboard for theoretical work that reveals 
and criticises the power structures which sustain it. 
Strangely enough, such considerations have been discussed in empirical political 
science and legal theory – specialists on political transitions and transitional 
justice have been particularly prolific in this regard – but much less in political 
theory.12 The political science literature, however, often focuses on the 
prosecution of heads of state or of specific groups (i.e. military juntas) as part of 
regime change.13 The International Criminal Court plays a significant role here,14 but 
more often than not, the cases admitted for trial concern war crimes and crimes 
against humanity perpetrated by non-Europeans – as if Europeans were not (or 
were no longer) capable of such atrocities. I am not interested in individual 
perpetrators, but in entire state administrations accused of human rights 
violations. When a citizen or (perhaps even more interestingly) a non-citizen 
 
 
12 An important exception is A. R. Murphy, “Trial Transcript as Political Theory: Principles 
and Performance in the Penn-Mead Case”, Political Theory, Vol. 41, No. 6 (2013), 775-808. 
13 E. L Lutz & C. Reiger (eds.), Prosecuting Heads of State (Cambridge. CUP, 2009); G. Bass, Stay 
the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, PUP, 2000); Laughland, 
A history of political trials: from Charles I to Saddam Hussein (Oxford, 2008); J. Meierhenrich, J., & D. Pendas, 
D. (eds.), Political Trials in Theory and History (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 
14 C.M. de Vos & C. Stahn (eds.), Contested justice: the politics and practice of the International Criminal Court 
interventions (Cambridge, CUP, 2015); C. Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential 
and conditions for the promotion of justice and peace”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2013), 
800-818. For an interesting discussion of time at the ICC see: P. Akhavan, “Complementarity 
Conundrums: The ICC Clock in Transitional Times”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 14, 
No. 5 (2016), 1043–1059. 
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accuses an institutionalised authority of serious crimes, the state and its power are 
put on trial. If the accusations are serious enough, the trial reveals something about 
the self-conception of the state. It is this revelation I want to focus on. I won’t 
focus on “regime change” because the term itself suggests that outside of 
tumultuous periods of change, there should be no challenges to state legitimacy. I 
do not think that there is any “before” and “after” political change, because 
regimes are constantly evolving. Against the statism that still pervades the 
literature on “democratic transitions”, I want to uncover and reactivate 
challenges to authority – especially within the Western states that are all too often 




My approach therefore falls into the growing scholarship in embedded, engaged 
and committed political theory.16 It is embedded, because abstract questions 
about matters like intergenerational collective agency or epistemic injustice are 
analysed in real-life debates whose outcome affects both political agenda-setting and 
legislation at the top, as well as the daily lives of citizens at the bottom. My method 
is in line with Herzog & Zacka’s call for “political theory in an ethnographic 
key”, with “ethnographic sensibility” conceived broadly to include not only 
immersive field work but also “being embedded in research sites for shorter 
visits” and “closely examining the texts and cultural artifacts they produce” as I 
have done in all three countries which are analysed in Part II. I join Herzog & 
Zacka in highlighting the potential benefits of such a 
 
 
15 See ch. 1, section III. 
16 M. Longo & B. Zacka, “Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key”, American Political Science Review, 
Vol.113, No. 4 (2019), 1066-1070; L. Herzog & B. Zacka, “Fieldwork in Political Theory: Five 
Arguments for an Ethnographic Sensibility”, British Journal of Political Science, 2019- 04, Vol.49, No. 2 
(2019), 763-784. 
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methodology: “It can help uncover the nature of situated normative demands 
(epistemic argument); diagnose obstacles encountered when responding to these 
demands (diagnostic argument); evaluate practices and institutions against a 
given set of values (evaluative argument); probe, question and refine our 
understanding of values (valuational argument); and uncover underlying social 
ontologies (ontological argument).”17 I would like to add that such ethnographic 
interest is by no means restricted to far-flung corners of the world. The 
additional value of uncovering the “underlying social ontologies” of one’s own 
social and political system is enormous. 
My work is also engaged because I do not pretend to be neutral on any of these 
issues. Although both sides of the argument will usually be represented, I write 
with the conviction that political theory should indeed be political. My research 
should contribute to understanding what obstacles we face in the long struggle 
for historical reconciliation, not as a purely theoretical diagnosis, but as a step 




It might also be worth stating clearly what I am not going to do in this thesis. 
First, I am not primarily offering any responsibility tracing across time, especially not 
to specific persons. I am not going to designate a single guilty generation or 
localised group either. I am not going to assign blame directly. Second, I am not 
going to deal with the non-identity problem and similar technical dilemmas in 
intergenerational justice. Intergenerational communication and responsibility 




17 L. Herzog & B. Zacka, Fieldwork in Political Theory, 764. 
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politico-cultural lifeworld with concomitant norms and expectations.18 Third, I am 
not going to offer any concrete policy recommendations to the problem of 
colonial injustice. In Part II we are going to look at different routes that different 
countries have taken to attempt historical reconciliation, but no choice will be 
made between them. Instead, I am offering a possible answer to the vexing 
question “Why can’t we overcome historical injustice even if we are self- 
consciously progressive?”. My suggestion is that the Western promise of 
progress cannot be fulfilled so long as our institutions defend an idea of progress 




Two methodological objections should be answered before we move on. First, 
the cosmopolitan objection against my use of the nation-state as the unit of 
analysis. This choice is the product of necessity. Legal systems and archives are still 
organised and maintained by national governments. We can turn this into an 
advantage though by analysing these formalised discourses as potentially 
questionable expressions of power. 
Second, the constructivist objection that the historical documents I analyse are 
not the truth, but at most distortions, dissimulations or semblances of absolute 
truth. Here again, I don’t disagree in principle. I attempt to assess the impact of 
these historically crafted national timescapes on the revelation of uncomfortable 
historical truths. The most interesting question then is not “Is there any 
historical truth?” but “What happens in the different regimes of historicity when 
someone reveals historical evidence that does not fit with the socially 
 
 
18 See A. Hampe-Nathaniel, “Communicative Punishment across Generations”, unpublished 
manuscript. 
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constructed idea of historical truth?”. Is that fact ignored, integrated or 
transformed to fit the customary patterns of public history? Are there any 
differences in the transformation of historical evidence depending on the 









This thesis asks why we struggle to rectify historical injustice in our time. The 
answer is that we struggle precisely because our Western institutions measure 
progress through the lens of a historically contingent, Eurocentric notion of 
time, which, despite its liberal aspirations is actually oppressive and exclusionary. A 
specific notion of time structures our theoretical, political and legal attempts at 
rectification – and so long as this notion persists as an implicit assumption, we 
might not be able to deliver on the increasingly widespread promises of 




Part I is about the relationship between time and Empire. Its overall argument is 
that the time which built Empire impedes its dissolution. 
Chapter 1 introduces and criticises the concept of Liberal Time, a specific 
conception of historical time as linear, progressive and forward-looking. I argue 
that this specific version of time, used by both opponents and proponents of 
historical redress, might be at the root of our inability to take historical 
grievances seriously. It may seem unproblematic that a firm narrative sequence 
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between past, present and future underpins our political debate and legal order.19 It 
is, after all, past injustice that we are supposedly trying to rectify in the present in 
order to achieve future justice. A close study of the debate on historical 
injustice, however, reveals that this arc of historical time creates advantages and 
disadvantages in that debate. The critical analysis of the temporal assumptions 
sustaining our academic and political views on reparation will be split into three 
parts: Section I examines the most common arguments against historical redress to 
show that opponents of rectification generally use time to their advantage. 
Section II zooms in on the most influential argument against reparation - Jeremy 
Waldron’s Supersession Thesis - to reveal that it relies on an extraordinarily 
progressive notion of time which ultimately favours the perpetrator of historical 
injustice. Although this conception of time serves his purpose, I argue that it is a 
trap, since it prevents Waldron from seeing historical injustice for what it really is. 
Section III asks whether the proponents of historical redress might be less 
constrained but shows that even they are ultimately trapped in the same temporal 
framework. I shall call this conceptual framework Liberal Time – and my 
suspicion is that the Western academic debate on historical injustice is in gridlock 




Chapter 2 looks for the origins of modern Liberal Time and finds them in the 
specificities of Europe’s historical development. First, the spread of Christianity 
effected the first fundamental change from ancient, cyclical to modern, linear 
time. Then, the rise of the bourgeoisie, for whom “time is money”, led to a re- 
evaluation from empty to valuable time. Last, the rupture of the French 
 
19 P. Ricœur, Temps et récit (Paris, Seuil, 1983). 
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Revolution radically redefined the idea of earthly time as a field for the unfolding of 
man-made progress. Thus, the trinity of providence, productivity and progress, 
linked to very specific moments in the religious, economic and political history of the 
European continent, lies behind the open-ended, forward-looking, optimistic 
framework of Liberal Time. The dominant temporal discourse arising from 
European history is this: a supposedly abstract, but carefully crafted conception 
of universal historical time, measured and enforced by increasingly sophisticated 
clock time which records the unfolding of Man’s Enlightenment in universal 
history. Until today, the institutional instantiations of European Liberal Time – 
from high courts to hourly work contracts - bear the marks of conflict, violence 
and domination. It is crucial to remember that the ostensibly scientific idea of 





Chapter 3 examines the impact of Europe’s temporal revolution on the wider 
world. After the successful scientific conquest of time itself had changed the 
daily habits and social structures of Europeans, the civilising wisdom of the clock 
and calendar was to be exported. Europe’s imperial expansion was intimately 
linked with ideas about time, with Liberal Time once again being not merely the 
backdrop, but the shaper of political change. I identify two kinds of temporal 
relationships between European colonisers and non-European colonised 
peoples. The first is diachronic: Europe saw itself as “more advanced” on the 
ladder of historical time than the “backward” societies which “still” lived in 
earlier times. That temporal distance was a powerful ideological tool; it justified 
imperial intervention. The second relationship is synchronic, since the imperial 
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project relied on uniform time discipline. The contrast between these diachronic 
orders of subjection and synchronic systems of coordination seems enormous, 
and yet imperial theorists sought to resolve it through a polychronic vision of 
progress. The religiously inspired notion of the “civilising mission” keeps non- 
Europeans at bay while reinforcing the European privilege of being the chosen 
guardians of progress. Overall, Part I concludes that Liberal Time was and 
remains the justification, tool and end of modern Empires. It is the time that 




Part II looks at challenges to Liberal Time through the lens of public trials in 
three states which have professed their commitment to progress: Britain, France 
and the United States. 
Chapter 4 opens with the Mau Mau trial in the United Kingdom, which reveals a 
specifically British view on the relationship between time and justice. I suggest that 
this relationship is characterised primarily by a cult of continuity. Like the two 
subsequent chapters, chapter 4 is divided into three parts: trial, tradition, and 
historical truth. Section I introduces the two Mutua et al. v. FCO trials (2011 and 
2012) to analyse the legal discourse on redress for the Mau Mau veterans who 
suffered systematic torture during Kenya’s decolonisation. Section II links these 
initial findings to a broader intellectual tradition that prioritises the idea of 
historical continuity at all cost. Section III asks what this specific context of a 
national timescape characterised by the idea of continuity means for the 
revelation and incorporation of uncomfortable historical truths. The key sources 
here will be the parliamentary debates on the Hola Camp Massacre on 27 July 
1959 and the Mau Mau settlement on 6 June 2013. After showing that the British 
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establishment is very adept at promoting a narrative of Britain as a continuous 
force for good in the world, despite colonial atrocities, I suggest that the British 
national timescape - characterised by an incessant quest for continuity - absorbs 




Chapter 5 contrasts the British approach with a very different strategy displayed at 
the trials of General Aussaresses in France. The veteran who exposed 
systematic torture during the Algerian War of independence was sued by the 
French League of Human Rights for “incitement to war crimes” which, for the 
League, represented a defamation of French Republican ideals. The French 
state’s willingness to defend those ideals – in all their revolutionary purity and all the 
way to the European Court of Human Rights – will be analysed in this chapter. 
Section I looks at the Aussaresses trials and the enormous public debate they 
unleashed when the state-sponsored silence on colonialism exploded. Section II 
investigates the intellectual conflicts that have divided France since its revolutionary 
watershed to show that it has become virtually impossible to think outside of the 
framework of a redemptive revolutionary timescape. The final section III asks 
what this means for the emergence of uncomfortable historical truths such as 
those revealed in Benjamin Stora’s presidential report on French colonial memory. 
My suggestion is that they are all but impossible to integrate into a tightly guarded 




Chapter 6 looks at the limits of the American history-making by examining 
different challenges to the master narrative of New World progress. If France 
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focuses on rupture and Britain on continuity, the American case might combine 
the two: there is a tension between the radical (re)founding of “the first new 
nation” and the linear promise of continuous progress thereafter. I shall analyse 
this mighty tension between rupture and continuity in the usual three steps: First, I 
look at legal action that revealed and questioned the national historical myth, in 
this case the two recent Supreme Court battles around McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020) 
and Shelby County v. Holder (2013); Section II examines the 1619 Project as a public 
history initiative which aimed to criticise the hegemonic narrative, but ultimately 
highlighted the strength of the orthodox American timescape - characterised by 
novelty, exceptionalism and providential progress. Finally, Section III uses a 
congressional hearing on slavery reparations to explore the manifold 
possibilities for integrating discordant truth into the national timescape. In my 
reading, this timescape absorbs dissent reasonably well, but only if it is presented 





Chapter 7 distils these interdisciplinary explorations into the following 
predicament: the Western promise of progress cannot be fulfilled so long as our 
institutions defend an idea of progress which is itself oppressive and 
exclusionary. This affects not only the current theoretical debate on historical 
injustice, where I highlight the dangers of operating with historically tainted 
terms. It affects the implicit norms of “liberal transitology” built into the wider 
academic fields of transitional justice, peacebuilding and conflict resolution;20 the 
 
20 N. Plätzer, “Civil Society As Domestication: Egyptian and Tunisian Uprisings beyond Liberal 
Transitology”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (New York, 2014), pp..255- 265; H.J. 
Wierda, “Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Comparative Politics: “Transitology” and the 
Need for New Theory”, East European politics and societies, Vol.15, No.1 
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assumptions built into the law of succession, the law of restitution and the 
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court.21 It also affects the explicit 
demands for postcolonial rectification which, as I analysed in the three case 
studies, need to be phrased in the dominant progressive terms to be successful. 
Ultimately, the all-encompassing expectation of progress does not lead to 
universal emancipation. On the contrary, when historically marginalised groups feel 
obliged to speak the language of their oppressors, something might get lost. 
Whether those lost experiences and lost conceptions of time can be recovered is 
still unknown. Ridding ourselves – and our institutions – of the problematic 
progress paradigm is a mighty feat. This dissertation takes a small step towards that 
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Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
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21 International public law and international criminal law have recently experienced their own 
historical turn. See chapters by Craven and Anghie in: A. Orford, F. Hoffmann & M. Clark (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016); M. Craven, 
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Time plays a central role in the debate on historical redress, since philosophers, 
politicians and lawyers focus on the discharge of rights and responsibilities that 
possibly persisted through time. This could seem unproblematic. It is after all, 
past injustice that we are supposedly trying to rectify in the present in order to 
achieve future justice. That narrative sequence between past, present and future 
underpins our political debate and legal order.23 A close study of the debate on 
historical injustice, however, reveals that this arc of historical time creates 
advantages and disadvantages in that debate. Generally speaking, opponents of 
historical rectification need only to point to the long decades passed between 
the original injustice (say, the 1770 landing of the Captain Cook’s Endeavour in 
Australia’s Botany Bay) and the present reparation claim to diminish the 
significance of the latter. They are against reparation because of the passage of time. 
Proponents of rectification, by contrast, need to show that their cause matters 





22 M. Serres, Éclaircissements : entretiens avec Bruno Latour (Paris, François Bourn, 1992), 79. 
23 P. Ricœur, Temps et récit (Paris, Seuil, 1983), Vol. 2. 
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If our conception of time is powerful enough to structure the debate in that way, 
we should examine it more closely. The critical analysis of the temporal 
assumptions sustaining our academic and political views on reparation will be 
split into three parts: Section I examines the most common arguments against 
historical redress to show that opponents of rectification generally use time to 
their advantage. Section II zooms in on the most influential argument against 
reparation - Jeremy Waldron’s Supersession Thesis - to reveal that it relies on an 
extraordinarily progressive notion of time which ultimately favours the 
perpetrator of historical injustice. Although this conception of time serves his 
purpose, I argue that it is a trap, since it inhibits Waldron from seeing historical 
injustice for what it really is. Section III asks whether the proponents of 
historical redress might be less constrained conceptually but shows that even 
they are ultimately trapped in the same temporal framework. I shall call this 
conceptual framework Liberal Time – and my suspicion is that the Western 
academic debate on historical injustice is in gridlock because we do not see – let 








Let us first look at how opponents of historical redress in general use the passage of 
time to their advantage. Their arguments can be grouped into four families: 
Epistemic complications, complex agency, constructivist pacifism, historical 
change. 
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1. Epistemic complications 
 
Marc Galanter counsels against digging too deep into the past, because we 
will never know enough to judge it like the present. If the collection of 
reliable evidence is already difficult when we try to settle disputes in the 
present, how could we, descendants of perpetrators and victims, have 
the epistemic hubris to judge crimes committed centuries ago, 
especially once we add the inescapable factors of biased and destroyed 
records? The basic epistemic asymmetry between a supposedly 
transparent present and the obscure past should make us abandon our 
hopes for intertemporal rectification.24 Unless we can travel in time to 
witness the historical events in question, we have to rely on public 
records. These are patchy, biased and sometimes purposefully destroyed. 
Any attempt to correct this problem of insufficient information would 
require significant human and financial commitment. Galanter takes this 
obstacle as a starting point to argue that the law knows statutes of 
limitations and prescriptions precisely because politico-legal resources are 
limited. Trials and political programmes concerning past injustice are 
complex, costly and time-consuming. Progress will always be piecemeal, the 
dispensation of justice “rationed” and rectification partial. Instead of 
following an endless path towards historical truth, we should accept our 
epistemic limitations and move on into the future. As David Rieff points 
out, nothing prevents our historical excavations from being less biased 
than the historical record: “it is actually quite easy for nations or groups to 
‘revise’ and rewrite their collective memories”, with these “exercises 
 
24 M. Galanter, “Righting Old Wrongs”, in: M. Minow (ed.), Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law and 
Repair (Princeton NJ, PUP, 2000). 
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in collective historical remembrance” all too often resembling “myth on 
one side and political propaganda on the other”.25 Given the increasing 
number of conflicts in which there is no clear victor and the “inimical 
relationship in the aftermath of savage wars” between “truth, justice and 
peace”, he urges us to abandon the mirage of historical truth altogether 
and to opt instead for a peaceful “modus vivendi among civilisations”: 
“Far from political remembrance being a moral imperative, then, there 
will be times when such remembrance is what stands in the way.”26 




2. Complex agency 
 
The change of agents and agency over time is another worry. It generally 
takes two forms. In the first version, critics develop the general epistemic 
critique further to argue that we cannot assign responsibility to any 
concrete agent, because we can never know with certainty who was the 
main perpetrator of a historical wrong and who were the additional 
agents intervening either to reinforce or to alleviate the wrong. If, for 
example, I am wrongly arrested by a racially profiling police corps, get sent 
to prison and later receive a rejection on a mortgage application 
because the bank does not like ex-convicts – who is really responsible for 
my suffering? The police officer who delivered the relevant training 




25 D. Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and its Ironies (New Haven, YUP, 2016), 32. 
26 Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting, 42. 
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recommended this bank, the bank employee? There could be many other 
additional agents between the original wrongdoing (the racist arrest) and the 
final result (the mortgage rejection). Chandran Kukathas and others are 
suggesting that we can never know with certainty how great or small the 
contribution of each agent was to my causal chain of suffering. This is not 
merely an epistemic problem; it is also a moral problem. What if we 
retrospectively assign responsibility to an innocent agent? Kukathas argues 
that it would be disrespectful to assign responsibility for misdeeds in the 
distant past because – even if we think we have identified the culprit – 
there are too many intervening agents in this muddled history to hold the 
rights and responsibilities of the original victim and wrongdoer 
constant. The sheer complexity and unpredictability of history produces 
such a long line of agents involved in a certain activity 
– e.g., the colonisation of Australia – that the risk of assigning 
rectificatory responsibility to an innocent third party is too high to 
attempt rectification at all.27 
The second version of the argument resting on the complexities of 
agency is not about who the relevant actors were but whether they still exist. It is an 
argument about the changing identities of actors over time. This can take a 
collective or individualistic form. Whether collective agents can persist 
over time is hotly debated since the continuous existence of those agents 
can be seen as a prerequisite for historical rectification.28 The case of the 
indigenous tribes of the New World who were enslaved, 
 
27 C. Kukathas, “Responsibility for Past Injustice: How to shift the burden”, Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics, Vol. 2, No.2 (2003), 165-190. 
28 See C. List & P. Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford, OUP, 
2011) and the applied discussions in Gosseries. A. & Meyer, L., Intergenerational Justice (Oxford, OUP, 
2009). 
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expropriated and extinguished in genocides perpetrated by the Spanish 
and British Crowns, for example, would not qualify as a historical crime 
that can be redressed adequately, precisely because the death of these 
groups was so savagely clear-cut. Without continuous group agency, 
there is no beneficiary of redress. Most cases of historical injustice, 
however, are more complicated. If it can be shown, for instance, that the 
current descendants of black slaves in the US are not sufficiently similar to 
the group they descended from, their claim to reparations is weakened. 
Similarly, if the current descendants of British settlers in Australia or 
New Zealand, can be shown to have evolved so much as a group (through 
intermarriage, migration, cultural change…) that they are no longer 
properly connected to their ancestors, then the demand to rectify the 
crimes of those ancestors may be rejected more quickly. But where do we 
draw the line between “acceptable change” that preserves group identity 
and “excessive change” that destroys it? What happens when 
descendants of victims and perpetrators intermingle over time? Would a 
mestizo have only half a right to reparations? What if a descendant of a 
historically marginalised group benefits from the original injustice by 
becoming the author of a bestselling book on that crime? Is she equally 
entitled to reparations? 
 
Finally, the problem of benefiting from injustice can be taken to a 
 




29 The classic statement is in D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, OUP, 1987), 351-380. For more 
recent discussions of the problem, see O.J. Herstein “Historic Justice and the Non- Identity 
Problem: The Limitations of the Subsequent-Wrong Solution and towards a New Solution”, Law 
and Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2008), 505-531. 
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the basic principle of rectification relies on the assumption that victim V 
would have been better off had the wrongful act A not occurred, but the 
claim is made by V’s descendants, the absence of act A could also mean 
the absence of the particular descendants. A case in point is Mohamed 
Garne, a Franco-Algerian born after a gang rape during the Algerian 
War, who campaigned for colonial reparations under the banner 
“Français par le crime - J’accuse!”.30 Christopher Morris believes that this is 
impossible, because “in virtually all such cases, the argument for 
compensation fails. […] Vn's very existence is conditional on A. The 
greater the effects of A on V, which we may assume are some increasing 
function of A's wrongness, the greater the certainty that Vn would not 
exist in the absence of A.”31 The Non-Identity Problem, repeating itself 
and becoming more serious with every generation that follows a 
historical crime, is a way in which the passage of time could diminish the 
negative consequences of the crime (at least it has given life to new 
individuals) and with that our duty to rectify it (would anyone seriously 
advocate that full rectification to the status quo ante would entail the 
killing of descendants?). When it comes to the complexities of agency, 
time trumps crime. 
 
3. Constructivist pacifism 
 
The third critique of historical redress can be made in the seemingly 
conciliatory language of constructivism. Bruce Ackerman, for example, 
argues 
30 M. Garne. Francais par le crime - J’accuse! (Paris, Harmattan, 2011). 
31 C.W. Morris, “Existential Limits to the Rectification of Past Wrongs”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 
21, No 2 (1984), 175–182 
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that historical soul-searching poses a risk to community cohesion. As 
inconsistencies are exposed in the carefully crafted national narrative of 
progressive integration, old antagonisms might flare up and divide 
society further instead of uniting it behind virtuous cleanliness. The 
“quixotic quest” for the real past risks generating “endless rounds of 
recrimination” that plunge the society in question into a “spiral of 
incivility”. 32 Of course, this rests on the unsubstantiated assumption that 
there is community cohesion in the first place. Some might say that this is 
begging the question: don’t claims for historical reparations usually 
indicate the absence of community cohesion? Nonetheless, the 
constructed stability paradigm dominates international (elite) politics. 
Policy handbooks and academic textbooks still present, regime change 
coupled with a new narrative to legitimise constructed order as the 
endpoint of transitional justice.33 Peace is placed above justice. 
David Rieff endorses that utilitarian hierarchy. His acclaimed In praise of 
forgetting is filled with examples of historical atrocities, and yet he recoils at the 
prospect of public investigations into and prosecution of the dark past. He 
warns that in our “therapeutic age”, where collective memorialization 
has become a moral and political duty, collective memory “has led to 
war rather than peace and to the determination to exact revenge rather 
than commit to the hard work of forgiveness.”34 In the Balkans, Central 
Africa, India and Israel, the expositions of past crimes have, according 
to Rieff, led not to collective Enlightenment, but 
 
32 B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven CT, YUP, 1992), 73, 98 and 81, 
respectively. 
33 R. Appleby, A. Omer and D. Little (eds.). The Oxford handbook of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding (New 




to cycles of ethnic and sectarian violence. If Geschichtsaufarbeitung does not lead 
to Vergangenheitsbewältigung, why engage in it in the first place? For the 
constructivists who value the present stability over any disingenuous or 
even dangerous discoveries about the past, forgetting is essential to 
surviving. To avoid social turmoil, we should privilege and preserve the present 
order. Future progress is more important than past justice. In the words of 
Northern Irish writer Edna Longley, the best thing for the divided 
peoples and divided histories of the world would be “raising a monument 
to Amnesia and forgetting where we put it.”35 
 
 
4. Historical change 
 
The most prominent argument to make historical injustices fade with the 
passage of time is that “claims about justice and injustice must be 
responsive to changes in circumstances.”36 According to Jeremy 
Waldron’s highly influential Supersession Thesis, these changes can be 
exogenous to a society or endogenous – the important point is that 
justice changes with them. Waldron’s general thesis is that “an act which 
counted as an injustice when it was committed in circumstances C1 may be 
transformed, […] into a just situation if circumstances change in the 
meantime from C1 to C2. When this happens, I shall say the injustice 
has been superseded.”37 The more time passes, the more circumstances 
change, the weaker the claim of the originally wronged party becomes - 
 
 
35 E. Longley’s public intervention at the 1998 bicentenary of the United Irish Rebellion, see 
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sorry-is-not-enough-1107258.html, accessed 
12/12/2019. 
36 J. Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice”, Ethics, Vol.103, No. 1 (1992), 4-28. 
37 Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 24. 
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until it is actually effaced. Here, it is not the change of evidence, actors or 
identities that matters. It is historical change at large in which ever new 
and flexible circumstances warrant a flexible conception of justice. Injustice 
can become justice as external circumstances change. Since this is the most 
time-sensitive argument of all those proposed against historical redress, 
we shall analyse it more closely in the next section. 
 
 
Overall, however, it is important to record the following interim conclusion: 
academic arguments against redress tend to increase the distance between the 
past and the present, pushing the problem backwards into the obscurity of 
history. The present is clean, clear and, according to the critics of reparations, the 








This section will examine Waldron’s Supersession Thesis more closely to 
uncover the temporal assumptions that underpin it. Although Waldron 
professes that his theory is “not about time per se, but about change”, that 
statement alone reveals a particular conception of time that is primarily 
characterised by the constant transformation of objects and characters.38 A dual 
analysis of what counts as “real change” for Waldron – first on the normative, 
 
 
38 Whether time can exist independently of observable change is a matter of heated debate in the 
contemporary philosophy of time. See S. Shoemaker’s classic “Time without change”, in: 
LePoidevin & McBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of Time (Oxford, OUP, 1993). 63-80; B. Skow, “Why does 
time pass?”, Noûs, Vol. 46, No.2 (2012), 223–42; J.D. Norton, “Time really passes”, Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol.13, No.4 (2010) and Callender, C. (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2002). 
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then on the empirical level – suggests that Waldron, acclaimed authority on 
historical injustice, might be unable to see the true nature of historical injustice. 
This section draws on three principal sources in order to better understand 
Waldron’s views on colonisation, settler life and the frontier: The classic 
“Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) and the restatement “Redressing 
Historic Injustice” (2002), but also an often overlooked paper on “Settlement, 
Return, and the Supersession Thesis” (2004) which he prepared for a conference on 
"Israeli Settlements and Related Cases," at Tel Aviv University.39 It is here, in a 
comparison of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with 
European settlement of New Zealand, that we see most clearly that Waldron is a 





It is best to start with an example proposed by Waldron himself: “Suppose, […] 
that in circumstances of plenty various groups on the savannah are legitimately in 
possession of their respective waterholes. One day, motivated purely by greed, 
members of group F descend on the waterhole, Hg, used and possessed by 
group G and insist on sharing that with them. (What is more, they do not allow 
reciprocity; they do not allow members of G to share the waterhole Hf, which 
was legitimately in the possession of the F.) That is an injustice. But then […] 
circumstances change, and all the waterholes of the territory dry up except the 
one that originally belonged to G. The members of group F are already sharing that 
waterhole, Hg, on the basis of their earlier incursion. But now that 
 
39 Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, J. Waldron, “Redressing Historic Injustice”, University of Toronto Law 
Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2002),135-160; J. Waldron “Settlement, Return and the Supersession 
Thesis”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004), 237-268. 
41 Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 11. 
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circumstances have changed, they are entitled to share that waterhole. Their use of 
Hg no longer counts as an injustice; it is now, in fact, part of what justice now 
requires.”40 
Although Waldron presents the argument in highly abstracted, exoticised form by 
using the imagery of undefined “groups”, “waterholes” and the “savannah”, this 
can easily be transposed to the concrete story of settler colonialism. Europeans 
arrive “motivated purely by greed”, descend on other people’s resources 
without granting them reciprocal access to the riches of the imperial centre, and 
still, when circumstances change (partly due to the actions of the settlers), the 
systematic exploitation of resources is not just acceptable (that would be 
worrying enough), but “what justice now requires”. My translation is not even 
needed, because there are more explicit publications, in which Waldron, talking 
about his native New Zealand writes: “A change in circumstances […] might 
justify our [he’s writing from the perspective of the coloniser] forcing the 
aboriginal inhabitants of some territory to share their land with others [...] the 
same change in circumstances […] can justify our saying that the others' 
occupation of some of their lands, which was previously wrongful, may become 
morally permissible.”41 Confronted with the obvious criticism that this colonial 
apologism generates “a moral hazard - an incentive for wrongdoers to seize 
others' lands, confident in the knowledge that if they hang on to them wrong- 
fully for long enough their possession may eventually become rightful”, Waldron 





40 J. Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice”, Ethics (1992); J. Waldron, “Redressing Historic 
Injustice”, The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, Liberal Democracy and Tribal Peoples: 
Group Rights in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Winter, 2002), 152. 
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supersedes all claims of injustice. Rather, it is that claims about justice must be 
responsive to changes in circumstances.”42 
This is peculiar for three reasons: first, it is not clear how exactly changing 
circumstances can turn an act that was wrongful at time t1 morally permissible at 
time t2; second, that supersession of injustice can only be automatic if it rests on a 
specific conception of time whose underlying assumptions Waldron fails to spell 
out; third, the relation between the Waldron’s normative claim about adaptive 
justice and his observations on the empirical circumstances of colonialism 





A. A leap of justice? 
 
The first worry with Waldron’s Supersession Thesis is that the underlying 
conception of justice is neither specified nor defended. How can the initial 
predatory act of the greedy group F be classified as an “injustice” at t1 and then 
become “what justice now requires” at t2? The change in circumstances is 
empirical - “all the waterholes of the territory dry up except the one that 
originally belonged to G” – but there seems to be a transformation of justice. 
How does this come about? Does is mean that the general act of attacking 
another group’s waterhole is unjust at t1 (circumstances of plenty) but just at t2 
(circumstances of scarcity)? Or does it mean that the very same particular act of 
attacking a waterhole is unjust at t1 and just at t2? Under the second scenario, the 




proposition, how do we grapple with the idea that exactly the same act can be 
both just and unjust, depending merely on changed background conditions 
through the passage of time? Shouldn’t an unjust act inscribed in history at t1 
continue to be unjust even if viewed from the later standpoint of t2? Is this simply a 
matter of perspective? The attack on the waterhole could look unjust for 
observers at t1 but just for observers at t2 who are looking backwards at the 
original theft from their new circumstances of scarcity. What should be the 
standard of justice when classifying temporally dispersed acts, the norms of 
justice prevailing at the time when the act was originally committed or the norms of 
justice prevailing in the present moment of judgement? The debate on 
intertemporal justice among lawyers focuses on that tension.43 Whether one or 
the other legal approach is chosen, it seems to me like the original injustice at t1 
persists. Whether we look at it from the perspective of reconstructed past 
circumstances or from our present circumstances, the injustice itself does not 
move. The original injustice may vary in importance from one time to the next, but 
its status as an injustice engraved in the historical record should not change. The 
original injustice as such persists through time. But Waldron suggests that, as a 
problem, it might disappear from our vision since the unjust act becomes a just act. 
That requires a very specific vision which Waldron seems to take for granted: a 
vision of history in which one segment of time (t2) follows and completely 
supersedes another segment (t1). T1 can only be superseded if it can actually 
disappear in our vision of human history. But temporal supersession does not 
automatically entail normative supersession. To me, the essence of a 
 
 
43 This is particularly important for the Law of Succession but matters for all legal disputes in 
which the law or “common opinion” has changed between commission of the act and litigation. 
See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The structure of legal argument (Cambridge, CUP, 2006) chs. 2 
and 6. 
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historical rectification claim is that the wrongful act committed at t1 does not 
simply disappear. The mere act of claiming compensation for a past injustice in the 
present seems to suggest that the past is not entirely gone. It may be helpful here 
to distinguish between time and the normativity of time. In one sense, everyone 
has moved beyond t1 – time passes. But in another sense the normative relevance of 
t1 can continue to resonate at t2. In normative terms, not everyone has moved 
beyond t1, a time segment that continues to live in the minds of the victims. It is 
the victors of history who have the chance of moving forward without looking 
back on their trail of destruction. And it is favourable to their position to assume 
that the past - the past of subaltern others – no longer exists. From his privileged 
position, Waldron seems to have missed the very essence of a claim for historical rectification: that the past 
matters for the present. 
This omission is not necessarily an individual mistake. It is supported by and 
embedded in a long tradition of European thinking about time – a tradition that 
was spread worldwide to peoples with different conceptions of time. The 
historical evolution of this conception of time will be reconstructed in chapters 2 
and 3. But Waldron’s thesis offers a good initial ground to excavate its core 




B. Does supersession rely on progress? 
 
My second worry with Waldron is that he does not acknowledge that 
supersession requires a specific, progressive notion of time. While Waldron 
states that he is not interested in “time as such”, the passage of time as a measure of 
change seems crucial for the conversion of injustice into justice. The fact that 
supersession requires continuously changing circumstances to work its magic 
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points us towards the modern European construct of Liberal Time. Its core 
feature is that value is distributed unequally along a timeline on which past, 
present and future succeed each other in this (and only this) order. The value 
increases from left to right (if we want to read the Western way): The present is 
more important than the past and the future is more important than the present. 
This is because the past is closed, while the present is the site of action and the 
future holds the promise of even better action. Liberal Time is the measure of 
irreversible improvement along a linear axis of history. 
Let me illustrate this priority of the present. Even when intergenerational justice is 
at stake, Waldron states his preference very clearly: “Justice may make reference 
to the past, through principles of desert and Lockean entitlement; but its primary 
focus is on the present — present-day people, present-day resources 
— and on the circumstances of the present inasmuch as they affect who should get 
what.”44 This preference for the present is not explained or supported by any 
independent reasons, but repeated across various texts. In the paper on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict he highlights the “importance of focusing the 
concerns of justice on the here and now and the needs and deserts of whoever 
happens to be in a given territory irrespective of how they or their ancestors got 
there” without any further supporting arguments. He acknowledges, however, 
that his viewpoint may not be neutral: “I am sure there is a significant relation 
between my personal background as a migrant, my ancestral background as the 
descendant of a settler family, and this scepticism about the moral significance of 
who was where first.”45 Justice for the inhabitants of postcolonial nations 
should, according to Waldron, be discussed “irrespective of how they or their 
 
44 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 246. 
45 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 239. 
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ancestors got there” because what matters is only “the here and now”. Late 
arrivals enjoy the benefit of doubt – or even stronger: the bliss of a clean slate. 
This is obviously beneficial to the current beneficiaries of questionable colonial 
pasts.46 Waldron’s philosophy seems to be influenced by the frontier spirit of 
European settlers, but this view is so dominant that Waldron sees no reason to 
defend why “justice may make reference to the past” only in the context of 
disputes about “principles of desert and Lockean entitlement” – European 
property theories which arguably underpinned colonial practices.47 In this strict 
delimitation of justice, indigenous peoples would have to express their 
rectificatory claims in the language of classical Liberalism. The range of 
legitimate reasons to return to the past is narrow. 
Any proposed step beyond the Lockean confines is treated with deep suspicion. 
Waldron writes that “[…] there is a sort of unhealthy formalism about an 
argument that moves from the sociological proposition that 'the settlement was 
one of the historical grievances of a tribal people' to the conclusion that the 
particular tribal entities that suffered the violation should be the sole beneficiary of 
the settlement, notwithstanding the very different and attenuated position that 
those entities presently occupy in modern Māori society. And I think this 
formalism is the occupational hazard of those who simply cast around to find a 
 
 
46 Exactly which portion of the population of present-day postcolonial states can be said to 
benefit from the colonial past and what that means for the distribution of duties in such 
societies is a matter of normative and empirical debate. See D. Butt, “On benefiting from 
injustice”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1 January 2007, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2007), 129-152, or for 
historical asset tracing see UCL’s project “Legacies of British slave-ownership”, via 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/, accessed 8/2/20. 
47 B. Arneil, John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford, OUP, 1996) is the classic text. 
More recent scholarship tests the details of the collaborator thesis and applies it to different parts 
of the Empire; see, for example, J. Whitehead, “John Locke, Accumulation by Dispossession and 
the Governance of Colonial India”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2012); P. 
Corcoran, “John Locke on Native Right, Colonial Possession, and the Concept of Vacuum 
domicilium”, The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms 
Vol. 23, No. 3 (2018). 
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way - any way will do - of sustaining the business of historic reparations without 
regard to the human circumstances of those they claim to be benefiting.”48 Quite 
apart from the fact that the variety of demands for reparations cannot be pinned 
down to this reductive model (the claim that wronged tribes should be “the sole 
beneficiary of the settlement” is particularly narrow), Waldron’s emphasis on 
“the very different and attenuated position that those entities presently occupy” 
must be highlighted. Without giving any indication of why the presently 
occupied position is “different and attenuated”, it is assumed that “presently 
occupied” positions count for more than previously occupied positions. This 
would only work if we relied on the liberal story that the passage of time is a 
proxy for progress. The criticism of those who act “without regard to the human 
circumstances of those they claim to be benefiting”, could however, be 
redirected towards Waldron himself. In using the phrase “historical grievances”, he 
seems to assume that “human circumstances” means “present human 
circumstances”, to which such “historical” grievances would be foreign. But 
what if “human circumstances” included remnants of the past, that were still 
affecting the present? What if the historical grievances were also present 
grievances, if past and present coexisted in the term “human circumstances”? If the 
past were entirely irrelevant to the work of “those sustaining the business of 
historic reparations”, their business wouldn’t really be “historic” reparations but 
would more plausibly be a present project of redistribution. But if “human 
circumstances” included “past human circumstances”, the benefit could be 






48 Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 151. 
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“without regard to the human circumstances of those whom [reparations 
 
activists] claim to be benefitting”. 
 
Waldron overlooks this possibility of multiple layers of time because he sees no 
reason to benefit a past that is long gone and uncivilised. He assumes that his 
reader is already in agreement with the Western assumption that the present is 
worth more than the past – presumably because the rule of historical progress 
implies that we are superior to those who came before us. It is hard to imagine 
many other reasons for ridiculing “those who simply cast around to find a way - 
any way will do - of sustaining the business of historic reparations” and rejecting 
outright “the absurdity of claims based on prehistorical first occupancy”. The 
priority of the present justifies such dismissive language. A present that does not 
have a very long past behind it, since – in classic colonial vocabulary – indigenous 
occupancy is “prehistoric”; real history was initiated by the arrival of the 
colonists.49 The phrase “any way will do” might also allude to radical methods 
outside the coloniser’s confines of legality.50 In the benevolent course of colonial 
history, the only problems that matter are those within colonial historiography; the 
only ones that require solutions are those that are still present, i.e. have not been 
superseded by civilisational change. 
Civilisation is the product of the factory of history. The Supersession Thesis 





49 See the discussion of origins in D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, PUP, 2000) and more recently, P. Hämäläinen, Lakota America: A New History of 
Indigenous Power (New Haven, YUP, 2019). 
50 For alternative visions of human rights, see J. J. Guzmán, “Decolonizing Law and expanding 
Human Rights: Indigenous Conceptions and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador”, Deusto Journal of 
Human Rights, No. 4 (2019) 59-87; S. Hope, “Human Rights: Sometimes One Thought Too Many?”, 
Jurisprudence, Vol.7, No. 1 (2016), 111-126. 
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mechanism seems to be almost impossible to halt, let alone reverse, if we are to 
 
believe Waldron’s repeated allusions to historical necessity and inevitability. 
 
The most explicit statement comes in the form of a comparison between Israeli 
settlers on the West Bank and the Europeans who populated the New World: 
“There is a difference […] in what the settlers are hoping time will accomplish in 
the Occupied Territories. [note that “time” is the grammatical subject of the 
subordinate clause!] It is the express aim of many of the settlers to expand — or to 
be the cause or occasion of the expansion — of the de jure boundaries of the 
State of Israel to include areas currently occupied by their settlements. […] They are 
looking to expand their options, rather than responding sadly to a radical 
contraction of them.” European settlers, by contrast are “stranded colonists, or 
the descendants of stranded colonists, abandoned by their homeland or 
abandoned by circumstances, who are now seeking to make the best of a bad 
situation and who are willing to share resources on a new and just basis with 
those who were in the territories when they arrived.” This opposition builds on a 
crass misrepresentation of the agents of European imperial expansion. The first 
settlers in Australia were convicts sent overseas to make space in Britain’s 
overcrowded prisons. After those, however, came the voluntary expatriation of 
labourers, merchants and investors who saw opportunities for enrichment. They 
were soon followed by the explicitly state-sponsored forces of civilisation: civil 
servants and clergymen.51 How any of these colonisers could have been 
“abandoned by their homeland” or “abandoned by circumstances” is not clear, 
even if we were able to understand what kind of circumstances Waldron is 
alluding to. How emigration to a resource-rich country with low economic and 
 
51 R. Porter and W.R. Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. III: The Nineteenth 
Century (Oxford, OUP, 2001), esp. chs. 24 and 25. 
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social competition could be seen as a “radical contraction” of options is another 
point on which Waldron fails to elaborate. A more serious problem is the 
characterisation of British settlers as people “seeking to make the best of a bad 
situation and who are willing to share resources on a new and just basis”. Why 
should the arrival of new people automatically lead to a “new” basis for justice? 
Why couldn’t they be asked to adapt to the lifestyles and jurisprudential norms of 
the original inhabitants? Is this because the “old” system of justice was 
impracticable on a large scale, because the Europeans didn’t understand it or 
because it did not suit their own priorities? The historical record does not 
corroborate Waldron’s reading of the arrival pact. Military expansion, genocide, 
resource monopolisation and legal discrimination against indigenous inhabitants do 
not display a willingness to “share resources on a new and just basis.” But what 
is most worrying in Waldron’s account is the weakening of historical 
responsibility as the sense of historical necessity is strengthened. In contrast to the 
Israeli settlers – “pioneers, spearheads of a movement that is one of conquest (or 
reconquest), a movement that may well involve the expulsion or ethnic 
cleansing of Palestinians in their vicinity”52 – settlers in Australia and New 
Zealand are, according to Waldron, “stranded”, brought there without will or 
colonial zeal. The distance between old and current “pioneers” is exaggerated. Yet 
this supposed lack of will is the crucial difference which in Waldron’s eyes, might 
mitigate the atrocities of colonialism. 
Waldron’s chosen theoretical starting point for the arrival agreement between 
old and new inhabitants of the New World is Kant’s idea that we ought to enter 
into a civil union with our immediate neighbours, which Waldron calls the 
 
 
52 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 256. 
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“Proximity Principle”.53 Applied to the colonial world, Kant writes that we have the 
right to offer to engage in commerce with other peoples, but we are not 
authorised to forcefully “establish a civil union with them and bring these men 
(savages) into a rightful condition (as with the American Indians, the Hottentots, 
and the inhabitants of New Holland)” if the offer is turned down.54 Waldron’s 
critique of Kant and defence of colonialism is revealing of his historical 
determinism, because he thinks that Kant’s prohibition “turns crucially on the 
voluntary nature of the would-be colonists' presence”. For Waldron, “that 
applies clearly enough to the first generation of settlers, and maybe even the 
second. But today [the relevant site of justice], we are talking about people who are 
fourth- or fifth-generation descendants of the original voluntary colonists, and 
for these people - us, here and now - there is little choice in the matter. This is where we are 
settled - this is where we are - now we can say, in truth, unavoidably side by side. And 
that remains true in spite of the violations committed by our ancestors and in spite of 
the transparent illegitimacy of their justifications.”55 The lack of historical 
voluntariness weakens the coloniser’s responsibility even for known rights 
violations; and the passage of time weakens the case for historical rectification 
since the will of the original perpetrators does not persist through time. 
That leads us to a situation where the descendants of the colonisers are less guilty 
because they were brought to the (still heavily discriminating) postcolonial states 
against their will and where old injustices cannot be reversed because the 
descendants of stranded colonists have – like their forefathers - “nowhere else 
 
 
53 Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 135ff. 
54 I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge, CUP, 1991), 158. 
55 Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 137, emphasis added. 
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to go”. “There is no question of the descendants of European settlers returning 
en masse to England or anywhere else”, Waldron writes, without even discussing 
potential options for resettlement. The lack of exit options is necessary to 
cement the idea that New World settlers are there to stay. Their option sets have 
been so limited by the course of history that instead of thinking about ideals of 
justice, they focused on “what works”. If that means demographic, economic, 
legal and political change according to the European model, so be it. They were 
forced to make the best out of a “bad situation”. 
Even if these actions and their potential supersession by historical circumstances 
present “a frightening prospect for those to whom the initial injustice is done”, 
Waldron concludes that for his “hardworking colonists”, the Supersession 
Thesis “offers a measure of redemptive hope for those who participate in the 
settlements movement but who do so in spite of their awareness that they are 
doing something wrong.”56 How one can systematically colonise a territory 
without noticing is difficult to fathom. But the lack of will, lack of exit options 
and lack of an external sense of justice to scrutinise one’s actions all point 
towards historical necessity. It is the determinism of Europe’s historical 
teleologies57 that sustains Waldron’s defence of the idealised innocent coloniser. 
To sum up this section: European change is positive and historically necessary 
change, which means that the present is more valuable than the past. 
Retrospective justice is misplaced. We would do better to make sure that the 
future continues to be an improvement over the present. We must ensure that 
the promise of progress is realised. These temporal assumptions are visible in 
 
 
56 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 250. 
57 The most thought-provoking recent overview is H. Trüper, D. Chakrabarty and S. 
Subrahmanyam (eds.), Historical Teleologies in the Modern World (London, Bloomsbury, 2015). 
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C. Normative or empirical progress? 
 
The third worry is that Waldron’s empirical arguments about colonialism 
emphasise his belief in progress, while distorting the violent record of 
colonialism. First of all, it is strange that he chooses to convince his readers of the 
Supersession Thesis by illustrating how the empirical circumstances of life in New 
Zealand have changed over time. This mirrors the purely empirical statement 
“circumstances change, and all the waterholes of the territory dry up except the one 
that originally belonged to G” in the savannah example. But just as in the savannah 
example, European colonialism in Waldron’s reading seems to be a process that 
changes the norms of justice. There is a liberal normative assumption that the 
present is an improvement of the past. He specifies that the changes necessary for 
supersession could take four forms: demographic change, economic growth, 
legitimate expectations, political stability. I scrutinise each of them, since it is not 
clear how any of these changes or even their combination are sufficient to 




When describing how much his native New Zealand had changed since the 
Treaty of Waitangi, Waldron writes: “The most striking change is in population: 
there is now a settled population - Māori, pakeha, and mixed-ancestry […] - that is 
larger by a factor of about twenty than the population in (say) 1840. There is 
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no question of the descendants of European settlers returning en masse to 
England or anywhere else. […] This, I think, has to make a difference to how we 
think about rights - even violated rights - that are alleged to have survived from 
that earlier era into the present.”58 The logical transition between “larger by a 
factor of about twenty” and “make a difference to how we think about rights” 
is weak. Population increase in itself is not necessarily an argument for a new kind 
of justice – even if it is presented as irreversible. If the expanding population 
descends to a very large extent (83% according to the latest census59) from 
European settlers, however, the suspicion arises that it is not numbers alone, 
but the identity of the new population that could shift frameworks of justice.60 
The preferences of the numerically and culturally predominant Europeans could 
be translated into the legal system.61 Importantly, legal changes do not mean that 
the arrival of Europeans and their comportment towards the Māori does not 
remain an outstanding issue of justice that needs to be addressed. It would mean, 
however, that the articulation and rectification of the issue within the legal system 
becomes more difficult.62 If that is the case, it would be “facts on the ground”, as 








58 Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 151. 
59http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/households/chang 
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60 See S. L. Morgensen, “The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now”, 
Journal of Settler Colonial Studies, Vol. 1 (2011). 
61 Western preferences have indeed been instrumental in designing the (post)imperial 
framework of international law together with its rules on state accountability. See J. von Bernstorff 
and P. Dann (eds.), The Battle for International Law: South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era. (Oxford, 
OUP, 2019); M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations (Cambridge. CUP, 2001); N. Jørgensen, The 
Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford, OUP, 2000). 
62 As we shall see in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the constraints of Western law can be circumvented 
trough extra-legal settlements. 
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These “facts on the ground” are not only biological, but also economic. Apart 
from the numerical superiority of New World settlers and their descendants, 
Waldron suggests that this group has initiated economic and technological 
change that should be welcomed. The paragraph in Settlement, Return and the 
Supersession Thesis is worth quoting in full: “[It is not merely justice which has 
changed but] the resources with which justice has to concern itself have also 
changed. European technology and farming, mining, and fishing methods have 
transformed out of all recognition the amount and the productivity of land and 
other resources available for use. Agriculture now supplements horticulture; 
mountainous hill country has become farmable; new species have been 
introduced; modern road, rail, and other infrastructure have developed; cities have been 
built (and most New Zealanders — Māori and Pākehā — live in cities); and the 
technology of a fully developed commercial society has replaced the Neolithic 
technology that characterized the thousand years or so of Māori occupation. In 
these different circumstances, it boggles belief to say that what justice requires in 
this territory now is anything like what justice required at the very beginning of 
European contact.”63 At least three issues must be highlighted here: first, the 
extraordinary pride and candour with which Waldron writes that it was “European 
technology”, “the technology of a fully developed commercial society” which has 
“transformed out of all recognition the amount and productivity of land and 
other resources available for use”, without considering that the first occupants 
whose lifestyles were forcefully suppressed might not find any positive 






63 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 250. Emphasis added. 
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Second, it could only be deemed beneficial that native socio-economic structures are 
unrecognisable if these structures are outdated. This could be suggested by 
contrast between the words “modern” and “Neolithic”, which can arguably be 
seen as Western shorthand for something that is very old (precedes our 3000- 
year-old civilisation) and therefore undesirable. If Waldron were an expert on the 
Neolithic age or Māori economics, he would know that the Neolithic Revolution 
that led to sedentary agricultural patterns in the Levant and Europe around 
10.000 BC did not occur in the same manner elsewhere. In fact, different 
geographic conditions accounted for the fact that itinerant, cyclical agriculture 
remained dominant almost everywhere outside the Great European Plain, 
including New Zealand. The historical label is misplaced, but the rhetorical result for 
a Western audience is the same. Anything from our civilisation (“modern road, 
rail, and other infrastructure”) is superior to the people, politics and products 
that preceded it. There is a temporal order in which “Neolithic”, “medieval” 
and “feudal” bear negative connotations, while words like “industrial” do not, 
simply because they are further ahead in the linear continuum of Western 
history. What matters is therefore not just any order of events but “certain 
sequences of circumstances”, as Waldron writes in another piece.64 This is 
faithful to the stagist theories of Adam Smith and other enlightenment 
thinkers, who fuelled imperial expansion.65 The novel introduction of “the 
technology of a fully developed commercial society” is thus better than “the 
Neolithic technology of “a thousand years or so” (note the 
 
64 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 245. 
65 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), bk III: “ According to the natural course of things, 
therefore, the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to 
agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce.”.via 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth- 
of-nations-cannan-ed-in-2-vols. For a genealogy from Hutchinson to Condorcet, Spencer and 
Fukuyama, see M. Meek Lange, "Progress", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition). 
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imprecision, denying the Māori entry into the meticulous accounting of the 
Western calendar), precisely because it is further ahead in the European 
sequence of historical development. 
The phrase “fully developed” suggests a third feature of Waldron’s economic 
account: developmentalism. There is not just an increase in value when lifestyles are 
more “modern”; that value is underpinned by a concrete belief in 
improvement. Individuals, groups and states are born with the capacity to 
develop their faculties to the fullest; and Waldron picks up a classic strand of 
melioristic Enlightenment teleology when he writes that the European settlers 
have “transformed the amount and the productivity of land and other resources 
available for use.” The settlers used their will and skill to get the most out of 
their land. From Locke’s labour theory for pleasing the Lord by multiplying the 
Earth’s resources to Avery Kolers’ suggestion that the rightful owner of a 
territory is he who brings it to “plenitude”, this has long been a justification of 
colonialism.66 Whether Waldron is conscious of the problematic aspects of his 
economic argument is not fully clear. 
The third kind of change that could make historical injustice fade with time is 
legal change based on legitimate expectations. Waldron starts with “the 
possibility that people’s sentiments, affections, and expectations may change 
over time in relation to a given set of resources” and then specifies: “People who 
are in possession of certain resources become accustomed to their possessions, 
while people who have been dispossessed may find their sentimental attachment to 
what they have lost gradually dissipating.”67 When one is in possession of 
 
66 Locke, Second Treatise; A. Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2009). 
67 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 260. This assumption of dissipating attachments is 
not supported by the facts. See the increasing number of restitution claims by 
55  
certain resources and the attachment is thereby continuously growing, the 
expectation of continuous benefit should be protected by the law. As Jeremy 
Bentham, whom Waldron cites, says: “In matters of property […] hardship 
depends upon disappointment; disappointment upon expectation; expectation 
upon the dispensations, meaning the known dispensations of the law."68 The law 
should evolve as the distribution of property progresses. 
When the legitimate expectations clash, some mechanism is needed to define 
who has priority. Waldron gives different answers in different papers, but as far as 
I can see, there are three criteria for deciding whose expectations are more 
important: sequence, need and productivity. All three are surprisingly empirical, 
even for an empiricist philosopher. 
First, we might ask of the claimants: “Who was there first?” Waldron admits 
from his settler perspective that legitimate expectation arguments are 
“particularly convincing when, as in Locke’s account, they are associated with First 
Occupancy, for in a case of First Occupancy, the sentimental investment of the 
appropriator in the particular resource does not accrue at the expense of anyone 
else’s sentimental investment in that resource.”69 If the European immigrants to 
New Zealand or any other colonial territory had indeed been the first occupants, 
this might be convincing. The census data of former British colonies does not 
include the native population for a considerable amount of time – until 1860 in 





native inhabitants of the Americas and Australasia in the OHCHR database: 
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and archaeological evidence show this assumption to be false in the vast majority of 
cases.70 
If Europeans are not the first occupants, there is a further question: “Who needs it 
most, the first occupant or the new arrival?”. At this point Waldron proposes an 
academic metaphor: If a person has an entitlement over a long time, then “at each 
of those times, the legitimacy of what she does depends on the appropriateness 
of her entitlement as a moral right at that time. Now, so long as circumstances 
remain unchanged or so long as any changes are broadly consonant with the 
necessary conditions for the legitimacy of her entitlement, the entitlement is, so 
to speak, renewed automatically. But if circumstances change radically in the way 
we have been envisaging, then continued application of her entitlement cannot be 
taken for granted. (It's like the automatic renewal of a library book until another 
reader puts in a request for it.)”71 This metaphor is inappropriate for the 
historical context. First, a book is not a vital resource, while arable land is. If I go 
without a library book for a few weeks, my life goes on as expected.72 If, however, a 
foreign property developer decides to bulldoze my land and my house disappears 
without my consent, my life is radically changed and my legitimate expectations 
are frustrated. Second, the library metaphor does not take into account that the 
other reader is in fact not a library member (let alone a considerate library 
member who pays his dues, returns his books on time and does not spread their 
papers out over two or three seats). In the reality of colonialism, the person “in 
need” of my book is more likely to be somebody who killed the librarian and 
hacked their way into the IT system to 
 
70  See https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2019/aian-month.html, 
accessed 3/12/19. 
71 Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 154. 
72 Of course, there are people whose livelihood depends on continuous access to books. 
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get access to my book. Despite these discrepancies, Waldron writes that “the 
significance of the sentimental investment cannot simply evaporate when we are 
dealing with something other than First Occupancy. Even when the possessor is 
not the first occupier — or even when he has actually dispossessed someone else — the attachment 
to the resource that he develops must still have (or in time acquire) some moral 
importance of its own.”73 
So the third question could be: “Who is more invested?”. If the attachment 
grows with time, “it is plausible to suggest that the case for sustaining the 
settlements grows stronger in proportion to the strength of the affection that 
the settlers and their descendants develop for the land.” Waldron does not 
specify why this should be “plausible”, but he does think he has a plausible 
answer for the dispossessed: “If something was taken from me decades ago, any 
claim that it now forms the emotional centre of my economic life becomes less 
credible.”74 Waldron gives no defence of this claim. Why should economic life be 
criterial here? Why should the passage of time diminish economic or emotional 
attachment? Both might in fact grow over time – which would give the 
dispossessed a stronger claim than the settlers. The real problem lies with 
Waldron’s requirement of judgement. Why should anyone have to make their 
claims “credible” to an external judge? If the judge of credible claims is the same 
coloniser who exploited the claimant economically and emotionally, it is highly 
unlikely that the native occupant will ever be able to prove her commitment to a 
contested place.75 When it comes to legitimate expectations, the only 
expectations that are legitimate are those that fit the Western frame. 
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The fourth and last kind of change that could make a difference to historical 
entitlements is political change. Waldron calls this “a beneficial change in the 
power balance”. 76 Like Hume, Waldron starts from the assumption of conflict: 
“people grab things and use them; they argue and fight over them; they try and 
defend what they have and take as much as they can from others.” This actually fits 
the real colonial situation better than his previous examples. “Over time”, 
Waldron admits, “the holdings determined in this way are going to be largely 
arbitrary.” Nevertheless, this is no reason for redistribution because “if any sort of 
stable pattern of possession emerges, then something like a peace dividend may 
be available. It may be possible for everyone to gain […] by an agreement not to 
fight anymore over possessions.”77 Imperialist dispossession is legitimised by the 
fact that after years of turmoil, some kind of stability might be possible. Once 
again, political progress is assumed, not demonstrated. 
When discussing the Israeli case, Waldron goes deeper into the coloniser’s 
mindset. He does admit that “in principle, an occupying power has an obligation to 
respect existing property arrangements and not effect any major change until the 
occupation is regularised.” Why the occupation should be “regularised” is not 
explained. If the baseline circumstances C0 are “very fragile and vulnerable either to 
the imposition of a new property regime or to the re-emergence of conflict over 
resources (a state of nature)”, Waldron writes, “a new equilibrium would have to be 
worked out” anyway. In this “state of nature” (another phrase pushing precolonial 
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group of settlers might play for control of certain resources in this region. 
Formally speaking, their move is unjust by reference to C0. And it may also be 
unjust with respect to whatever indeterminate, unstable, and unreliable version of 
C0 — we will call it C1 — prevails during the occupation. Still, the settlers may make 
their move with a view to affecting and constraining the interplay of forces that will 
eventually lead — some years hence — to a new and stable convention, C2, concerning 
property in the region.” If that stability is to last, the “grievances of persons or 
peoples” who suffered in this transition should then be treated as “mere 
historic sentiments, irrelevant to issues of justice.”78 
Why is Waldron so sure that “some years hence”, the interplay of forces “will 
eventually lead” to a “new and stable” order? Waldron’s teleological writing 
implies a belief in progress, unfolding neatly as time goes by. The political change he 
envisions even has a clear goal: “to move us away from fighting about who uses 
what and towards the benefits promised by a system of positive law and an orderly 
marketplace.”79 These are evidently liberal capitalist criteria for progress for which 
there will be little competition from the prior occupants. These are also 
sidestepped by an important omission in the consequentialist argument: there is 
a gap between the duty to form a political society and the duty to form it in an 
orderly manner. An “orderly” political transition may include a public 
discussion, even prosecution of the past – as it did in Argentina, South Africa, 
Timor-Leste, and the Balkans.80 It should, above all, include conscious agents. 
Waldron writes as if no individual or collective will, no man booking a cabin on 
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a ship and no government burning indigenous forests, had any concrete 
responsibility for their actions. By saying to the colonised that “our coexistence is 
to be treated as a brute fact”81, the coloniser asks us to set aside any 
considerations of retrospective responsibility and urges us to look towards a 
brighter future instead. Responsibility dissipates in the powerful story of 
progress. The mechanical determinism of the liberal vision of history hides great 
crimes with great elegance. 
These four changes – demographic, economic, legal, political - are privileged in all 
three articles because “the facts that have changed are exactly the sort of facts one 
would expect to make a difference to the justice of a set of entitlements”. Of course, it 
is somewhat understandable that Waldron, an empiricist inspired by Hume and 
Locke, takes empirics into account when assessing the changing circumstances 
of justice. Waldron finds the cumulative power of these changes so important, 
however, that “it boggles belief to say that what justice requires in this territory 
now is anything like what justice required at the very beginning of European 
contact”. The big question raised by this last quote on belief is: “Whose 
belief?”. Whose viewpoint matters to assess the circumstances of justice? It is 
remarkable that the changes that matter are precisely those brought about by the 
European colonisation of the world – and that they work in favour of Waldron’s 
argument only if viewed from the coloniser’s perspective. Demographic, 
economic, legal and political change matters if and when it fits the sequence of 
Enlightenment meliorism – from savage chaos to civilised commerce. The 
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D. The moral hazard objection 
 
Let us now step back and consider the implications of Waldron’s position as a 
whole. In the lively debate on the Supersession Thesis, the most powerful 
objection against supersession is that it incentivises imperialism. Once we 
understand Waldron’s forward-looking, constructivist assumptions, it seems 
stronger than before. If the possibility of supersession is embedded in a 
progressive temporal framework that privileges the newcomer, the probability of 
crimes being superseded by circumstances increases. Let us first look at the 
objection, then at Waldron’s defence and finally at the reasons why this defence 
fails. 
The “moral hazard” objection has two versions: (1) the standard version is that a 
group could appropriate land or resources by unjust means and then simply wait 
until the circumstances have changed to a sufficient degree for the original injustice 
to fade. Waldron’s Supersession Thesis would then be reassuring and even 
“redemptive” (his own term) for prospective colonisers. (2) The second version 
goes even further, since the previous section has sought to show that all the 
changes that are thought to make a difference to the balance of justice are 
precisely the changes usually entailed by colonialism. In this stronger version of the 
objection, colonisers would not only be reassured of their eventual impunity but 
would be encouraged to actively colonise at a greater speed and intensity. The 
new circumstances which turn past injustice into present justice are 
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produced by the unjust act itself. The reward for effective colonisation would be a 




Waldron first denies the weak standard version. Using the example of Israeli 
settlers who see themselves as “pioneers, spearheads of a movement that is one of 
conquest (or reconquest)”82, he writes that, if we know that violations of 
International Law or International Humanitarian Law are being contemplated, 
“our primary and most urgent obligation” is to prevent that unjust act. In fact, 
Waldron concedes “the despair associated with the anticipated operation of the 
Supersession Thesis […] may heighten the case for blocking the injustice now, 
before it is superseded.”83 This does not mean, however, that the author wants to 
abandon his Supersession Thesis once the injustice has indeed been committed. 
The peculiar reason given for this moral and temporal disjuncture is what Waldron 
calls “an offensive use of injustice as a means”. 84 He writes: “Suppose the best 
way to prevent a particularly hideous injustice would be to perpetrate another 
injustice […]We have no choice but to do justice in and for that situation and let 
the incentives fall out as they may.”85 Before the Supersession Thesis can be 
applied, we should stop it, but after it has come into play, we should not. This 
defence of inaction might be even stronger for the descendants of those 
colonisers. The colonisers’ descendants no longer conceive of themselves as active 
colonisers, he says, and are not required to intervene. Waldron makes them 
look like J.R. Seeley’s Britons who “conquered and 
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peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind”86, but once we see that 
descendants can also perpetuate colonial structures – unwittingly or wittingly - to 





This stronger objection against incentivising colonialism takes into account what I 
will call “compounded supersession”. If an injustice occurs under 
circumstances C1, then the circumstances which would allow the supersession of 
that injustice, could not only be external – they could be circumstances directly 
produced by that injustice. At first, Waldron seems to focus on changes of the 
wider context, changes in circumstances not causally linked to the original 
injustice. A calculation which includes change that is produced directly by 
injustice, however, is a calculation which potentially encourages not just the 
initial injustice but further injustices. Contrary to some people’s expectations, this 
accumulation of injustice could actually diminish the responsibility to rectify the 
original injustice. Waldron accepts this hazard: “the change of circumstances 
referred to in the Supersession Thesis may include changes that are the 
immediate causal product of the very injustice originally complained of.”87 If we 
take this further, new, but related injustices could be committed to consolidate the 
“changes in circumstances” alter the balance of justice. This runs counter to 
Waldron’s professed aversion to the “consequentialism of injustice”, but seems to 
be acceptable. If additional injustices are perpetrated to accelerate the 
supersession of the original injustice, how could that be a satisfactory outcome? 
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The combination of two injustices does not equal justice. Waldron claims that 
the Supersession Thesis is not “the prostitution of morality and justice to the 
claims of the tank, the bullet, and the bulldozer”, but a “realistic assessment of 
what we can do to improve our situation here and now”. 88 The possibility of 
compounding supersession in the name of progress, however, should make us 
reconsider the liberal temporal framework. 
Like many other theories against redress based on historical change, Waldron’s 
leaps of supersession are underpinned by an extraordinarily optimistic notion of 
time, which comes close to equating the latter with continuous progress. It 
would only be worth upholding the lifestyles of Australia’s “honest settlers” 
today, if today were actually an improvement on 1770, just before the First Fleet 
landed in Botany Bay. The passage of time diminishes historical responsibility not 
just because of epistemic problems, the non-identity problem or the 
intervening agency of third parties, but also – and perhaps most importantly, 
because forward-looking Western culture relies on the promise that time cures all 
ills. A great amount of power and faith is placed in something as contingent as 
time and conceptions of temporality. Waldron’s argument has numerous 
political and legal equivalents, such as various forms of prescription or adverse 
possession. In the Common Law tradition, where the body of law adapts as men 
change their habits, this belief in a core principle of goodness that progressively 
unfolds is even more visible than in codified continental systems. The dominant 
temporal framework of modernity dictates that whoever is at the forefront of 







In the next and final section, we will pivot towards Waldron’s opponents, who 
favour historical rectification. The aim is to discover whether they think about 
time differently and, if so, in what way. I will engage with them much more 
briefly since they actually share a number of characteristics and assumptions with the 








Do proponents of historical rectification take the past more seriously? There is 
certainly much deeper historical knowledge and a more explicit 
acknowledgement of the vicissitudes of history in their writings. Ta-Nehisi 
Coates’s influential essay The Case for Reparations, for instance, is based on diligent archival 
research and personal interviews with descendants of African-American slaves.89 
The Reparations Coordinating Committee, of which Charles J. Ogletree is the 
chairman, has funded dozens of historical research projects to get to the root of 
racial discrimination in the US.90 The 2012 legal battle over the torture claims of 
Mau Mau veterans was supported by extensive historical research.91 Yet it is 
remarkable that reparations activists worldwide have tended to couch their 
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present and future rather than the past. Academic arguments in favour of 
reparations tend to pull past injustice into the present. Here are some examples: 
(1) When Janna Thompson demands reparations for Australian aborigines, 
she uses the terminology of promise-making and promise-keeping, a 
fundamentally forward-looking act of restricting one’s behaviour in the 
future. When she criticises settlers for having breeched contracts and 
agreements that were initially made with the indigenous population, she 
criticises them for not having managed their future properly.92 The same 
kind of reasoning is at work in most texts on the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), 
which the British governor made with the Māori of New Zealand and the 
repeated legal disputes about Sioux land.93 The problem of colonialism is 
distilled into a breach of contract. The postcolonial demand for reparation is 
often a complaint against a broken promise – but the criticism is that it was 
broken, not that the promise was made in the first place. Why was there a 
forward-looking contract in the first place? And why should we 
perpetuate this focus on the future? 
(2) Another line of argument refined by Sher, Boxill, Butt and Cohen defends 
reparations because rights are heritable across generations.94 This refers not 
just to treaty rights, but to a child’s right to subsistence or even to a 
sufficiently large inheritance. Here again, the past injustice matters only 
insofar as it is the source of injustice in the present. 
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(3) The third option is a re-conceptualisation of historical duties in terms of 
the universal duty to assist those in need. Whatever we owe to the victims of 
historical injustice is not linked to any time-sensitive injustice but 
grounded in timeless universal justice. Richard Vernon, for example, 
defends this view in writing that “obligations termed ‘restitutive’ should not 
in many cases be seen as examples of special ties arising from historical 
connections [but] as local instances of universal requirements of justice, 
[this] does not require a theory of deep historical connection.”95 Historical 
injustice is only a local instance of universal injustice. Here, the past falls out 
of the picture completely. 
(4) Similar mechanics are visible in the writings of structuralists. Structuralists like 
Catherine Lu suggest that historical injustice should be understood in the 
framework of wider structural injustice that allows for unjust interactions 
within and across generations.96 This has important implications for our 
temporal order. Alasia Nuti, for example, announces that she wants to 
develop “an alternative framework to think about the theoretical and 
normative relation between past and present”, but ultimately reaches for 
the metaphor of the mechanic reproduction of history that turns 
historical injustice into structural injustice. Historical injustice, then, 
matters only insofar as “the reproduction of unjust history […] shapes the 
background conditions in which some present wrongs occur and relations 
between agents are established”.97 Is change possible? And if so, how? “Even 
in cases of significant structural change”, Lu writes, 
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“those who continue to occupy social positions of disadvantage or 
indignity based on the continued reproduction of structural injustices may still 
have particular rectificatory claims on participants of the contemporary unjust 
structure.”98 That fact that she has to use the words “may” and “still” could 
suggest the persistence of the automatic assumption that structural change 
should be accompanied by altered duties of justice. Nonetheless, she 
ultimately describes the element persisting beyond the past into the 
present as a large impersonal structure, rather than the concrete event of 
past wrongdoing which persists for victims and allows claimants in modern 
courts to make their rectification claim. Instead of the persistence of 
precise injustices, it is the possible persistence of their context that should 
ground historical redress. Despite Lu’s innovative distinction between 
(timeless) justice and (temporally bound) reconciliation across generations, she 
ultimately advocates for the latter, slipping into the temporal mould that 
makes her reject “retrospective reparations” to ask readers to go “beyond 
reparations: toward structural transformation”.99 The words “beyond” 
and “towards” suggest a spatio-temporal order in which we move away 
from the past and towards our goals. Although she takes great care to qualify 
her position and separate herself from purely utilitarian, consciously 
progressive, forward-looking arguments for redress, not even her diligently 
argued case is fully free of forward-looking temporal assumptions. 
Structuralists seem to have overlooked that they, too, operate in the structure 
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(5) Finally, there are those proponents of historical redress who want us to 
focus on the future. The forward-looking linearity of “progressive” 
conceptions of historical rectification is particularly visible in the words of 
those academics and legislators who justify historical rectification as an 
instance of transitional justice. 
 
 
Transitional justice, originally defined by Ruti Teitel as “the conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change”, has been extended to cover “the 
full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”.100 Such mechanisms often 
combine backward-looking corrective justice (e.g. public trials) and forward-
looking restorative justice (e.g. amnesties). I believe that the choice of the concept 
and toolkit of transitional justice reveals the deeply teleological, forward-
looking nature of the Western conception of time. 
 
When Andrew Valls asks us to consider racial justice in the US as an instance of 
transitional justice, for instance, he writes: “In the United States today, there 
remain many unresolved issues related to race, in particular issues that are 
legacies of past injustices toward African Americans. […]. I argue […] that 
transitional justice usually requires the backward-looking measures of 
prosecution, reparation, and acknowledgement, and […] that by this standard 
the transformation that took place during the civil rights era in the United States 
was unjust, or, at least, remains incomplete.” To solve that problem of 
“incompleteness”, Valls surveys and endorses a number of measures which 
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should be undertaken by local and national authorities, “as ways of completing our 
transition to a racially just society”.101 This is matched by a 2021 resolution of the 
US Congress which “(1) affirms, on the 400th anniversary of the arrival of the 
first slave ship to the United States, that the Nation owes a long-overdue debt of 
remembrance to not only those who lived through the egregious injustices 
enumerated in this resolution, but also to their descendants; and (2) urges the 
establishment of a United States Commission on Truth, Racial Healing, and 
Transformation to properly acknowledge, memorialize, and be a catalyst for 
progress toward - (A) jettisoning the belief in a hierarchy of human value; (B) 
embracing our common humanity; and (C) permanently eliminating persistent 
racial inequities.”102 
 
Instead of being temporally discrete, or even outside of the “ordinary” flow of 
historical development, the choice of “transitional justice” as a (policy) 
framework to address historical wrongs is paradigmatic of the futuristic 
orientation of Liberal Time. 
What is striking in the transitional justice framework is that the destination is 
already set. A goal is necessary since transitions are only transitions if we 
transition away from something and towards something else. In temporal terms, we 
transition from the past into the future, via a present which is the site of 
agency.103 So what is the goal of such transitions? Is it the fulfilment of a 
previously made promise? Is it a collectively established goal or is it in some way 
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imposed externally? If the latter, who imposed it and why? Most of the academic 
and political debate around transitional justice assumes that the goal is Western- 
style, stable democracy with a strong civil-society to hold government 
accountable. Non-European countries like South Africa, Chile or Timor-Leste 
are said to be transitioning to European democracy through “transitional tools” 
like truth commissions, trials, amnesties – often under the assistance 
(supervision) of Western institutions like the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED). The societies in question are not doomed to remain 
barbaric; the pull of progress is supposed to be universal and inclusive. Even 
“established democracies” like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States can and should use transitional justice mechanisms to better themselves. For 
Stephen Winter, who analysed the specificities of state redress for state- 
authorised historical injustice in those paradigmatic liberal settler colonies, this is a 
question of legitimacy. These liberal states are “profoundly burdened by their 
histories” since they “failed to meet their own standards of legitimacy”. We are 
going to encounter three “established democracies” who did fail to meet self- 
imposed standards and their efforts at historical rectification later in Part II.104 
Yet what matters for now is Winter’s assessment that “the legitimating account of 
state redress relinquishes neither progress nor civilization. Indeed, insofar as the 
theory is both potentially progressive (redress improves state legitimacy) and a 
theory of citizenship, it reproduces versions of both dynamics.”105 Whether 
Western or non-Western, efforts to deal with past injustice within the framework of 
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The moral standard to measure such progress - modern liberal democracy - is 
available to everyone and, this is crucial, everyone is expected to desire fulfilment of 
that standard. It is in this sense that the “transitional justice” paradigm of 
historical reparations replicates the demands of enlightened imperialism. 
Ruti Teitel is one of the very few scholars who identify “transitional justice as 
liberal narrative”. Her characterisation, however, seems to be predominantly 
positive: “The liberal transition is distinguished by processes that illuminate the 
possibility of future choice. Transitional accounts hold the kernels of a liberal 
future foretold. The revelation of truth brings on the switch from the tragic past to 
the promise of a hopeful future. A catastrophe is somehow turned around, an 
awful fate averted. Transitional justice operates as this magical kind of switch: legal 
processes involve persons vested with transformative powers: judges, lawyers, 
commissioners, experts, witnesses with special access to privileged knowledge. 
Reckoning with the past enables the perception of a liberalising shift.”106 That 
“liberalising shift”, however, relies on a specific conception of time which 
values future states as inherently better than what preceded them; presumably 
because regime change is expected to be regime change towards the Western ideal 
of liberal democracy. “In this sense”, Teitel writes, “narratives of transition are 
stories of progress, beginning with backward-looking reflection on the past, but 
always viewing it in light of the future.” That future-orientation which promises 
improvement by first understanding and then expressly rejecting the past. In 
Teitel’s assessment, “If the constructive fiction is that earlier awareness of the 
knowledge that has now been acquired might have averted the tragedy, a new 
society can be built on this claim. It is the change in political 
 
 
106 R. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays (New York, OUP, 2014), ch. 6. 
73  
knowledge that allows the move from an evil past to a sense of national 
redemption.[…] . There is a ritual disowning of previously secreted knowledge, a 
purging of the past, as well as an appropriation of a newly revealed truth, 
enabling a corrective return to the society’s true nature. A new course is 
charted.”107 The passage of time leads to the growth of knowledge. At some 
point, there is enough knowledge to “deal” with the past and move on. Crucially, 
this is not about novelty per se; it is about a “corrective return to society’s true 
nature”. In her optimistic endorsement for future-oriented regime change, 
however, Teitel does not question the historical baseline conception of 
liberalism: the future will be better since it will be more liberal. 
This optimism is borne out by the empirical literature on political transitions. 
The NED’s Journal of Democracy, perhaps the most influential in the field, publishes 
not only timelines for democratic transitions but also “scientifically backed” 
pronouncements on the irreversibility of such transitions. In a famous 1997 
article, for example, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi affirmed: “[…] 
history gradually accumulates wealthy democracies, since every time a dictatorship 
happens to die in an affluent country, democracy is there to stay”.108 When 
Western-style democracies deviate from this standard, it is called “democratic 
backsliding” - another spatio-temporal term which proudly illustrates the 
supposed superiority of liberal democracy. Paradoxically, such backsliding is often 
portrayed as a temporary deviation from the norm, which can be reversed, 
whereas the expansion of the norm itself cannot be reversed. Nancy Bermeo, to 
take a more recent example, writes in 2016 that 
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“contemporary forms of backsliding are especially vexing because they are 
legitimated by the very institutions democracy promoters prioritize but, overall, 
backsliding today reflects democracy’s advance and not its retreat.” Why should 
that be the case? Because “the current mix of backsliding [techniques] is more 
easily reversible than the past mix and successor dictatorships are shorter-lived and 
less authoritarian.”109 
In sum, five aspects of “historical justice as transitional justice” should be 
highlighted: (1) the term transition suggests movement; (2) that movement is 
directed towards a pre-defined endpoint, usually liberal democracy; (3) to reach the 
endpoint transitional justice offers a toolkit for corrective intervention: there is no 
creation as such, since we are merely correcting deviations from the norm; 
(4) those corrections are man-made, because Man makes his own history and (5) 






We have now encountered opponents and proponents of historical rectification. 
One important commonality is their orientation in time. Why do so many of 
these authors feel the need to focus on the future? Why are we looking forward in 
time even when we are talking about the past? And how can it be that both 
enemies and defenders of historical redress converge on this point? 
My thesis is that we are operating in a biased temporal framework created and 
sustained by the European politico-legal establishment. As we have seen with 
Waldron and his opponents, that framework has six characteristics that may 
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seem almost natural to us: (1)The schematisation of time is an open-ended line on 
which (2) unique, irreversible and irretrievable events in (3) past, present and future 
succeed each other in this order, (4) and value increases with proximity to the future 
because (5) the passage of time brings progress. The passage of time is the earthly 
measurement for the progressive unfolding of humankind. Since humankind is 
capable of self-improvement110, the future either is or should be better than the past. 
(6) The past is therefore an undesirable word. The past is uncivilised, the 
present is civilised - but never completely because the open future always 
leaves space for improvement. 
Of course, there have been many damning critiques of this promise of progress, 
especially in response to the catastrophes of the twentieth century.111 But as Amy 
Allen has admirably shown, even the critical figures of the Frankfurt School did 
not manage to shed their progressive assumptions.112 The fundamentally 
forward-looking nature of our “regime of historicity”, as Hartog would call it,113 is 
ingrained so deeply in Western culture that it is very difficult to get rid of. The 
temporal distortions that I have tried to highlight in the academic debate on 
historical injustice are only the tip of the iceberg. What if the whole Western 
debate on reparations is underpinned by a notion of time which favours the 
coloniser? 
The problem this poses for the rectification of historical injustice is enormous: 




110 Either in the straightforward sense or in the Christian version, where original sin makes 
Man wicked, and the moral desire to escape it underwrites earthly efforts at individual and  
civilisational progress. 
111 See ch. 7. 
112 A. Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (New York, CUP, 2017). 
113 F. Hartog, Régimes d'historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps (Paris, Seuil, 2003). 
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if the future is prioritised in almost everything we do? How can we give peoples of 
the past any legitimacy in our debates on justice, if even our debates on justice are 
forward-looking? And how exactly should a real dialogue with the past work if we 
have exported our very particular conceptions of time and history to the world, 
thereby suppressing valuable alternative ways of looking at the problem of 
intertemporal justice? Before we can attempt to answer any of these big 
questions, we should understand how the Western conception of time emerged in 
the historical context of European domestic development and international 
expansion. This will be the focus of chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
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“You see, my friend,’ Mr. Bounderby put in, ‘we are the kind of people who know the value 
 




How did we come to adopt the currently dominant notion of time? What we 
need to study here is the complex intersection between (1) the spread of physical 
time-pieces, (2) the internalisation of ever-changing temporal patterns by those 
who use these chronographs, (3) the appropriation, modification and creation of 
those patterns by political rulers, and (4) the integration of specific temporal 
patterns into the wider idea of history. Methodologically, this requires 
considerable two-way translation between empirical social science and social 
theory. On the whole, I agree with Heidegger that it is our inability to know our 
own time, the time when death comes for us, which fuels an anxious interest in any 
outward signs of temporal control.115 The form that this desire to tame time takes, 
however, can be varied and historically contingent – which is why it deserves 
deeper investigation. Thankfully the recently renewed interest in time among 
historians, sociologists and economists has led to some excellent examples of 
that interplay. Reinhart Koselleck did the conceptual groundwork by examining 
different layers of time (Zeitschichten) and how they interact in man- made history;116 
François Hartog has identified a succession of different 
 
 
114 C. Dickens, Hard Times (London, Penguin, 2018 [1854]) 
115 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Berlin, 1927) 
116 R. Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2017 [1989]) and R. 
Koselleck, Zeitschichten (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2003). 
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“regimes of historicity” in the European imagination;117 Hartmut Rosa has asked 
questions about speed (“Is there really an acceleration of history?”) and analysed 
how different institutions of the modern state work with different temporal 
preferences;118 Christopher Clark has convincingly demonstrated how the 
exercise of power in German history is shaped by different notions of time.119 
Nonetheless much work remains to be done – especially when it comes to the 
Anglo-Saxon historical imagination, where the shape of time is all too often 




Why would a treasure hunt to the sources of our time matter for political 
theorists? I see at least three reasons: First, political theorists should know the 
full depth of the terms they are using, especially when a seemingly abstract 
concept is the product of concrete human practices. In the contemporary West 
we tend to think of time as a linear framework in which past, present and future 
succeed each other in that order. That framework is used for remembering the 
past, meeting in the present and planning for the future. Our calendar is an 
ordering system initially synchronised with cosmological change, and then 
fragmented further and further into 12 months, 52 seven-day weeks and 365 
days. For us, these days have 24 equal hours, counted in two sets of 12, from 
noon to midnight. All of these features of time are illustrated by natural, 
mechanical and digital clocks in the public and private sphere. None of this is 
inevitable or universal. Glennie and Thrift remind us of the complexity of these 
 
117 F. Hartog, Régimes d'historicité: Présentisme et expériences du temps (Paris, Seuil, 2003). 
118  H. Rosa, Beschleunigung: Zur Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2005) and Rosa, 
Resonanz: Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2016). 
119 C. Clark, Time and Power: Visions of History in German politics from the Thirty-Years-War to the Third Reich 
(Princeton, PUP, 2019). 
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practices: “We tend to experience its elements as components of an entire 
package, encompassing conventions about the units into which time is divided, the 
ways in which time is measured, counted, and signalled. Neither current 
practices nor changes in clock time over time can be considered to be ‘natural’. […] 
Looking back to periods when alternative ways of defining clock time still co-
existed alongside those that survived to be taken for granted nowadays, the 
components of clock time are much more clearly recognizable as these 
conventions.”120 One such “alternative period” would be that marked by the 
republican calendar of the French revolution: the year was split into 12 newly 
named months, with 10-day weeks, 10-hour days and specially fabricated clocks 
which reflected the new decimal system (see figure 1).121 Like Russia’s change from 
the Julian to the Gregorian calendar after the 1917 revolution, this way of 
reordering time was a symbol of power. 
 
 




120 P. Glennie & N. Thrift, Shaping the day Shaping the day: a history of timekeeping in England and Wales 1300-1800 
(Oxford, OUP, 2009), 29. 
121 E. Zerubavel, “The French Republican Calendar: A Case Study in the Sociology of Time”, 
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Second, engaging with the history of time and time-keeping is particularly 
important when these practices are expressive of power relations. If we don’t 
want to abandon the “political” aspect of our discipline, we must enquire into 
the real constellations of power that are produced, sustained and changed by the 
conceptual and technological transformations in history. In the case of the 
evolution of Western time, it is not a coincidence that the Communards of 1871 
started their rebellion by shooting at the public clocks of Paris. This was the 
culmination of almost 400 years of different social classes fighting for and about 
time.122 As we will see below, whoever controlled the system of time-reckoning, 
controlled the social order. 
Third, Political Theory should be more embedded in the context of real human 
practices, if it is to offer any political guidance. The aim is to identify a political 
problem that is sustained by particular interpretations of the words “time”, 
“history” and “progress” – that problem being an inability to understand the 
core of historical injustice (see chapter I) - and to offer the normative tools to 
dismantle these constructs. 
The exact relationship between physical expressions of time, internalised time- 
consciousness and historical consciousness is still debated. Glennie and Thrift, 
authors of the largest evidence-based study of timekeeping in Western Europe, 
consider the issue so fraught that they have opted for a purely physical, rather 
than metaphysical approach: “First, we do not want to invest the passage of time 
with mystical qualities: for us, time is a resolutely material and mundane set of 
 
 
122 This aspect of time is particularly well-documented in the Marxist literature. See J. Le Goff, Time, 
Work and Culture in the Middle Ages. Transl. A. Goldhammer. (Chicago, UCP, 1980); E.P. Thompson, 
The Making of the English Working Class (New York, Vintage Books, 1966) and Thompson, ‘Time, 
Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’, Past & Present, No. 38 (1967), 56-97. 
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procedures and practices of aggregation. Second, we do not believe that the 
passage of time takes on mysteriously different qualities in different cultures […] 
Third, we want to count time as a historically variable process […] Fourth, we see 
no reason to blame clock time for all the ills of the world. Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that the gradual putting into place of those procedures and practices 
of aggregation that for convenience we call ‘clock time’ has been as much a 
liberatory as an oppressive force. It has allowed as much it has disciplined. […] 
We are convinced of the need for theoretically informed empirical work that can 
make clear what it is that is at stake.”123 Although their materialistic reconstruction 
of time-keeping in Western Europe is impressive, I take issue with some of their 
methodological choices, especially the first and fourth rule: 
I do not believe that theory can be abandoned when we study time because it is 
remarkable that the spread and increasing technical sophistication of timepieces in 
the modern era went hand in hand with a remarkable output of philosophical, 
psychological and anthropological works on time. As temporal indicators 
multiplied and entered the fabric of daily life, people seem to have felt the urge to 
give this practice meaning. The results produced by people as different as 
Tocqueville, Marx, Proust, Freud, Heidegger, Niebuhr, Cassirer, Löwith and 
Ricœur124 are an integral part of the Western intellectual landscape. These 
thinkers influenced not only each other, but also social vocabularies and 
 
123 Glennie & Thrift, Shaping the Day, 14. 
124 A. de Tocqueville, L’ancien régime et la révolution. Edition revue et corrigee. Ed. J-P Mayer (Paris, 
Gallimard, 1967 [1856]), K. Marx, Deutsche Ideologie (1845); M. Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu (Paris, 
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philosophy of the Enlightenment. transl. F.C. 
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practices of political life. The prestige that came with the ownership of a personal 
wristwatch, for example, is only intelligible if we know about the association 
between watch ownership and modern bourgeois values such as self-control, 
productivity and predictability.125 As different social classes were actively 
appropriating, fighting and changing patterns of time and history, they were 
aware of the wider ideological implications. The physical and normative 
evolution of our notions of time are intimately linked. 
My second criticism of Glennie and Thrift’s approach is that they make such 
furious efforts to push back against the “apocalyptic” critics of modern 
temporality126 that they seem to forget that time was a tool of the powerful. Of 
course, they say they want to focus on everyday timekeeping among ordinary 
people. Their study’s core is also geographically restrained to England and 
Wales. Maybe it is possible to tell a neutral or even positive story about 
timekeeping in the British Isles, especially if the authors stop their archival 
research before the Industrial Revolution is in full swing. But in writing that 
“time has been as much a liberatory as an oppressive force”, they seem to gloss 
over the question of who benefitted and who did not. Modern European time, 
as I see it, has always been liberating for some and oppressive for many. In the 
enormous timespan they cover – 1300 to 1800 – Britain underwent drastic social 
transformations at home and abroad. None of this would have been possible 
without the help of (a) increasingly sophisticated, synchronised timepieces and 
(b) the progressive visions of historical mastery that came with them. The two 
together produced frighteningly formidable frameworks to penetrate and 
control the daily lives and minds of subjected classes at home and abroad. It is 
 
125 Landes, Revolution in Time, ch. 5. 
126 Glennie & Thrift, Shaping the Day, esp. ch. 2, 45-55. 
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therefore valuable to connect material with intellectual history to see the full 
extent to which Liberal Time has transformed human experience. Before we 
look at imperial expansion in the next chapter, we should try to understand the 
rather provincial origins of the powerful invention of world standard time. 
Europe’s notion of time emerged from the specific religious, economic and 
political development of the continent. Three terms lead the inquiry: 








The spread of Christianity effected the first fundamental change from ancient, 
cyclical to modern, linear time. In ancient Greece and Rome, human history was 
cyclical. On the one hand, there was the eternal wisdom of the Gods and nature, 
on the other the messy realm of human affairs in which people, cities and 
Empires rose and fell. Human history was a multiplicity of stories, and the slate 
periodically wiped clean by cathartic nemesis. “For classical culture the world of 
change and becoming was intelligible and real insofar as it participated in the 
changeless world […] time is the cycle of coming to be and falling away, of birth and 
death, of growth and decay.”127 From Aristotle (“It is in circular movement and 
cyclical coming-to-be that the absolutely necessary is to be found”128) and 
Thucydides to Lucretius and the Stoics, the predominant thought was that “the 
chiefest members and parts of the world are destroyed and begotten anew”.129 
 
 
127 Niebuhr, Faith and History, 38. 
128 Aristotle, On generation and corruption (c. 350 BC), 338a, via 
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If human life was cyclical, novelty or progress as we understand it were absent. 
Marcus Aurelius summarises this neatly in 80 AD: “The rational soul wanders 
round the whole world and through the encompassing void and gazes on infinite 
time and considers the periodic destructions and rebirths of the universe and 
reflects that our posterity will see nothing new and that our ancestors saw 
nothing that we have not seen.”130 Human life is short, but the cosmos is infinite. 
“All things that owe their existence to men, such as works, deeds, and words, are 
perishable, infected, as it were, by the mortality of their authors. However, if 
mortals succeeded in endowing their works, deeds, and words with some 
permanence and in arresting their perishability, then these things would, to a 
degree at least, enter and be at home in the world of everlastingness, and the 
mortals themselves would find their place in the cosmos […].”131 
Historiography plays an important mediating role between the immortal cosmos 
and the mortal world. As Arendt highlights, it was the poet who would elevate 
great mortal deeds into the sphere of epic immortality: “Immortality is what 
nature possesses without effort and without anybody's assistance, and 
immortality is what the mortals therefore must try to achieve if they want to live up 
to the world into which they were born, to live up to the things which 
surround them and to whose company they are admitted for a short while. The 
connection between history and nature is therefore by no means an opposition. 
History receives into its remembrance those mortals who through deed and 
word have proved themselves worthy of nature, and their everlasting fame 
means that they, despite their mortality, may remain in the company of the things 
 
 
130 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Edited and translated by C. R. Haines. Loeb Classical Library 
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131 H. Arendt, “On the concept of history: Ancient and Modern”, in: Between Past and Future: Six 
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that last forever.”132 What we need to remember here for the comparison with 
subsequent visions of human time is that mortal history had no meaning in itself. 
Meaning was conferred to some outstanding lives through elevation into the 
world of nature. 
It was the arrival of Christianity that radically changed the European conception of 
time, history and human action. There was a democratisation of meaning as all 
Christian lives were endowed with significance by the divine Creator; and a new 
narrative structure helped humans escape the cyclicity of antiquity. The advent 
of Christianity introduced a single story with a beginning, middle and end 
– Christ’s birth, judgement and resurrection - which would serve as a model for all 
others. The Incarnation was the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies. 
History had come down to Earth and revealed its meaning. In St Augustine’s 
classic reworking of Jewish eschatology in De civitate dei, we see six ages of world 
history, which parallel the six days of the Creation and the six ages of the 
individual human life span. The Augustinian focus on the Creation and 
predestination splits time in two: on the one hand, there is the saeculum (the 
sphere of mortal human history), on the other the saeculum saeculorum (the never- ending 
century of centuries, or heavenly afterlife). 133 A clear temporal succession orders the 
world into (1) a pagan, godless past, (2) a present in which good and evil fight each 
other, sometimes in the form of warfare between members of the Divine and the 
Earthly city and (3) a future after the Final Judgement when it will be revealed 
who was chosen by God’s grace to join the sphere of immortality in endless love.134 
History has a definite finis, understood both ethically as 
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“ultimate goal” and eschatologically as “end of times”. This shift from cycles to a 
timeline that includes a final judgment suddenly opens up the prospect of 
meaning in history. 
Since neither our belonging to the City of God nor the ultimate meaning of 
historical events are apparent in the historical events themselves, however, 
humans begin to produce sophisticated philosophies of history to reveal the 
divine intentions behind mortal life. 135 Karl Löwith suggests that this Christian 
impulse guides philosophical history in the West: “To the Jews and Christians 
[…] history was primarily a history of salvation […] The very existence of a 
philosophy of history and its quest for a meaning is due to the history of 
salvation; it emerged from the faith in an ultimate purpose.” That is why 
“History […] is meaningful only by indicating some transcendent purpose 
beyond the actual facts.”136 In the divine scheme of things, all events are 
connected. For Christians, every action, every moment, every life acquired a 
significance they had lacked in Antiquity, since the historical process might give an 
indication of its ultimate end. This is also one of the reasons why the character of 
historiography changed. After mere record-keeping of the great deeds of the 
present, the promise of salvation turned historians towards the interpretive 
reconstruction of developments to understand the past, present and even the 
future as a coherent whole. Here we have first an act of looking backwards 
(“When a historical movement has unfolded its consequences, we reflect on its first 
appearance, in order to determine the meaning of the whole”) and then the new 
practice of looking forward (“imagining its beginning and anticipating its 
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end, we think of its meaning in terms of an ultimate purpose”). For the chosen 
people of Israel, the members of the City of God, (Isaiah 40-45 is the essential 
reference for all optimistic prognostication in modern history), everything points 
towards the future. The past matters only insofar as “the past is a promise to the 
future; consequently, the interpretation of the past becomes a prophecy in 
reverse, demonstrating the past as a meaningful ‘preparation’ for the future.”137 The 
temporal horizon of ever-expanding Christendom is an eschatological future. 
Even once the official narratives of the organised Church are replaced by new 
theories with new terminologies, “the Christian and post-Christian outlook on 
history is futuristic.” For example, the interplay of providence, process and 
progress is clearly visible in the Enlightenment teleologies of Condorcet, Kant or 
Hegel. The latter wrote in 1813: “Our intellectual striving aims at realizing the 
conviction that what was intended by eternal wisdom is actually accomplished in 
the domain of existent, active Spirit, as well as in that of mere Nature. Our 
mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, theodicy, a justification of the ways of 
God […]. Indeed, nowhere is such a harmonising view more pressingly 
demanded than in Universal History.”138 This Universal History, according to 
Hegel, lets the Weltgeist travel from one chosen nation to the next, from one 
messiah to his successor. Politically speaking, this is an incredibly powerful set- up. 
Whoever can convince the others that he is the embodiment of the spirit of 
History is – like Napoleon139 – unstoppable. The religious development of the 
European continent produced a shift from cyclical to linear history with a clear 
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beginning, a pivotal Day of Judgment and then, for the chosen and the saved, an 









The second shift is linked to economics. Urbanisation in the early modern era 
promoted not only a convergence of many dispersed times into the coordinated 
time that fuelled the commercial and industrial revolutions140 - urbanisation 
created a class, the bourgeoisie, that led to a conceptual change from empty to valuable 
time. 
David Landes has admirably traced the intellectual “Revolution in Time” that 
accompanied the spread of increasingly sophisticated timepieces as a new 
merchant class arose in Europe.141 While urbanisation and economic 
specialisation during the late Middle Ages had created a need for collective 
temporal coordination, the power to tell the time was long restricted to the town 
church, whose belfry chimed the rhythms of fieldwork, fasting and feasting to 
the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside. But the changing conditions of 
urban labour as traced by Jacques Le Goff “brought about a change in the 
measurement of time, which was indeed a change in time itself.”142 As merchant 




140 See D. Landes, Revolution in Time, J. de Vries, “The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious 
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ecclesiastical monopoly on time was questioned by increasingly powerful 
townhalls which put up their own clockfaces to mark the working day. Le Goff 
writes, “Merchants and artisans began replacing this Church time with a more 
accurately measured time useful for profane and secular tasks, clock time. The 
clocks which, everywhere, were erected opposite church bell towers, represent the 
great revolution of the communal movement in the time domain.”143 
The fourteenth-century crisis of inflation and decimation of workers by the 
Black death, however, led to the first urban conflicts around time. Workers 
wanted to work longer and more flexible hours - nocturnal work, previously 
considered heretical was legitimised by the Provost of Paris on 19 January 
1322144 - but burghers wanted more control. In response to a crisis of rising 
labour costs “employers sought to regulate the working day more closely to 
combat workers’ cheating in this area. It was at this time that the proliferation of 
work bells (Werkglocken) […] occurred.” At Amiens, for example, “Philipp IV granted 
the request of the mayor and aldermen ‘that they might be permitted to issue an 
ordinance concerning the time when the workers of said city and its suburbs 
should go each morning to work, when they should eat and when they should 
return to work after eating; and also, in the evening, when they should quit work 
for the day; and that by the issuance of said ordinance, they might ring a bell which 
has been installed in the Belfry of the said city, which differs from other bells.”145 
These new work schedules, however, were not accepted by everyone. The “new 
 
time”, as it was called, became the object of bitter social conflicts. Workers 
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repeatedly organised strikes and uprisings to silence the “Werkglocke”. The 
records show that these protests were, at times, remarkably successful: In Ghent on 
6 December 1349, for example, “the aldermen issued a proclamation ordering 
the weavers to return to the city within a week, but thereafter allowed them to 
start and stop work at the hours of their choosing.” At Thérouanne on 16 March 
1367, the dean “promised ‘the workers, fullers and other mechanics’ to silence 
‘forever the workers bell in order that no scandal or conflict be born in the city 
and church as a result of the ringing of a bell of this type’.”146 In other cities, the 
bourgeoisie protected its interest by law: in Northern France, anyone who should “ 
ring the bell to call for revolt against the king, the aldermen or the officer in charge 
of the bell” would face the death penalty.147 
The result of these struggles was the emergence of a new conception of time, 
entirely separate from its ecclesiastical predecessor. “Instead of a time linked to 
events, which made itself felt only episodically and sporadically”, Le Goff’s 
research suggests that “there arose a regular, normal time. Rather than the 
uncertain clerical hours of the church bells, there were certain hours spoken by the 
bourgeois […]. Time was no longer associated with cataclysms or festivals but 
rather with daily life.”148 I believe that this was a significant step towards the 
conception of time we are used to today, for three reasons: first, time was 
secularised; second, time was gradually democratised to the extent that public 
clockfaces like Venice’s lavish torre dell’orologio (constructed 1493) could be consulted 
by anyone; third, time was a measure of value, both in the instrumental 
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sense of measuring valuable labour hours and in the intrinsic sense that time 
itself became something of value. And still, the revolution was not uniform. 
Each merchant town in Northern Italy, for instance, counted the two sets of 12 
hours of the day differently; some starting at sunrise, others at sunset. Due to 
variation with the seasons and local custom, hours were unequally long. 149 There was 
still a multiplicity of times. 
It was only once the commercial revolution facilitated by imperial expansion 
created a powerful merchant class which could scrutinise government, that 
individual men could afford to live in their own time by purchasing a personal 
pendulum or pocket watch. The pocket watch in particular became a sign of 
power. It signified independence, punctuality, precision, trustworthiness - the 
virtues of the self-made man.150 That man produced his own temporal regime - the 
regime of capitalism - in which no hour must be left empty or wasted, because 
“time is money”. Every minute must be put to productive use if labourers are 
paid by the hour and the race for innovation becomes fiercer with every new 
competitor. 
Benjamin Franklin’s advice, taken by Max Weber to be the essence of the Puritan 
Work Ethic, is instructive here: “Remember that time is money. He that can earn 
ten shillings a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that 
day, though he spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to 
reckon that the only expense; he has really spent, rather thrown away, five 
shillings, besides. […] After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to 
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the raising of a young man in the world than punctuality and justice in all his 
dealings.”151 Of course, there is still a religious element in this, since in the 
Puritan mindset every hour productively spent was a possibility to receive 
material signs of a favourable predestination. But the religious torment that 
dominated merchants in the trading centres of North-Western Europe also had 
profound effects on society at large. 
When the social historian E.P. Thompson asked “How far, and in what ways, 
did this shift in time-sense affect labour discipline, and how far did it influence the 
inward apprehension of time of working people?” the results were 
astounding.152 In the course of only a century, from the Agrarian revolution of 
the 1740s via the Commercial Revolution of the 1780s until the Industrial 
Revolution’s success in the 1840s, working habits in North-Western Europe 
underwent a profound change. The task orientation of pre-capitalist societies 
(one works as long as it takes to complete a task; the tasks change with the 
seasons; there is little separation between work and “free time”153) gave way to the 
strictest time-discipline, legitimated by the ideological elevation of “progress” 
and enforced, if necessary, with the baton of the factory’s overseer. “To the end 
that sloath and villany should be detected and the just and diligent rewarded”, an 
industrialist wrote in 1772, “I have thought meet to create an account of time by 




151 Benjamin Franklin as quoted in M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, via 
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-07432-6, accessed 02/10/19. 
152 Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism”. See also P. Glennie and N. 
Thrift, “Reworking E. P. Thompson's `Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism'”, Time & 
Society, October 1996, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.275-299. 
153 J. Rose, Free Time (Princeton, PUP, 2017); R. Goodin et al., Discretionary Time: a new measure of freedom 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2008). See also M. O’Malleys scepticism about task orientation in “Time, Work 
and Task orientations. A critique of American historiography.”, Time & Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 
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[…] There will then be thirteen hours and a half neat service […] This service 
must be calculated after all deductions for being at taverns, alehouses, coffee 
houses, breakfast, dinner, playing, sleeping, smoaking, singing, reading of news 
history, quarelling, contention, disputes or anything forreign to my business, any 
way loytering […] no person upon the account doth reckon by any other clock, 
bell, watch or dyall but the Monitor's, which clock is never to be altered but by the 
clock-keeper."154 
Capitalists soon learnt that control of the clock conferred greater powers of 
exploitation. A factory boy from Dundee, who escaped during a strike, reveals the 
tricks of 1887: “The clocks at the factories were often put forward in the 
morning and back at night, and instead of being instruments for the 
measurement of time, they were used as cloaks for cheatery and oppression. 
Though this was known amongst the hands, all were afraid to speak, and a 
workman then was afraid to carry a watch, as it was no uncommon event to 
dismiss any one who presumed to know too much about the science of 
horology.”155 
Foucault finds similar disciplinary practices in the manufactures of mercantilist 
France. Here, spatial distribution and temporal segmentation combine to get the 
most out of the disciplined body. The institutions of bourgeois violence – 
school, factory, hospital, prison, barracks – all follow and perfect the original 
patterns of the old European monastery. All these spaces, Foucault writes, are 
“closed-off, protected places of disciplinary monotony”. In the early factories of 
central France, there was a guardian who was allowed to open the gates “only 
 
154 Law Book of the Crowley Iron Works, as cited in Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial 
Capitalism”, 81. 
155 Chapters in the life of a Dundee factory boy, as cited in Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial 
Capitalism”, 86. 
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when the workers came back [from their break] and after the bell that announces 
the return to work had tolled; a quarter of an hour later nobody would have the 
right to enter or exit”. The factory, which “consciously resembles the convent, 
the fortress, the citadel” is a place where strict timekeeping helps to “concentrate 
the forces of production, to get the maximum amount of benefits and to 
neutralise any inconveniences (theft, interruptions, agitation, cabals)”.156 Like in 
Thompson’s English cases, employers were visibly trying to capture their 
employees’ time – but not just any time: “the aim was to ensure a high quality of 
time: uninterrupted surveillance, pressure from the overseers and the annulation of 
anything that could distract show the desire to constitute a time that is entirely 
useful.”157 
Like in the medieval convent, where time was well-ordered in order to promote 
Christian virtue and accelerate salvation, industrial workplaces accelerated 
production through a strict timetable. According to Foucault, its three great 
elements – “establishing rhythms, constraining actors to specific predetermined 
tasks, managing the cycles of repetition”, were continuously improved by the 
dominant class of modernity. Importantly, the connection between Christian 
and capitalist rhythms persisted long beyond the initial shift from salvation to 
profit. The rulebook of one of the examined manufactures spelled out very 
clearly that the workers were labouring for two masters : “All persons who arrive at 
their workplace in the morning shall begin by washing their hands, offering their 
labour to God, making the sign of the cross and then proceed to work”. Even 
“measured and salaried” time had to be “free from impurity”.158 
 
 
156 M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris, Gallimard, 1975), 153. 157 M. 
Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris, Gallimard, 1975), 154. 158 
Foucault, Surveiller et punir, 154. 
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The widespread use of disciplinary rigour around time was not just aimed at the 
lower classes of workers. Anne Murphy, for instance, has applied Thompson’s 
concept of time-discipline to the clerks of the Bank of England, the Kingdom’s 
largest private white-collar employer in the eighteenth century. Her analysis 
reveals that as a consequence of the high “levels of specialization, co-ordination 
and scrutiny that were evident in the Bank’s business”, all types of specific tasks and 
breaks were “regulated by the clock” as well as by inspectors with pocket 
watches. But the clerks were not the only ones: “By restricting access to its 
various services to particular times, the Bank also imposed its time discipline on its 
customers and the investing public who went there to buy, sell and transfer 
shares or government securities and to collect their dividends. Symbolic of this 
were the large clocks which dominated the banking hall and hung on the external 
wall over the Bartholomew Lane entrance to the Transfer Offices.” These clocks 
radiated authority, precision and trustworthiness. They also helped synchronise the 
City of London more widely, since the Bank “co-ordinated its own routines with 
the external time-specific routines of the City and the requirements of the 
bankers, brokers and notaries who used its services and wanted the right to 
interrogate its records.”159 Puritan (self)discipline, measured by the clock and the 




This interaction between money, clock time and ideas about future-oriented 
“progress” was later exported worldwide (see chapter 3). Capitalist success relies on 
continuous innovation, ever-greater productivity and ever-larger markets.160 
 
159 A.L. Murphy, “Clock-watching: work and working time at the late eighteenth-century Bank of 
England”, Past & Present, no. 236 (2017) 101. 




Like the eschatological timeline of Christianity, the time of capitalism looks into the 
future – so much so, in fact, that the cult of capitalist prediction has created a 
market for trading “futures”. Rosa shows this to be ingrained in the capitalist 
necessity of being “one step ahead” of one’s competitors.161 Beckert goes even 
further in positing that the “temporal order of capitalism” relies on “imagined 
futures”, i.e. “fictional expectations about how the economy is going to evolve”. 
Without such fictional expectations about interest rates, profit and returns of 
investment, the risk for investors would be so high that decision-makers would be 
paralysed. Without forward-looking trust in forecasts – however fictional – what 
we call “the economy” (a network of expectations) could hardly exist.162 After the 
Christian shift from cyclical to linear time – the bourgeois shift from empty to 
valuable time sharpened the idea of European time as a tool for enrichment, 








The third and last step that turned time into the concept we know today is 
revolution. Ideas of emancipation, self-government and liberation had 
dominated the enlightened Republic of letters throughout the Early Modern 
period, but the French Revolution of 1789 completely changed the way 
Europeans thought about progress. Before the French Revolution, it was 




161 H. Rosa, Beschleunigung, 257-279. 
162 J. Beckert, Imagined Futures : Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics (Cambridge MA, HUP, 2016). s 
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understand the present. Edward Gibbon, for example, published his Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire in 1776, just when the agitation of the 13 American colonies 
was at its peak. Showing the inhabitants of an increasingly strained British 
Empire how Rome had fallen, he was able to able to focus minds in London 
on the recovery of England, “the new Rome”. For an intellectual class steeped in 
classical culture, the analogies were obvious.163 In the eighteenth century it was 
still perfectly possible to solve present political problems by reference to the 
past. 
The French Revolution changed this transhistorical dialogue in a most radical 
manner. The theoretical debates on human rationality and perfectibility among 
Voltaire, Condorcet, Sieyes and the German Idealists were suddenly put into 
practice. The Revolution suggested that Man could replace Providence in 
knowing and changing World History. As Koselleck has convincingly shown, the 
utter novelty of a people taking their evolution into their own hands and 
starting a new story, led to a unique separation between the known and the 
unknown. Up until 1800, men had lived with a common treasure chest of 
historical references (stories, quotes, images, patterns) which could always be 
compared and contrasted according to the topos of Historia Magistra Vitae, and that 
knowledge made it possible to make predictions about the future: their three-
dimensional, physical and metaphysical space of experience had informed their 
one-dimensional horizon of expectation. After centuries of reproduction with 
comparatively minor changes, suddenly the future was completely unknown. 




163 See S. Goldhill, Victorian Culture and Classical Antiquity (Princeton, 2012); N. Vance, The Victorians and 
Ancient Rome (Oxford, 1997); S. Butler, Britain and Its Empire in the Shadow of Rome (London, 2012); C. 
Hagerman, Britain’s Imperial Muse (Basingstoke, 2013). 
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Erwartungshorizont. This disjuncture between experience and expectation is, 
according to Koselleck the distinctive feature of modern historical 
consciousness.164 The best contemporary expressions of the new sense of 
historical rupture come from the Revolution’s aristocratic critics on both sides of 
the Channel: 
Alexis de Tocqueville found this radical rupture with all established orders 
deeply unsettling: “I go back through from one century to the other until the 
furthest corners of Antiquity, but I do not see anything that resembles what I 
have before my eyes. Now that the past has ceased to illuminate the future, the 
spirit marches in darkness.”165 This unease is not divine; it is man-made. Half a 
century after the first shock, looking back at L’Ancien régime et la révolution, he 
captures the enormity of this historical rupture thus : “In 1789 the French have 
made the greatest effort which any people has ever embarked upon in order to, as 
it were, cut their destiny in half, and to separate by an abyss that which they had been until 
then, from who they wanted to be henceforth. With this objective in mind, they 
took all kinds of precautionary measures to avoid bringing anything from the past 
into their new condition. They imposed on themselves all kinds of constraints to 
fashion themselves different from their fathers; they did not forget anything to 
render themselves unrecognisable […] I have undertaken to penetrate the core of 
this ancien régime, so close to us in terms of years passed, 
 
 
164 Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft, essays 2 and 10. 
165 : « Les Français ont fait en 1789 le plus grand effort auquel se soit jamais livré aucun peuple,  afin 
de couper pour ainsi dire en deux leur destinée, et de séparer par un abîme ce qu'ils avaient été 
jusque-là de ce qu'ils voulaient être désormais. Dans ce but, ils ont pris toutes sortes de 
précautions pour ne rien emporter du passé dans leur condition nouvelle; ils se sont imposé 
toutes sortes de contraintes pour se façonner autrement que leurs pères; ils n'ont rien oublié 
enfin pour se rendre méconnaissables. […] J'ai entrepris de pénétrer jusqu'au cœur de cet ancien 
régime, si près de nous par le nombre des années, mais que la Révolution nous cache. » 
A. Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (Paris, 1840) Part II, ch. 8, via 
https://www.institutcoppet.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/De-la-
d%C3%A9mocratie-en- Am%C3%A9rique.pdf, accessed 01/06/19. 
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but so far because the Revolution hides it from us.”166 The fact that the 
revolution is able to “hide” the newly named “Ancien” régime suggests the 
success of the people who “cut their destiny in half” in order to replace “who 
they were”, with “who they wanted to be”. It was the Enlightenment vision of 
history as a malleable process that allowed for the conceptual possibility of 
becoming the person or people one wishes to be.167 And it was the organicism of 
European conservatives that made Edmund Burke pronounce a similar 
judgement of horror. Even though he watched from a comfortable distance, every 
word of his Reflections on the Revolution in France conveys the incredulity, misapprehension 
and outrage at the revolution. “It appears to me as if I were in a great crisis, of 
the affairs not of France alone but of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe. 
All circumstances taken together, the French revolution is the most astonishing one 
that has ever happened. […] Everything seems out of nature in this strange chaos.]”168 Burke’s 
conception of “nature” appears in the famous lament “The age of chivalry is 
gone. The age of logical tricksters, economists, and calculators has taken over, and 
the glory of Europe is extinguished forever.”169 Age-old custom was replaced by a 
new chess board on which the new social classes make their unpredictable moves. 
“When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly 
be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we 
clearly know what port we are steering to.”170 Like Tocqueville, Edmund Burke 





166 Tocqueville, L’Ancien régime et la révolution, preface. 
167 Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, ch. V. “The conquest of the historical world”. 
168 E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London, 1790), via 
https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Reflections_on_the_Revolution_in_France/u81bA 
AAAQAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0, accessed 25/02/20. 
169 Burke, Reflections, 42. 
170 Burke, Reflections, 43. 
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seems complete, confirming Koselleck’s thesis of a significant change in our 
 
conception of time. 
 
The fact that there was “no compass”, however, was celebrated ferociously in 
French revolutionary circles. It found its most telling expression in a new 
Revolutionary calendar, marking the beginning of a new era. Taking up the 
central story of Christian time and refashioning it in Roman numerals – some 
backward looking was apparently still necessary - a new beginning was declared as 
the new “Era of liberty” was counted from the Founding of the Republic on 
22 September 1792 onwards. The rapporteur presenting the Calendar 
Commission’s work to the National Assembly explained the rationale behind the 
new time-reckoning system in effusive terms: “The prejudices of the throne and 
the Church, the lies of both, sully every page of the calendar which we use. You, 
dear committee, have reformed this calendar and replaced it with another, where 
time is measured by calculations that are more exact and symmetrical; this is not yet 
enough. The old habit of the Gregorian calendar has filled the memory of a people 
with a considerable number of images which they have long revered, and which 
until today lie at the source of religious errors. It is thus necessary to substitute 
these visions of ignorance with the realities of reason, to replace priestly prestige 
with the truth of nature.”171 Eviatar Zerubavel sees this calendar as an ideal case to 
show the extent to which temporal and historical frameworks 
 
 
171 : « Les prejugés du trône et de l’église, les mensonges de l’un et de l’autre, souilloient chaque page 
du calendrier dont nous nous servions. Vous avez reformé se calendrier, vous lui en avez substitué 
un autre, où le temps est mesuré par des calculs plus exacts et plus symétriques ; ce n’est pas assez. 
Une longue habitude du calendrier grégorien a rempli la mémoire d’un peuple d’un nombre 
considérable d’images qu’il a long-temps révérées, et qui font encore aujourd’hui la source des 
erreurs religieuses ; il est donc nécessaire de substituer à ces visions de l’ignorance, les réalités de 
la raison et au prestige sacerdotal, la vérité de la nature. » Rapport fait à la Convention nationale, dans la séance du 
3 du second mois de la seconde année de la République française, au nom de la commission chargée de la confection du calendrier ; par 
Fabre d’Eglantine ; via https://books.google.com/books?id=vVtWj-W- 
KP8C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false , accessed 23/02/20. 
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are socially negotiated and constructed;172 while David Ciavatta uses it to explore the 
Hegelian tensions between universality and historicity in the self-fashioning of an 
event of “absolute freedom”.173 In any event, the French Revolutionaries were 
aware of the historical rupture they produced and did not shy away from staging 
the event for everyone to see. 
Idealists like Kant, Hegel and Fichte were perhaps more approving of the 
revolution than their counterparts, but still expressed awe at this new 
beginning.174 Kant solved the riddle of Man making his own history by 
suggesting that the history of the future was not entirely unknown. On the 
contrary, the Revolution, a “Geschichtszeichen (signum rememorativum, 
demonstrativum, prognostikon)”, he declared, “can have no other cause than a 
moral predisposition in the human race.”175 Man was a rational being and the 
revolution was a sign of reason in history. What happens next is crucial: Kant 
uses the “Vorzeichen”, extrapolates from it to make a prediction for the future, 
that “this expression of reason in action” has opened for Man “a perspective 
into a time without end.” This “unforgettable” event that “cannot be undone” 
shows that we need not be scared about the open future, but resolutely 
optimistic. The Enlightened appropriation of history as a setting for and 
simultaneous expression of freedom and authentic agency has dominated 
Western social theory ever since. For example, Friedrich Engels continued this line 
in 1878 when he specified that the “leap from the realm of necessity into 
 
172 Zerubavel, “The French Republican Calendar”. 
173 D. Ciavatta, “The event of absolute freedom: Hegel on the French Revolution and its calendar”, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 40, No. 6 (2014), 577–605. 
174 I. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis  (1793); G.W.F. 
Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Leipzig, 1807), ch. 6. A. La Vopa, “The Revelatory Moment: Fichte and 
the French Revolution”, Central European History, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1989), 130-159. 
175 I. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis 
(1793). 
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the realm of freedom” requires that “the objective alien forces that used to direct 
history” move “under the rule of Man himself”, because only then can their 
“self-initiated causes” also have the “effect wished for”.176 Men no longer 
execute history but “make it themselves in full consciousness.’’ As man-made 
history continues, there will be ever more revolutions, ever more liberations, 
ever more ecstatic emancipations from the obscurities of tradition. Francis 
Fukuyama even went so far after the revolutions 1989 as to say that “it is 
against this background that the remarkable worldwide character of the current 
liberal revolution takes on a special significance. For it constitutes further evidence 
that there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary 
pattern for all human societies – in short, something like a Universal History of 
Mankind in the direction of liberal democracy.”177 Even though our academic 
scepticism may make us wary of such exclamations, we can hardly deny that this last 
step, from the history of Man to man-made history, gave the Europeans an even greater 
feeling of temporal control than before. Indeed, it is notable that the system of 
counting years forward and backward from the Incarnation – total temporal 
control – was only adopted in the late nineteenth century, when European 
imperial expansion was at its peak. On that calendar change Arendt writes: “ […] 
now, for the first time, the history of mankind reaches back into an infinite past 
to which we can add at will and into which we can inquire further as it stretches 
ahead into an infinite future. This twofold infinity of past and 
 
176 “Die eigne Vergesellschaftung der Menschen, die ihnen bisher als von Natur und 
Geschichte aufgenötigt gegenüberstand, wird jetzt ihre freie Tat. Die objektiven, fremden Mächte, 
die bisher die Geschichte beherrschten, treten unter die Kontrolle der Menschen selbst. Erst 
von da an werden die Menschen ihre Geschichte mit vollem Bewusstsein selbst machen, erst von 
da an werden die von ihnen in Bewegung gesetzten gesellschaftlichen Ursachen vorwiegend und in 
stets steigendem Maß auch die von ihnen gewollten Wirkungen haben. Es ist der Sprung der 
Menschheit aus dem Reich der Notwendigkeit in das Reich der Freiheit.“, F. Engels: Die Entwicklung 
des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft, via 
http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me19/me19_210.htm, accessed 01/10/19. 
177 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1992), 48ff. 
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future eliminates all notions of beginning and end, establishing Mankind in a 
potential earthly immortality.”178 It is important to note that the promise of 
immortality, of an endless future was restricted to Europeans, while others were 
relegated to very different temporal regimes (see ch. 3).179 
Whether the changes put in motion by the Revolution were considered positive or 
negative, the new perspective in history is the same: the past is no longer 
reliable, a new era has begun and the future that people are now looking into is 
open-ended. As Niebuhr points out, “the modern interpretation of history does 
not understand the cycle of birth and death of civilisations and culture at all 
because its conception of the indeterminate possibilities in history leaves no 
room for death or judgment.”180 This idea is actively discussed in Britain at 
several moments in the modern era, because this is a country in which no 
revolution comparable to the French or indeed the American reordering has 
taken place, but people are still attracted to the idea of an endlessly progressive 
history. Chapter 4 will examine in more detail why British political discourse 
venerated the absence of revolution181 – but for now it suffices to emphasize that 
Victorians were at pains to reconcile classical and Christian visions of historical 
development. 
Under the banner of finding an “escape velocity” that would let Britain sidestep the 
cycles of growth and decay that had afflicted all previous Empires, politicians, 






178 H. Arendt, “On the concept of history”. 
179 J. Fabian, Time and the Other. How Anthropology makes its object (New York, Columbian University Press, 
1983); A. Zarakol (ed.), Hierarchies in World Politics (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 180 Niebuhr, Faith and 
History, 216. 
181 See chapter 4, section II. 
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had to develop in order to escape the final judgement.182 Like the contemporary 
watchmaker John Harrison, who – in responding to a royal competition - 
invented the mechanical escapement to build perpetual watches that did not 
have to be reset,183 the British dream was to reposition itself in history such that the 
ancient course of history could be avoided. Two uniquely British advantages were 
repeatedly highlighted in the public debate: First, the British character was 
supposed to be more progressive than others: “The Anglo-Saxon has so far, 
chiefly owing to the mixture of blood in his veins, kept alive side by side both the 
military and the commercial spirit; and it is this unique combination of talents which 
offers the best hopes for the survival of the Anglo-Saxon as the fittest of humanity 
to defy the decaying process of time.”184 Second, Britain would be able to stay at the 
forefront of modernity even without a revolution because it had its Empire, an 
outlet for social conflict and violence abroad. In his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 
1870, John Ruskin, suggested that this was Britannia’s only way out: “She must 
found colonies as fast and as far as she is able.”81 Continuous expansion was the 
only way to avoid decline. J. B. Bury declared that “civilization has moved, is moving, 
and will move, in a desirable direction”, hiding the fact that “progress […] the 
animating and controlling idea of western civilization” was often achieved at the 
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The trinity of providence, productivity and progress, then, linked to very specific 
moments in the religious, economic and political history of the European 
continent defines the open-ended, forward-looking, optimistic framework that I 
call “Liberal Time”. Of course, these changes faced serious social, political and 
academic resistance. For many, “progress” was deeply disorientating. We should 
also acknowledge that all three transitions were never fully completed, as the 
doubts of nihilism, existential philosophy and psychoanalysis demonstrate. 
Theories of temporal fragmentation, simultaneity and disorder coexisted with 
the clean narratives of the powerful line of progress.185 This was especially the 
case in the tumultuous period between the Universal Exhibition in Paris 1889, 
showing off the possibilities of infinite progress, and the First World War, 
forcing minds to readjust to a potentially destructive future. Yet ultimately the 
dominant temporal discourse arising from European history is this: a supposedly 
abstract, but carefully crafted conception of universal time, measured and 
enforced by increasingly sophisticated timepieces which record the unfolding of 
Man’s enlightened decisions in endless universal history. Until today, the story of its 
emergence is all too often in triumphalist terms: “I would not want simply to say 
that time measurement and the mechanical clock made the modern world and gave 
the West primacy over the rest. That they did. But the clock in turn was part of a 
larger open, competitive Western attitude toward knowledge, science and 
exploration. Nothing like this attitude was to be found elsewhere. Attitude and 
theme came together, and we have all been the beneficiaries, including those 
civilizations and societies that are now learning and catching up. Vive l'heure! Et 
 
185 Is it mere coincidence that the doubts of Bergson, Freud, Proust or Heidegger arose precisely 
when bourgeois imperialist time-keeping was at its peak? 
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vive l'horloge!” 186 Landes might be right in thinking that open-ended European 
time has the potential to be liberating - but more often than not the institutional 
instantiations of European Liberal Time bear the marks of conflict. It is crucial to 
remember that this, the ostentatiously scientific idea which conquered the 

























































“All hours of the twenty-four are alike to Orientals, 
 




This chapter takes the problem of Liberal Time to the global level. In the 
previous chapter, I identified a specifically European way of thinking about 
historical development which was linear, meaningful and man-made. This 
chapter will show how Europe created, exported and maintained its own 
temporal order worldwide for its own political benefit. Methodologically, such a 
critical reconstruction requires a mixed use of published historical sources, 
secondary historiography and original archival research. The primary sources cited 
below are housed by the British National Archives at Kew. This leads to a multi-
level, global account of the relationship between Liberal Time and Empire. That 
relationship, however, is by no means straightforward. My global examination 
will reveal that Liberal Time generated an important contradiction within the 
imperial project: synchronic systems of coordination rely on diachronic orders 
of subjection. This tension will be explained and analysed in three sections: 
Section I explores the idea that Europeans were at the forefront of history- 
 




187 Rudyard Kipling, Kim (London: Penguin, 1989 [1901]), 74. 
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interaction with non-Europeans was strictly diachronic. Europeans were located at 
one point in time – modernity – while others were either at another, earlier stage 
of development in the same timeline, or even outside of the modern temporal 
regime altogether. This diachronic order of separation allowed for hierarchy 
and intrusion: Europe was supposedly more advanced and therefore had a right 
to interfere with “developing nations” who seemed to require “development 
assistance”.188 
Section II identifies a conflicting desire for synchronicity between Europeans 
and non-Europeans. If European colonial powers wanted to extract maximum 
value from their colonies, timetables would have to be synchronised. Otherwise the 
global political economy of dispersed production lines, migrant labour and mobile 
law enforcement would not work. Moving from the micro to the macro level, such 
European interventions to bring their colonies “up to speed” included 
standardised factory hours, standardised railway timetables and standardised 
global time zones. This very practical synchronicity was particularly important for 
the functioning of the British Empire, but was also imposed by others.189 The 
synchronic approach is clearly at odds with the desire to maintain a certain level of 
diachronicity in order to justify such international interventions in the first place. 
Section III focuses on this contradictory combination of diachronicity and 
synchronicity. Since the declaration of diachronicity is used to justify imperial 
intervention, the real question is: how much practical imperial synchronicity can be 
 
 
188 M.N. Barnett & T.G. Weiss, Humanitarianism in question: politics, power, ethics (Ithaca, NY, Cornell UP, 
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introduced without undermining the ideological foundation of imperial expansion? Up to a certain extent 
synchronicity enhances productivity, purpose and belonging in the Empire – the 
colonised are partaking in Western progress. When synchronicity is introduced 
too extensively or too forcefully, however, acts of resistance appear. The 
smashing of clocks, burning of factory timecards and sabotage of railway 
timetables were typically lauded by anti-colonial newspapers on the ground and 
registered woefully in the reports of the Colonial Office in London.190 How 
could this tension be resolved? How could the Europeans maintain the delicate 
balance between subjecting the “backward” while still ensuring that everyone 
contributed to moving Europe “further ahead”? The most effective solution 
was a secularised version of the Christian redemption narrative in which the 
promotion of civilisation brought everyone closer to salvation. The chosen 
nation(s) instructed the “uncivilised” heathens to practice small acts of faith (e.g. 
making the freight train depart on time) in order to increase the likelihood of 
large-scale salvation (universal progress). I call this solution “effective” because, 
from the European point of view, it led to both desired outcomes: On the one 
hand, non-Europeans were fixed in “the not-yet of European historicism”, as 
Chakrabarty calls it,191 but on the other, they were simultaneously employing their 
zeal to fulfil the promise of universal progress. There was thus a synchronisation of 
dreams, even if these had different practical effects on participants in the global 
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Europeans had a universalising vision, in which all ages were shrunk to dots on 
great historical maps and tables, mere stepping stones to the European form of 
civilisation.192 These histories were by their very nature teleological. From 
Bossuet to Condorcet, timelines promised progress for everyone. Thus, 
Condorcet finished his Abstract for a Universal History of the Human Spirit on a highly 
optimistic note: “If man can predict, almost with certainty, those appearances 
of which he understands the laws; if […] the past enables him to foresee, with 
considerable probability, future appearances; why should we suppose it a 
chimerical undertaking to delineate, with some degree of truth, the picture of the 
future destiny of mankind from the results of its history? […] Will not every nation 
one day arrive at the state of civilisation attained by those people who are most 
enlightened, most free, most exempt from prejudices, as the French, for 
instance, and the Anglo-Americans? Will not the slavery of countries subjected to 
kings, the barbarity of African tribes, and the ignorance of savages gradually 
vanish? Is there upon the face of the globe a single spot whose inhabitants are 
condemned by nature never to enjoy liberty, never to exercise their reason?”193 
Let me highlight two features of Condorcet’s promise: first, the 
 
 
192 The classic treatment of such perspectives of governance is J C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State 
(New Haven, CT, 1991). 
193 “Si l'homme peut prédire, avec une assurance presque entière les phénomènes dont il 
connaît les lois ; si, lors même qu'elles lui sont inconnues, il peut, d'après l'expérience du passé, 
prévoir, avec une grande probabilité, les événements de l'avenir ; pourquoi regarderait-on comme 
une entreprise chimérique, celle de tracer, avec quelque vraisemblance, le tableau des destinées 
futures de l'espèce humaine, d'après les résultats de son histoire ? […] Nos espérances sur l'état 
à venir de l'espèce humaine peuvent se réduire à ces trois points importants : la destruction de 
l'inégalité entre les nations ; les progrès de l'égalité dans un même peuple ; enfin, le 
perfectionnement réel de l'homme. Toutes les nations doivent-elles se rapprocher un jour de 
l'état de civilisation où sont parvenus les peuples les plus éclairés, les plus libres, les plus affranchis 
de préjugés, tels que les Français et les Anglo-Américains ? Cette distance immense qui sépare ces 
peuples de la servitude des nations soumises à des rois, de la 
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European belief in scientific process. History, like everything else in the 
eighteenth-century imagination, is a process with a beginning, middle and end; 
certain causal patterns arise from observation and then – this is crucial – the 
educated can extrapolate from the beginning of a process how it will end, i.e. 
understanding of the past gives rise to predictions about the future. The end is 
the betterment of Mankind through learning, productivity and emancipation, 
which are assessed by the quasi-divine judgement of History itself. We have 
already encountered this kind of thinking with Kant in Chapter 2,194 but it is 
worth stressing again how much this notion of progress relies on a linear 
conception of time in which the future is expected to be better than the past. 
This takes us to the second notable feature of Condorcet’s paragraph: the 
confidence with which he places “the French” and “the Anglo-Americans” at 
end of the timeline. These nations have supposedly achieved “the state of 
civilisation attained by those people who are most enlightened, most free, most 
exempt from prejudices”. Everybody else will “one day” (purposefully vague like the 
Christian Day of Judgement) “arrive” (as if everyone had willingly set out on a 
journey designed by the Europeans) at the end of universal history. 
Enlightenment teleology, supported by the ethnographic science of the period, 
was not only temporal; there was a spatial element to it. There was a conflation of 
geographic and temporal distance. It is this idea which allowed the European explorers to 
report from the overseas voyages that they had seen “Mankind before the 
Fall”, “humanity in its infancy”.195 The history of European political philosophy 
 
barbarie des peuplades africaines, de l'ignorance des sauvages, doit-elle peu à peu s'évanouir ? Y a-
t-il sur le globe des contrées dont la nature ait condamné les habitants à ne jamais jouir de la liberté, 
à ne jamais exercer leur raison ? » Marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit 
humain (Paris, 1793), ch. 10. 
194 See ch. 2, section III. 
195 A. Pagden, European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1993), 112ff. 
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would have been radically different without this idea that the distant Other was 
also living in a distant past.196 The most influential example is perhaps John 
Locke. When he attempted to imagine a state preceding civil society, Locke did not 
have to rely on fantasy. Since his patron Lord Shaftesbury was involved in the 
British colonisation of North America, Locke was firmly embedded in the real 
infrastructure of imperialism. He owned extensive lands in South Carolina, became 
a member of the Lords Proprietors of South Carolina, joined the Council of 
Trades and Plantations and also worked part-time for the East India Company.197 
These everyday tasks were complemented by voracious reading of the travel 
accounts of his time. Locke’s library included Jean de Léry’s Histoire d'un Voyage faict 
en la terre du Brésil (1578), the Spanish Jesuit Cristobal d'Acuña’s, Relation de la Rivière des 
Amazones (1682), the French Franciscan missionary Theodat-Gabriel Sagard’s Le 
Grand Voyage du Pays des Hurons (1632) and Histoire du Canada et Voyages (1636), as well as 
A New Survey of the West Indies (1677) by the Englishman Thomas Gage.198 It was this 
historical and intellectual context which gave rise to one of Locke’s most famous 
sentences: “In the beginning all the world was America.”199 
What does this mean exactly? Locke specifies that America “is still a pattern of the 
first ages in Asia and Europe” and thereby gives glimpses into long gone stages 
of human development.200 When asked “ […] where are, or ever were 
 
196 Living in the past, that is, while oddly and inconsistently also living contemporaneously with Europeans. 
197 M.B. Arneil, All the world was America: John Locke and the American Indian, doct. diss (University 
College London, 1992). 
198 W. G. Batz, “The Historical Anthropology of John Locke”, Journal of the History of Ideas 
Vol. 35, No. 4 (1974), 664. 
199 J. Locke, Two Treatiss on Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1988 [1689]), §49. 
200 Locke, Second Treatise, §108. It might be worth stressing to 21st century audiences that Asia is listed 
first since it precedes Europe in the classical theory of the five ages in which five Empires (e.g. 
Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, Europe, America) represent improvement while moving westward. 
See George Berkeley’s famous stanza: “Westward the course of Empire 
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there any men in such a state of nature [as the one of his political philosophy]?”, 
Locke confidently replies that “governments all through the world, are in a state of 
nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men 
in that state.”201 The examples of “the promises and bargains for truck, &c. 
between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in 
his History of Peru or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America [who] 
are perfectly in a state of nature” come directly from his wide anthropological 
reading. The state of nature of the famous contract theorists had a real equivalent, 
and this equivalent, this new Garden of Eden, could be visited in America. It 
coexisted with the more “advanced” state of civil society in Europe. 
The travelogue of Joseph-Marie Degérando in 1800 is even more explicit when it 
comes to this fusion of space and time in the European learned imagination: “He 
who sails to the farthest corners of the globe, travels, in fact, along the road of time. He 
travels into the past. Every step he takes is a century passed. The islands he reaches are for him 
the cradle of human society […] like ancient and majestic monuments from the 
origins of time.”202 On the same global map – there were places which were not 
sharing the same time. The continued coexistence of these different “islands of 
history”, as the anthropologist Sahlins calls them,203 however, was important to 
the self-understanding of civilised Europeans, as we can see in Locke’s hope that 
the world “never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state”. 
Somebody would always be lagging behind. Due 
 
 
takes its way /The first four acts already past / A fifth shall close the drama with the day / 
Time’s noblest offspring is the last.”, via 
https://www.eighteenthcenturypoetry.org/works/o5157-w0840.shtml, accessed 02/04/21. 
201 Locke, Second Treatise, §14. 
202 As cited in Pagden, European Encounters with the New World, 116f. Emphasis added. 
203 M. Sahlins, Islands of History (Chicago, CUP, 1976). 
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to “uneven” or even “arrested” development, as policy-makers still like to say 
even now,204 the Spanish territories in the New World were living in the past, 
whereas the Europeans were already living in the present. The European notion of 
civilisation was structured by space-time. 
There are two theoretical strands of European developmental thinking that 
should be disentangled here. On the one hand, there is the very visible postulate 
towards non-Europeans that “We Europeans are ahead and you are behind”; on 
the other, there is the related but separate idea that “You, faraway non- 
Europeans, are now where we were once.” The first idea is often supported by an 
account of material progress. From Smith to Kant and Croce, authors present 
evidence in support of European superiority by presenting the well-rehearsed 
story of permanent settlement, agriculture, urbanisation, commerce, and the 
widespread refinement of manners that comes with metropolitan lifestyles.205 As we 
saw in chapter 1, Waldron is among that group of liberals.206 Europe is at the end of 
that linear story and is therefore able to classify other regions by checking how 
many phases of the story they have completed. If, for example, a newly 
encountered people in North America is settled, but has not yet gone beyond 
the agricultural stage, they are “behind” the Europeans, who are “ahead”. Why 
there should be a line in the first place, and why that line should go from past to 
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The second element of Europe’s temporal classification scheme is even more 
puzzling: the idea that non-Europeans represented the infancy of humankind. This is strange 
for three reasons. First, historically speaking, the discovery of their different 
lifestyles was not mediated through mythical stories, but through a live meeting in 
the flesh. Colonisers and colonised shared the same historical moment, and yet 
they were supposed to represent different stages of historical development, just 
like a boy standing next to his father. In the etching commemorating how 
Columbus tricked the Jamaican “Natives” into believing he had divine powers 
when he used a European almanac to predict a lunar eclipse (see fig. 2), for 
example, Bloch’s 
phrase of “the 
simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous” 207 
finds its full 
expression, since it 






Figure 2: Columbus announcing the 1504 lunar eclipse to the natives of Jamaica 
with European time while the commemorative act of painting adds yet another, 
third layer of time to the very same historical moment. 
The second oddity of this distancing act is that non-Europeans might be “far 
away” and different in terms of human evolution, but at the same time partake in 
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subsided fully, but the image of the boy and the father suggests that the boy 
carries within him the potential to grow and – one day - become a father himself. 
The Enlightenment theorists who underpinned the imperial project could have 
explicitly placed the “Natives” outside the confines of humanity, but that 
anthropological functionalism was at odds with the universal values of equality and  a 
shared capacity for reason. There is thus a further tension between the 
difference of the people living “there and then” and the sameness of the 
Europeans living “here and now”. That tension is exploited in a third European 
practice which became a scientific discipline of its own: anthropology. If the 
distant peoples of this globe represent earlier stages of our own development, 
the reasoning went, why don’t we examine them scientifically in order to get 
clearer insights into our own history? To supplement traditional research in 
Europe’s archives, “fieldwork” emerged as the non-plus-ultra of scientific 
method. Travelling to the Caribbean, for example, and collecting biological 
specimens and material objects for comparative purposes, was time-travel in the 
service of modern politico-scientific taxonomies. The problem, of course, is that the 
non-Europeans who were first promised that they had the same potential to evolve 
as Europeans, then had to stay in their historical place for the comparison to work 
(see section III below). 
This leads to a “denial of coevalness” which produces the curious problem of 
the “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous”, which Ernst Bloch famously 
introduced thus: “Not everyone is present in the same Now. They are present 
only externally [superficially] as they are visible today. That does not mean, 
however, that they are living simultaneously with others. Rather, they carry 
precedents with them, which intermingle with the present. Depending on where 
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someone stands physically, but also in terms of class, he has his times."208 Even 
without adopting Bloch’s Marxist angle, the fact that “not everyone is present in the 
same Now” creates worrying tensions. Why are some people “stuck” in other times? 
Why are they denied presence in the present?209 How is that denial performed? 
Johannes Fabian’s pathbreaking Time and the Other, which argues that “geopolitics has 
its ideological foundations in chronopolitics”, offers some important answers 
to these questions.210 The book highlights a temporal order in which non-
Europeans were denied the possibility of evolving together with Europe. This is 
particularly striking when Europeans and non-Europeans meet in (neo)colonial 
settings. How can peoples who had communicated and cohabitated with 
European visitors in a shared present be relegated to the past as soon as these 
observers depart? 
He starts with the historical statement that “the temporal discourse of 
anthropology as it was formed decisively under the paradigm of evolutionism 
rested on a conception of time that was not only secularised and naturalised but 
also thoroughly spatialised. Ever since […] anthropology’s efforts to construct 
relations with its Other by means of temporal devices implied an affirmation of 
difference as distance.”211 This much we have already seen in the stagist theories of 
history examined above. The problem, however, arises when we realise that 
 
 
208 “Ungleichzeitigkeit und die Pflicht zu ihrer Dialektik: Nicht alle sind im selben Jetzt da. Sie  sind 
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many methods of many modern social sciences rely on such “allochronic” 
discourse. Our knowledge of other cultures depends on intense interaction with 
and inside them. For anthropologists, the problem is particularly pressing, which is 
why a peculiar strategy was invented to circumvent it: “The sharing of time that 
such interaction requires demands that ethnographers recognize the people whom 
they study as their coevals. However—and this is where the contradiction arises—
when those same ethnographers represent their knowledge in teaching and 
writing, they do this in terms of a discourse that consistently places those who 
are talked about in a time other that of the one who speaks.”212 The objectified 
inhabitants of the past are analysed by the self-proclaimed inhabitants of the 
present. 
We may conclude that the picture which Europeans paint of their own 
interactions with the extra-European world is characterised by diachronicity. 
Europeans do not share the same time with other inhabitants of the world. The 
temporal distance between the time of Europeans and the time of others is 
marked in three ways: (1) non-Europeans illustrate earlier stages of historical 
development, which Europe has already outgrown; (2) the geographical distance 
which separates Europe from its colonies intensifies that temporal distance; (3) the 
narrative structure in which European travellers recount their encounters 
establishes the author as an agent in the present, while his passive “objects of 
analysis” are trapped in the past. That diachronic structure of interaction justified 
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For the imperial enterprise to yield the desired economic and geopolitical results, life 
in the colonies had to be synchronised through international systems of 
temporal coordination. Moving from the micro and macro level, I will use some 
recent historical case studies to show that Europeans sought to bring their 
colonies “up to speed” through standardised working hours, standardised 
railway timetables and standardised global time zones. We would do well to 
remember Partha Chatterjee’s critique of the “dominant strand in modern 
historical thinking that imagines the social space of modernity as distributed in 
homogeneous empty time”. Chatterjee prefers to call it “the time of capital”, 
because “it is the same simultaneity experienced in homogeneous empty time 
that allows us to speak of the reality of such categories of political economy as 
prices, wages, markets, and so on. […] Within its domain, capital allows for no 
resistance to its free movement. When it encounters an impediment, it thinks it has 
encountered another time - something out of pre-capital, something that 
belongs to the pre-modern. Such resistances to capital (or to modernity) are 
therefore understood as coming out of humanity’s past, something people 
should have left behind but somehow haven’t.”213 Liberal Time, as I call it, is not just 
linked to a specific kind of politics. Valuable, manipulable and linear Liberal Time is 
firmly wedded to the economic system of capitalism. Hence the standardisation 
of working hours, railway timetables and global time zones is essential to 
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A. Working hours 
 
Once European countries had synchronised their schedules, they sought to 
expand the new temporal efficiency of the industrial revolution to their colonies. In 
the context of Victorian “humanitarianism” and “trusteeship”, this meant that the 
“savages” should be taught to measure, manage and appreciate time – for their 
own benefit and, of course, that of the coloniser. This effort to instil “time- 
consciousness” and the “economy of time” in labourers has recently been 
studied in places as far-flung as slave plantations in the American Antebellum 
South and clearing houses in Bombay. 
Justin Roberts’ study on Slavery and the Enlightenment in the British Atlantic, 1750- 1807, for 
example, looks at plantation records which suggest that, as early as the mid-
eighteenth century, “Time was a tool of discipline and an aid to measuring 
performance.” The planters, who “conceptualised time as a currency”, soon 
learnt that “the manipulation and organisation of work time and rest time […] 
was the key to both improving an estate’s productivity and ameliorating the 
conditions of slavery.” This is surprising for two reasons. First, Roberts locates the 
beginning of imperial time discipline much earlier than the classic studies by 
E.P. Thompson and his successors suggest.214 The argument is that time- 
management became part of the imperial project long before scientific advances 
had made accurate portable timekeepers available to the wider public. “In fact, 
clock-time discipline and the standardisation and numerical precision that we 
associate with the labour management techniques of early industrialisation were 
implemented on slave plantations decades before they transformed the early 
 
214 See ch. 2, section II. 
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factory labour systems.” Imperial agents, who transformed North-American and 
Caribbean plantations into a “factory in the field”, had priority, because they 
could test new techniques of social discipline on “virgin land”. America and 
other colonies became the laboratory in which the efficacy of European 
inventions could be tested and refined before they returned to European 
societies. 
The second reason why Roberts’ analysis is surprising is that from the earliest 
days of colonisation, the same planters, who whipped their slaves for being too 
slow or “behind schedule”, thought that they were promoting the 
Enlightenment project of universal improvement. “The clock and the precise 
divisions and systematic ordering of the work day that it enabled” were, 
according to Roberts, “integral parts of an Enlightenment-driven improvement 
project that transformed the plantation system of the British Americas from the 
early eighteenth century through [to] the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.”215 
These practices of time discipline, backed by the ideology of liberal progress, 
became even more visible in nineteenth-century factories. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, we may observe E.P. Thompson’s thesis that temporality, time-sense and 
time-management were radically transformed by industrialisation. The sound of 
factory bells became as common as church bells in industrialising cities where 
workers of all classes were forced to register their working hours on timesheets 
and timecards. Punching in and out under the supervision of an overseer who, 
like planters, displayed a pocket watch to mark his power, these workers 
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from more natural rhythms like sun or sleep.216 Shift workers in Fordist factories 
who were detached from their natural needs and from the final product of their 
labour experienced double alienation. From the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, time-management became a highly desirable skill in both managers and 
their staff. Until today managers are trained to guard against “time fraud”, the act 
by which an employee uses company time to perform tasks unrelated to the 
business – for example by taking extended smoking breaks. According to the 
American Payroll Association, American businesses lose on average 1.5% of their 
annual earnings to time fraud.217 This shows to what extent the artificial time of 
clocks and calendars has been internalised and commodified in so-called “advanced 
economies”. 
If working patterns on particular plantations and factory floors in the United 
States show the power of European notions of time at the micro-level, temporal 
reform as part of a general drive towards modernisation can be illustrated at the 







Like ports and telegraphs, railways were part of the large-scale imperial 
infrastructure that sought to keep the distant parts of the British world 
connected. The whole system relied on temporal coordination. The railway in 
 
216 M. O’Malley, “Time, Work and Task Orientation: A Critique of American Historiography”, 
Time & Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1992) 341-358 and O’Malley, Keeping Watch. 
217  https://www.nettimesolutions.com/blog/time-clock-fraud-stealing-seconds-adds-up-to- 




particular was not only a mechanical innovation; it brought a whole new lifestyle 
with it. Business, travel and politics could only be conducted across vast 
continents, if everyone agreed on a publicly coordinated relationship between 
time and space. As Giddens pointed out in The Nation-State and Violence, “A 
timetable is one of the most significant modern organisational devices, 
presuming and stimulating a regulation of social life by quantified time in a 
manner quite unknown to prior types of society. […] A time-table is a time- 
space ordering device, which is at the heart of modern organizations.”218 The 
railway timetable was the ultimate tool of social cohesion and synchronisation. 
Let us look at two different territories – India and the United States – to learn 
how British railways transformed time and temporality. In India the approach 
was very much a top-down imposition of European technology. In 1881, the 
British governor of Bombay, James Fergusson, missed a train because he had 
failed to calculate his way through the web of simultaneously existing times 
applied by different railway lines, telegraph bureaus, and local town hall buildings across 
British India.219 He decided to introduce an Indian Standard Time across the 
subcontinent. As Ritika Prasad explains, this involved “(i) replacing local time 
with that of the presidency/province served by a particular railway system; 
(ii) replacing presidency/province time with an all-India time; and (iii) ensuring that 
this all-India time was mathematically related to that of an internationally 
accepted base meridian at Greenwich.”220 This project however, was not just 
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administrators, universal coordination of clock time was also a policy tool to 
encourage Indians’ progress through historical time: According to an official 
writing in 1846, railways were a “mighty engine of improvement” which would 
“cause the slumbering spirit of India to awake from the sleep of ages, the sleep of 
apathy, superstition, and prejudice.” Railways became “a speedy mechanism to 
literally transport temporally backward societies into a normative historical 
modern.”221 
Between 1853 (the first passenger train in India) and 1905 (the adoption of All- 
India Railway Time), scientists and civil servants across the British Empire 
collaborated to develop ever more precise systems of time-management.222 For 
example, early railway timetables which were based on the 12-hour diurnal 
system, using “a.m.” and “p.m.” notations were reformed by the Canadian 
engineer Sanford Fleming, who in 1889 introduced the 24-hour notation. His 
1889 memorandum highlights the importance of precise temporal coordination for 
modern economic systems: In Fleming's view, counting the hours from zero to 
twenty-four was necessary because ‘the misprint of a single letter, a.m. for 
p.m. or vice versa will easily arise to cause inconvenience, loss of time, probably loss 
of property.”223 When Indian Standard Time (IST) was introduced across the 
subcontinent in 1919, nationalists complained that “Indian Standard Time”, 
5.30 hours “ahead” of GMT was not Indian enough, since it merely followed 
the time of the British. Mohandis Gandhi even published a critical piece entitled 
Time Sense discussing the “common charge” that Indians “have no sense of time” 
because “we are as a rule behind time”—an explicit reference to the diachronic 
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rendering of the colonial regime. Gandhi stressed: “Someone who is too late is 
admittedly behind time. But it is equally true to say that one who is four hours 
before time is also behind time. […] He may succeed in catching his train, but he 
will be behind time for many other things probably more important.”224 The 
problem of communication between Gandhi and the Governor boils down to 
the fact that Indians “still” experience multiple times, since “modern time” was 
imposed on them externally, while for the British standardised railway time has 
become the only time that matters. The Empire-building power of the railways can 




The United States, in their dual identity as a colonised and colonising 
community, received the impulse towards time reform from Britain but then 
promoted precision, punctuality and progress themselves via an ever-expanding 
railway network.225 Two recent studies by Ian Bartky and Michael O’Malley on time-
keeping in nineteenth-century America suggest that the railroad was essential to 
American territorial expansion and its self-understanding as an inherently 
benevolent civilisation.226 “The railroad system of the United States”, Henry Poor 
proclaimed in 1852, “is destined to be one of the most potent 
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History and Theory, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1972), 214-225. 
225 Public time was complemented by personal timekeepers which conferred prestige and – as US 
emerged as an independent power on the world stage – also national pride. American-made 
watches in the 1850s transitioned from being a symbol of European prestige to an emblem of 
American ingenuity. In 1870 Appleton’s Journal encouraged individual watch ownership thus: "The 
American watch has eminent claims as the true republican heirloom - a triumph of industry in 
an age of industry, it symbolizes the progress and dignity of labour; a product of American 
enterprise, it is associated with the sentiment of patriotism; moderate in cost, it is accessible to the 
body of the people, and, thoroughly made, it is prepared for a lengthened future . . . When a 
hundred years have rolled away, and the continent is reclaimed to civilization, and telegraphs 
enclose the globe like a net, a white-haired man shall say: 'My son, when I pass away I shall leave you 
this watch.'", A. McCrosssen, Marking Modern Times: A History of Clocks, Watches, and Other Timekeepers in 
American Life (Chicago, CUP, 2013), p.63. 
226 M. O’Malley, Keeping Watch: A History of American Time (New York, Viking, 1990); I.R. Bartky, 
Selling the True Time: Nineteenth-century timekeeping in America (Stanford, SUP, 2000). 
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physical instruments in the onward course of the nation. Any improvement that 
will give to this mighty engine of civilisation increased safety, efficiency and order, 
should be promptly adopted.”227 In fact, the railway companies cooperated 
closely with the United States Coastal Survey to explore which regions they 
could extend to. Territorial expansion was fuelled by the extraordinary 
confidence which modern timepieces conferred: “What a miracle that a man can 
put within this little machine a spirit that measures the flight of time with greater 
accuracy than the unassisted intellect of the profoundest philosophy. […] By 
means of a watch punctuality in all his duties – which in its perfection is one of the 
incommunicable attributes of Deity – is brought within the reach of Man.”228 
Imperial expansion was a quasi-religious mission. As the rail network grew, the 
coordination of a dozen different local times became increasingly complicated. 
When two terrible train accidents occurred in 1853 due to errors in timekeeping, it 
was the beginning of a concerted national effort to improve time measurement 
and temporal coordination in America. 
Scientific observatories proliferated around the country and literally started 
“selling the true time”, as Ian Bartky's book title suggests, to progressive public 
authorities and upwardly mobile individual customers. Time became a utility, 
publicly sold and exchanged – often at a high price since it promised nothing 
less than purchasable civilisation. “Observatory time”, O’Malley writes, was 
“something new; a utility, like gas or water, a tool for improving the morality of 
labourers, facilitating the movements of trade, and synchronising the economies of 
different regions.”229 This permitted some businesses to make considerable 
 
227 Henry Poor, as cited in O’Malley, Keeping Watch, 73. 
228 Edward Everett speaking at the Massachusetts Charitable Mechanics Association in 1837, as 
cited in O’Malley, Keeping Watch, 42. 
229 O’Malley, Keeping Watch, 98. 
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gains. The astronomer Leonard Waldo, for example, was originally employed at the 
New Haven observatory, then founded a Horological Bureau at Yale’s 
Winchester Observatory and finally formed the Standard Time Company, a joint 
stock enterprise organised to provide telegraphed time signals, like Western 
Union’s.230 These private pioneers played a significant role in coordinating and 
disciplining American daily life – and they had an unexpectedly wide impact on the 
global temporal order. It was Waldo and his colleagues who lobbied the railway 
operators to adopt a single rational system of time-keeping across the North-
American continent. “At noon on Sunday, 18 November 1883”, Bartky writes, 
“North American railroads created the modern era of public timekeeping. They 
discarded 49 different times by which they had been running freight and 
passenger trains and replaced them with five new ones. Known collectively as 
Standard Railway Time, these operating times differed from each other by exact 
hours across the continent and were indexed to the Royal Observatory at 
Greenwich’s Meridian. They were the first elements in what would become the 
worldwide system of civil time zones that we now call Standard Time.”231 It was no 
coincidence that it was the newly independent colonies of North America – 
which prolonged and perfected the imperial order to which they owed their 
birth. The more “advanced” a nation, the more profit – political and economic 
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C. Standardisation of time zones 
 
At the highest political level we find the imperial project of dividing and 
classifying the entire globe according to a scientific grid of time zones. This fits the 
taxonomic desires of Europeans at the intellectual level, but also had 
enormously beneficial effects on the practical coordination of people and 
products moving in a global economy. Vanessa Ogle, who offers a rare 
comparative analysis of chronopolitics from various international viewpoints, has 
traced exactly how the reference points which we now take for granted were 
negotiated in a global struggle for time which accompanied the phase of High 
Imperialism.232 Knowing the exact time in each colonial possession from the 
imperial centre and coordinating activities between colonies on the periphery 
was valued so highly by the European imperial powers that they even started 
temporal disputes between them. The International Meridian Conference in 
1884, which we encountered in the introduction,233 was only the most dramatic of 
many diplomatic gatherings at which European imperial powers planned how to 
(re)order the world according to a scientific temporal grid. There were regular 
international conferences in which the “civilised” nations of Europe and North 
America defined the standards to which infrastructure and communications 
systems had to adjust the world over. The three most important developments in 
international temporal standardisations were: (1) the convergence of national times 
into regional times roughly along the lines of longitude, which greatly 
facilitated communications, trade and warfare; (2) the abovementioned 
International Meridian Conference in 1884, in which London’s power was 
immortalised by setting the Greenwich meridian as the heart of global time- 
 
232 Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time. 
233 See introduction, 1. 
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keeping; (3) the process initiated by George Hudson of New Zealand in 1895 to 
optimise the working day with Daylight Saving Time. The last battle was the 
longest and remains incomplete, since the introduction of British Summer Time by 
Parliament in 1908 was not adopted by all nations with the same zeal as GMT. From 
the perspective of the imperial superpowers, the theoretical taming of time was the 
easy part – it was the implementation of such “civilised” visions of time on the 
ground which proved considerably more difficult. 
A few examples from my original archival research at the British National 
Archives in Kew demonstrate the variety of ways in which Western time was 
first defined and then accepted, negotiated or resisted. The British government 
papers show that temporal standardisation was one of the main sources of 
contention between colonial governors and local populations. Between the mid- 
nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, dispatches concerning disputes about 
time multiply continuously. They concern mostly the backlash to Europe’s 
efforts at standardising the national and international level of temporal 
synchronisation. In order of intensifying resistance to imperial timetables, I will 
show some correspondence from Barbados, India and Kenya. 
The Colonial and Dominion Offices kept large tables offering a total 
Archimedean picture of time and its variations across the British Empire (see 
fig. 3). The fact that they were updated several times a year by dozens of civil 
servants exclusively focused on this task shows their importance to the British 
imperial system. The creation of such tables, and the wider temporal order they 
represented, however, required diplomatic skill and persistence. 
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In 1920 the Colonial Office sent out a circular asking for all colonies to report 
what the local time was at their main harbour. The colonial administration in 
Barbados – assisted by the local Royal Navy commander - replied swiftly and 
obediently, informing London precisely that “Local Mean Time is kept in this 
colony, the meridian passing through the Flag Staff on Rickett’s Battery, on the 
North Shore of Carlyle Bay which is in Latitude 13” 5’ 42” N - Longitude 59” 37’ 
18” W.”234 This is the compliance London wanted to see. 
On the Indian subcontinent, the confrontation was much more heated, and 
continued over several decades, as active local resistance repeatedly frustrated 
British plans to impose IST. Bombay illustrates the intricate interplay between 
temporal colonialism and temporal anticolonialism. An initial attempt in 1881 by 
the British governor to introduce IST – the reference point for which was 
Madras (Chennai), 1350 km to the East and therefore also roughly two hours 
ahead of Bombay – was met with widespread non-compliance. As the clockfaces 
 
 
234 FO 286/725, National Archives, Letter of 1 Dec 1920. 
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of schools, cafés and private offices continued to show the original Bombay 
time, the result was an environment of multiple times that required knowledge 
not only of which time was kept where, but also of which time was followed by 
whom. After two years of strikes and complaints in the local newspaper - 
“Suppose I submit and keep Madras time, how am I to know that Jones and 
Smith do the same?” – the government relented. 
In 1905 a renewed attempt by the British to put Bombay on IST elicited a similar 
reaction. By then, the populations of India’s Western cities had fused their local 
complaint with a larger nationalist, anti-colonial narrative. The Kaiser-i-hind 
newspaper was most explicit: “We are asked to forget our natural time, the same 
that we have been familiar with from times immemorial, and adopt the new 
‘standard’ which the ingenuity of the Astronomer Royal [at Greenwich 
Observatory] has devised […] Nobody has asked for artificial time!” The anti- 
IST protestors in Bombay saw very clearly how temporal synchronisation 
benefited the agents of British power such as the Chamber of Commerce, but 




When Daylight Saving Time was to be introduced to maximise productivity in 
Kenya (a colony we will encounter again in chapter 4235) a long consultation 
began with the local tribes. The British committee charged with the task 









235 See ch. 4, section I. 
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offices half an hour earlier; (3) moving the 
clock forward half an hour.” Of these, (1) was a 
mere formality since the British had already 
decided to   alter the   time, as internal 
correspondence in the relevant Colonial 
Office file shows. Still, the records of oral and 
written consultations reveal that there was a 
multiplicity of opinions on the remaining two 
options. After having registered the different 
viewpoints of local chiefs, shopkeepers and 
 
 
Figure 4: Effect of altering clock (CO 533/380/8) 
farmers, the committee’s final report shows a complete lack of concern for local 
interests. First, they point to the Chairman of the Nairobi Chamber of 
Commerce, undoubtedly a government-friendly figure, who “stressed the fact 
that by altering the clock, the ‘danger period’, as he described it, between sunset 
and dinner would be satisfactorily reduced, while the hours of sleep remained 
undisturbed.” (see fig. 4). Then, they distance themselves from the term “danger- 
hour”, perhaps because it sounded foreign and even primitive. In a state of 
civilisation, there should be no danger-hour. The committee was nevertheless 
“unanimous in agreeing that the half hour period should be taken from this 
period rather than from the hours of sleep.” After all, the British needed well- 
rested labourers for their plantations, mines and infrastructure. But in the next 
paragraph a counterargument is raised: “It has been contended, though not 
before the Committee, that this ‘danger period’ is, on the contrary, a very 
important period of social intercourse in the tropics and that in effect any 
attempts to alter the clock would simply mean that the dinner hour would be 
postponed, and that the half hour would eventually be taken from the sleep 
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period”. The way in which this objection is presented illustrates the European 
belief in superiority. Instead of real engagement, the reader should content 
himself with exoticising language and a generalisation about life in “the tropics”. No 
names, no explanations are offered. “It has been contended” as passively and 
impersonally as possible and “not before the Committee”, the real authority, that 
the British might be making a mistake by interfering with the lives of others. 
Hearsay about mysterious customs – that is all which the subject peoples can 
muster in their defence. The British, by contrast, were able to use their 
comparative perspective across multiple colonies to scientifically assess that an 
adjustment to local customs was not needed: “The Committee, however, could get 
no evidence in support of this contention, but on the contrary the practice in 
Uganda, which, owing to its more westerly position, already has in effect the 
system suggested for Kenya, was cited. The dinner at Government House in 
Entebbe, for example, is exactly the same as the dinner hour at Government 
House in Nairobi, and no great inconvenience is felt in the consequent 
shortening of the ‘danger period’”.236 
Why the protocol of “Government House”, rather than the real lives of 
Kenyans, should be chosen as a reference point is not explained. For British 
officials in Nairobi writing to British officials in London, this seemed beside the 
point. The committee did not hide its interest: “On the evidence before it, the 
Committee must come definitely to the conclusion that the whole of the 
European community in Nairobi who at present work until 5.0 p.m. […] would 
welcome a measure that would, without reducing their working hours, enable 
them to obtain an extra half hour of daylight for recreation.”237 Native dissent 
 
236 Report of the Select Committee on Daylight Saving, CO 533/380/8, National Archives, 4. 
237 Report of the Select Committee on Daylight Saving, CO 533/380/8, National Archives, 6. 
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was squashed with the force of civilisation, and Kenya ultimately put its clocks 




We cannot but conclude from this overview that temporal standardisation was a 
highly political matter, of the utmost economic and strategic importance for 
Europeans but therefore also a prime target for anti-colonial acts of resistance. 
Overall, this section has shown that the functioning of Empires relied on 
synchronic systems of coordination, which served a double purpose: on the one 
hand, they facilitated international trade and labour migration; on the other they 
“civilised” non-Europeans who were deemed to be “lagging behind” European 









The combination of diachronic theories of subjection and synchronic practices of 
coordination leads to a paradoxical tension: On the one hand, time is conceived 
as ‘universal’: clock time makes it possible to measure time in exactly the same way 
wherever you are in the world, because the British Greenwich meridian sets the 
universal clock. At the same time, there is the notion of different historical 




238 The Acting Attorney General’s Legal Report of 22 June 1928 confirmed to London that the 
motion Alteration of the Time Bill, was passed on 11 June 1928, and would come into effect on 
30 June 1928. It took only a month for the British to move the clock throughout the colony. 
CO 533/380/8, National Archives. 
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makes it possible for Europeans to travel geographically backwards in time.239 Is 
time the same everywhere, as clock time affirms, or are there simultaneously 
existing temporal differences as historical time seems to suggest? 
As we have seen, the two visions of time are historically linked: People who were 
classified as “primitive” according to the standard of historical time were 
brought into more “advanced” stages of historical development when they 
reoriented their lives around “modern” clock time. There is a real risk, however, 
that successful modernisation through the clock will lead to demands, on the 
part of the colonised, to be reclassified in higher stages of historical time. This 
however, threatens the very basis of colonialism – the creed of 
(under)development. 
I call it a “creed” because it plays nearly the same function in modern Empires as 
religion played in the Early Modern Empires. Those Empires – Spain, Portugal, 
and to some extent the Netherlands – made conversion to Christianity the aim and 
justification of imperial expansion. The idea was that Europeans were already 
living within the orbit of sacred biblical time, while non-Europeans had been left 
outside of it. Since there is no salvation outside of the sacred orbit, the “heathens” 
had to be brought into the story of Christianity. Until today, the Final Judgement 
remains the strongest image in the service of European superiority. In its 
secularised and naturalised version, “heathens” are relabelled as “savages” and it is 
one’s positionality in history which defines one’s prospect for salvation. 
Backwardness is sin, while forward-looking modernity is virtue. The sinfulness of 
backwardness stems from the apparent failure, even unwillingness to subject 
oneself to the reform projects that the Europeans 
 
239 I am grateful to Katrin Flikschuh for highlighting this dissonance. 
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offered. A failure to make the most out of the time God has granted you on 
Earth - by sticking to an intense factory labour schedule, for instance - is seen as 
irreligious. You are wasting the gift of life – and also your capitalist employer’s 
money. 
The desire to be modern is warmly greeted by the enlightened judges, especially if it 
is accompanied by the zeal of the convert, the desperate desire to catch up with 
those “further ahead” on the linear path of Christianity. Successive waves of 
secularisation have altered the vocabulary, but the logic remains the same. 
Instead of the question: “Have you been good enough?” the Lord of the new 
Final Judgement asks: “Have you been modern enough?”. If strict predestination is 
replaced with an enlightened belief in human perfectibility and self- 
improvement, the ultimate question in the Eurocentric judgement of world 
history is: “Have you become modern enough?”. It is the development towards 
something that matters most in the linear conception of Liberal Time – and, 
strangely enough, that development, however painful, however violent, is 
couched in the language of freedom. Following the path of Liberal Time is 
supposed to bring liberty. 
The power of Europe’s normative claim to holding the key to modernity, like St 
Peter at the gates of Heaven, has been amply illustrated by the thoughtful works of 
Edward Said, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Gayatri Spivak.240 And still , we should ask 
ourselves: why did Europeans think they had a right to enforce their historico-temporal order on the world? 
For Europeans, progress was not something that happened around them, or even to 
them – progress was the world-historical change that 
 
 
240 E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London, 1993), esp. 16-25; R. Morris (ed.). Can the Subaltern Speak? : 
Reflections on the History of an Idea (New York, CUP, 2010); D. Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe (Princeton, 
PUP, 2000). 
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happened through them. Europeans were warriors and guardians of progressive 
modernity. In their own understanding, Europeans had the power to “bring” 
progress to other peoples and “invite” them to partake in the fulfilment of a 
global historical project. 
This, of course, requires a careful balancing act between postulating multiple 
lived times while upholding the single line of European historical time. Universal 
progress relies on particular pockets of polychronicity, the coexistence of 
different political temporal orders, different imagined timescapes. Two political 
proposals, 126 years apart, might give us more insights into the European vision of 
orchestrated polychronic progress. 
In 1883 the chief theorist of the late Victorian British Empire, John Seeley, 
proposed that different colonies should be assigned different roles on the 
timeline of imperial politics. His lectures on The Expansion of England shaped the minds 
of many generations of civil servants, diplomats and governors with the following 
philosophy of Britain’s historical mission: “It is a favourite maxim of mine that 
history, while it should be scientific in its method, should pursue a practical 
object. That is, it should not merely gratify the reader's opinion about the past, 
but modify his view of the present and his forecast of the future. Now if this 
maxim be sound, the history of England ought to end with something that might be called a moral. 
Some large conclusion ought to arise out of it; it ought to exhibit the general 
tendency of English affairs in such a way as to set us thinking about the future and 
divining the destiny which is reserved for us. The more so because the part played 
by our country in the world certainly does not grow less prominent as history 
advances. Some countries, such as Holland and Sweden, might pardonably 
regard their history as in a manner wound up. […] But 
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England has grown steadily greater and greater.”241 This “practical” history 
already shares all the basic assumptions identified in our exploration of Liberal 
Time in Chapter 1: (1) human history is a linear system; (2) the system has 
meaning, “it ought to end with something that might be called a moral”; (3) some 
chosen country is at the forefront of history (“England has grown steadily 
greater and greater”, seemingly due to “the destiny which is reserved for us”), 
while others have already missed the train of time (Holland and Sweden); (4) this 
chosen country will not decline ( it “certainly does not grow less prominent”); 
because (5) scientific observation of quasi-natural processes interlocks with 
eschatological divinations to show that “the history of England ought to end with something that 
might be called a moral. Some large conclusion ought to arise out of it”. The past 
informs the future, and we should be interested in the past only insofar as it 
“set[s] us thinking about the future”. 
In an Empire as vast as Britain’s, however, not everyone shares the same position in 
history. In conformity with the abovementioned Enlightenment taxonomies, the 
British possessions formed a multi-speed Empire,242 in which different degrees of 
advancement in time were illustrated by different geographical locations. Seeley 
fused time and space skilfully: “The [white settler] colonies and India are in opposite 
extremes. Whatever political maxims are applicable to one, are most inapplicable to 
the other. In the [white settler] colonies everything is brand-new. There you have 
the most progressive race put in the circumstances most 
 
 
241 J. Seeley, The Expansion of England (1883), lecture I, 2, via 
https://ia800906.us.archive.org/25/items/expansionofengla00seelrich/expansionofengla00see 
lrich_djvu.txt, accessed 28/09/19. 
242 A phrase recently taken up again with the idea of a “Multi-speed Europe”, defined as “the term 
used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration whereby common objectives 
are pursued by a group of EU countries both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the 
others will follow later.” https://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/multispeed_europe.html, accessed 03/03/20. 
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favourable to progress. There you have no past and an unbounded future. Government and 
institutions are all ultra-English. All is liberty, industry, invention, innovation and as 
yet tranquillity. […] But there is at the same time another Greater Britain, surpassing 
this in population though not in territory, and it is everything which this is not. India 
is all past and, I may almost say, no future. […] All the oldest religions, all the oldest customs, 
petrified as it were. No form of popular government as yet possible. Everything 
which Europe, and still more the New World, has outlived still flourishing in full 
vigour.”243 In this multi-speed Empire, the Indian past coexisted with the 
British present and the American future. America was the laboratory of futuristic 
fantasies while Britain could confidently speak from “the here and now”, having 
progressed from India’s historico-spatial position in “the there and then”, as 
Fabian calls it.244 The British Empire was construed as a benevolent project to 
even-out levels of progress across the globe. The division of the world’s peoples 
into those of the past, present and future informed imperial policy. The 
ostensible aim of imperial government was therefore to bring everyone up to 
speed by exporting the future to backward peoples. While American settlers were 
given free reign because they had the potential to correct Europe’s mistakes, 
Indians, a nation of the past, were dominated with imperial practices that had 
long been outlawed in Europe. The barbarian colonies were an outlet for 
repressed European violence, while the progressive colonies enabled 







243 J. Seeley, The Expansion of England (1883) lecture II, 51, via 
https://ia800906.us.archive.org/25/items/expansionofengla00seelrich/expansionofengla00see 
lrich_djvu.txt, accessed 28/09/19, emphasis added. 
244 Fabian, Time and the Other, esp. ch. 2 entitled “Our time, their time, no time: co-evalness denied”. 
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Now, this international temporal order may be compared with a much more 
recent proposal by French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who, on a state visit to 
Senegal in 2009 gave an extraordinary speech inviting young Africans “to enter 
History”. “I have not come here, young Africans, to teach you any lesson”, 
President Sarkozy begins, but a few seconds later, an almost complete picture of the 
imperialist gospel of progress is revealed: “The tragedy of Africa is that the African 
Man has not yet sufficiently entered History. The African peasant, whose ideal in life 
has for thousands of years been to live in harmony with the seasons, to live in 
harmony with nature, that man knows only the eternal recurrence of time, 
rhythmically marked by the repetition of the same words and movements. In this 
imaginary where everything always recommences, there is no space for human 
adventure, no space for the idea of progress. In this universe in which nature commands 
everything, Man escapes the anxiety of History which torments modern Man, 
but thereby also remains immobile in an immutable order where everything 
already seems written in advance. That Man never leaps towards the future. Never does 
it occur to him to escape repetition in order to invent a destiny for himself. That is 
exactly where the problem of Africa lies (if I may say so as a friend of Africa). The 
challenge for Africa is to enter further into History.”245 
This passage weaves together the temporality of everyday life with the larger 
forces of historical time to lay bare five fundamental tenets of imperialist history: 
(1) There might be different local histories, but here is only one Hegelian History 
which records and guides the fate of the world’s nations. The “problem” of 
African Man is that even though he might think he has entered local histories, 
 
 
245 N. Sarkozy, Discours de Dakar, 26 July 2009, via 
https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2007/11/09/le-
discours-de- dakar_976786_3212.html, accessed 22/02/21. 
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he has not entered the right kind of history, a universal history defined by 
change. (2) For change to be possible at all, moments in time must be unique 
and irreversible. In contrast to cyclical conceptions of time, which do not allow for 
lasting causal change, the History of Europeans is linear, unidirectional and 
evolutionary. (3) Even if evolution is important and natural metaphors abound in 
European historiography, that History of change is clearly distinct from and 
superior to nature’s cyclical rhythms, precisely because the non-repetition of 
Liberal Time allows for lasting historical change. (4) There are some non- 
European collectives who have “not yet” made the jump from primitive cycles to 
linear development. They live in the same calendar year but not in the same 
historical period. (5) These non-observers of Western time are grouped together, 
standardised and pathologised as inferior beings since they lack a defining 
human feature: the will to “invent a destiny” for themselves. By extension, the 
“problem” is not that Africans cannot partake in history; it is rather that they 
cannot muster “the will” to do so. Like so many European politicians before 
him, Sarkozy does not even consider the option that his audience has a will, but 
that it might be directed against the Europeans and their history.246 Instead, it is 
suggested that they have a weaker will or no will at all (both in the European 
conception of the term), since anyone with the capacity to will is assumed to will the 
same objectives as Europeans. It is in this regard that “Africans” are declared to be 
unable to make History: “The problem of Africa lies in ceasing to repeat 





246 For an analysis of the “philosophical racism” of supposedly universal terms like “will” or “soul”, 
see the K. Flikschuh, “Philosophical racism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 92, No. 1 (2018), 91-
110 and C. Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism (New York, OUP, 2017). 
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eternal return, the cyclical, naturalist, fatalist view of history should be 
 
abandoned by anyone who wants to “fully enter” real “History”. 
 
What could be done to remedy this “problem” according to the representative of 
the colonising country? Mr Sarkozy suggests “finding a way to remain faithful to 
itself without remaining immobile” – mobility is essential – learning “to 
appreciate accession to the Universal not as a renouncement of what she [Africa] is, 
but as an accomplishment.” This “accession to the Universal” is facilitated by the 
enduring link to France, home of universal human rights: “The part of Europe 
which is within you is the fruit of a great sin of pride”, Sarkozy admits, but it is 
also “a call to liberty, to emancipation, to justice and equality between men and 
women.” The part of Europe which was violently implanted in a subject 
population is, the president concludes, “the call to Reason and universal 
conscience.” 247 If History is the unfolding of Reason in global societal 
development, then entering hegemonic History is partaking in Reason while 
 
 
247 N. Sarkozy, Discours de Dakar, 26 July 2009, via 
https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2007/11/09/le-discours-de- 
dakar_976786_3212.html, accessed 22/02/21. « Je ne suis pas venu, jeunes d'Afrique, vous donner 
des leçons. Je ne suis pas venu vous faire la morale. Mais je suis venu vous dire que la part 
d'Europe qui est en vous est le fruit d'un grand péché d'orgueil de l'Occident mais que cette 
part d'Europe en vous n'est pas indigne. Car elle est l'appel de la liberté, de l'émancipation et de la 
justice et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. Car elle est l'appel à la raison et à la 
conscience universelles. Le drame de l'Afrique, c'est que l'homme africain n'est pas assez entré dans 
l'histoire. Le paysan africain, qui depuis des millénaires, vit avec les saisons, dont l'idéal de vie est 
d'être en harmonie avec la nature, ne connaît que l'éternel recommencement du temps rythmé par 
la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles. Dans cet imaginaire où tout 
recommence toujours, il n'y a de place ni pour l'aventure humaine, ni pour l'idée de progrès. Dans 
cet univers où la nature commande tout, l'homme échappe à l'angoisse de l'histoire qui tenaille 
l'homme moderne mais l'homme reste immobile au milieu d'un ordre immuable où tout semble 
être écrit d'avance. Jamais l'homme ne s'élance vers l'avenir. Jamais il ne lui vient à l'idée de sortir 
de la répétition pour s'inventer un destin. Le problème de l'Afrique et permettez à un ami de 
l'Afrique de le dire, il est là. Le défi de l'Afrique, c'est d'entrer davantage dans l'histoire. C'est de 
puiser en elle l'énergie, la force, l'envie, la volonté d'écouter et d'épouser sa propre histoire. Le 
problème de l'Afrique, c'est de cesser de toujours répéter, de toujours ressasser, de se libérer du 
mythe de l'éternel retour, c'est de prendre conscience que l'âge d'or qu'elle ne cesse de regretter, ne 
reviendra pas pour la raison qu'il n'a jamais existé. Le problème de l'Afrique, c'est qu'elle vit trop le 
présent dans la nostalgie du paradis perdu de l'enfance. […]Le problème de l'Afrique, c'est de rester 
fidèle à elle-même sans rester immobile. Le défi de l'Afrique, c'est d'apprendre à regarder son 
accession à l'universel non comme un reniement de ce qu'elle est mais comme un 
accomplissement. » 
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following alternative, particularist histories is retrograde. Universalist Christian 
eschatology, naturalised, secularised and politicised, thus underpinned imperial 






This chapter has analysed the idea and practice of Liberal Time at the global 
level. It identified two kinds of relationship between European colonisers and 
non-European colonised peoples. The first is diachronic because Europe saw 
itself as “more advanced” on the ladder of historical development than the 
“backward” societies which “still” lived in earlier times. That temporal distance was 
a powerful ideological tool because it justified imperial intervention. The second 
relationship is synchronic, since the imperial project relied on uniform time 
discipline. The contrast between the two approaches seems enormous, and yet 
imperial theorists sought to resolve it through the religiously inspired notion of the 
“civilising mission”. This “white Man’s burden”, to use Kipling’s phrase,248 was 
supposedly based on the European privilege of being the chosen guardian of 
progress. In Part II of this thesis we shall see how this self- understanding of 
“progressive power”, a European “force for good” played out in the long run. By 
analysing present-day contestations of the original imperialist progress paradigm, we 








248 R. Kipling, The white Man’s burden (1899), via 
http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_burden.htm, accessed 20/07/2021. 
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Doctor: “My friend, my friend, you are forgetting the Oriental character. How iss 
 
[sic] it possible to have developed us, with our apathy and superstition? At least you 
have brought to us law and order. The unswerving British 
Justice and the Pax Britannica.” 
Flory: “Pox Britannica, doctor, Pox Britannica is its proper name. And in any 
 





Liberal Time might be powerful, but thereby not necessarily monolithic. I have 
identified a number of variations and articulations of Liberal Time in different 
contexts. To see how established institutions build, promote and defend 
conceptions of progress, I will focus on the national institutions and vocabulary of 
three traditional imperial powers. The comparative analysis of national 
timescapes begins with Britain, the first and last of Europe’s modern Empires. 
The vast imperial network which was gradually built up from early explorations of 
Newfoundland until it covered a quarter of the Earth’s habitable surface at its late 
Victorian peak distinguished itself from competitor Empires through its agility. 
Just as it survived the secession of the American Colonies and the Napoleonic 
Wars with the “Swing to the East” in the late eighteenth century,250 the Crown’s 




249 G. Orwell, Burmese Days (London, Penguin Modern Classics, 2009 [1934]), p. 40. 
250 Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. II: The eighteenth century, esp. P. J. Marshall, “Britain 
without America: A Second British Empire?”, 576-595. See also: H.V. Bowen, The Business of 
Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833 (Cambridge, CUP, 2005). 
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Calcutta, Cape Town and the Suez Canal in the nineteenth century.251 In the 
twentieth century, the British style of colonialism was characterised by a 
comparatively small footprint: economic ties preceded political connections, 
private investment from metropolitan capitalists alleviated the state purse and 
territories were secured and administered by fewer colonial officials per square mile 
than in any other colonial system. This flexibility also made the twentieth century 
retreat from Empire somewhat easier for Britain than for its competitors, but 
that does not mean that there was no friction. Imperial retreat was accompanied 
by great suffering, even large-scale criminal wrongdoing – and yet the British state 
apparatus tried its utmost not to rock the boat at home. From the 
“emancipation” of the Thirteen Colonies to the peaceful “transfer of power” in 
India, the dissolution of Empire was meant to look organic, slow, inevitable. 
Why? 
This chapter seeks to find answers in the British tradition of progressive 
organicism. Like the two subsequent ones it will be divided into three parts: trial, 
tradition, and historical truth. More specifically, section I introduces the Mutua et 
al. v. FCO trials (2011 and 2012) to analyse the legal discourse on redress for the 
Mau Mau veterans who suffered systematic torture during Kenyan 
decolonisation. As already stated,252 I do not pretend to analyse these trials as a 




251 If we agree, that is, with Robinson and Gallagher’s thesis of the periphery-driven 
“Imperialism of Free Trade”. The alternative would be Cain and Hopkins’ concept of 
“Gentlemanly Capitalism”, positing that it was the imperial centre, and more specifically London’s 
unique fusion between moneyed interests and Parliament, that fuelled the Empire. See J. Gallagher 
& R. Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, Economic History Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1953) 1-15; 
P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old 
Colonial System, 1688-1850”, Economic History Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1986) 501-525; “Gentlemanly 
Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945”, Economic History 
Review., Vol.40, No. 1 (1987) 1-26. 
252 See Introduction, section II. 
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legal records as discourse; a public discourse which reveals a specifically British 
view on the relationship between time and justice. Section II links these initial 
findings to a broader intellectual tradition that, as I argue, prioritises the idea of 
historical continuity at all cost. Section III asks what this specific context of a 
national timescape characterised by the idea of continuity means for the 
revelation and incorporation of uncomfortable historical truths. The key sources 
will be the parliamentary debates on the Hola Camp Massacre on 27 July 1959 and 
the Mau Mau settlement on 6 June 2013. By showing that the British 
establishment is very adept at promoting a narrative of Britain as a continuous 
force for good in the world, I suggest that the British national timescape - 









Dozens of victims of British “counterinsurgency” or “law and order” operations 
have sued the British Government for damages, yet no legal battle revealed the 
structure and extent of the British timescape like Mutua et al. v. FCO, heard at 
the Royal Courts of Justice in 2011 and 2012. The claimants were five veterans of 
the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion (1952-63), who had been illegally detained and 
tortured as part of the British counter-insurgency operations (COIN) during the 
Kenyan struggle for independence. This struggle had escalated continuously 
since the Colonial Secretary, Sir Evelyn Baring, proclaimed a State of Emergency on 
20 October 1952, which allowed for “wide powers of arrest and detention of 
147  
suspected persons.”253 The most important directive in this context was the so- 
called Cowan Plan, an internally distributed document, explaining in great detail 
how suspicious individuals could be arrested without trial and distributed across 
detention camps in the country’s interior, where they would work for 
“rehabilitation”. John Cowan, senior Prisons Officer of the Mwea Camps, knew 
that this would include the systematic use of force – which he authorised in 
paragraph 182 of his memo: “(j) It is assumed that the party would obey this 
order (the order to proceed to the work site) but should they refuse they would 
be manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task.” Mr Goudie, a 
coroner at the infamous Hola Camp, where this “manhandling” led to the 
death of 11 prisoners, translates Cowan’s instructions as “a carte blanche to use 
whatever force might prove necessary to ensure the performance of the task 
whether the detainees affected proved merely reluctant or completely 
obdurate.”254 The five veterans – Ndiku Mutua, Paulo Nzili, Wambugu Nyingi, 
Jane Muthoni Mara and Susan Ngondi - who appeared before the British High 
Court in July 2011 had suffered beatings, rape and mutilation in these camps. 
They therefore thought they had a claim to compensation from the British 
government even half a century after the alleged crimes had occurred. 
Before we go any further into the details of their arguments, it must be said that 
the two rounds – 2011 and 2012 – of this legal action were very different. The 





253 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2011), Approved Judgement, § 9, via 
https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20130311T095828-mutua-v-ors- 
judgment%20judgment%2021-07-2011.pdf , accessed 01/08/17. 
254 Hansard, House of Commons, Hola Camp (Kenya) Report debate, 27 July 1959, c 182, via  
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/jul/27/hola-camp-kenya-
report, accessed 15/01/19. 
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second round turned out to be a probe into the power of procedure in English 
law. 
In 2011, the claimants, represented by Leigh Day, argued thus: “First, (1) it is 
said that the former liability of the Colonial Administration in Kenya simply 
devolved or was transferred, by operation of the Common Law, upon the UK 
Government at the time of independence in 1963. Secondly, (2) it is said that the 
UK Government is directly liable to the claimants, as a joint tortfeasor, with the 
Colonial Administration and the individual perpetrators of the tortious assaults, for 
having encouraged, procured, acquiesced in, or otherwise having been 
complicit in, the creation and maintenance of the “system” under which the 
claimants were mistreated. Such liability is said to arise out of the role of the 
military/security forces under the command of the British Commander-in- 
Chief. Thirdly, (3) it is alleged that the UK Government is similarly jointly liable, 
through the former Colonial Office, for the acts complained of, because of its 
role in the creation of the same system under which detainees were knowingly 
exposed to ill-treatment. Fourthly, (4) it is said that the UK Government is liable to 
the claimants (and to the third claimant in particular) as the result of an 
instruction, approval or authorisation of particular treatment of claimants given on 
16 July 1957. Fifthly, and finally, (5) it is alleged that the UK Government is liable 
in negligence for breach of a Common Law duty of care in failing to put a stop to 
what it knew was the systemic use of torture and other violence upon detainees 
in the camps when it had a clear ability to do so.”255 Against those claims, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office did not deny that there was systematic 
torture in colonial Kenya or that the claimants were direct victims of 
 
 
255 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2011), Approved Judgement, § 13. 
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such wrongdoing. However, the entity potentially responsible for those 
wrongdoings – the Colonial Government of Kenya – no longer existed. More 
specifically, the defence argued, (1) that the Colonial Government and 
Administration in Kenya was “separate and distinct“ from the UK Government 
and (2) that “it was only the former that could conceivably have been held liable for 
the torts at the time when they were committed”.256 For the lawyers of the FCO, 
there was no significant institutional link between London and Nairobi, and 
therefore no continuity of legal personhood or moral responsibility between the 
London-based Colonial Office of the 1950s and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of the new millennium. By exploiting geographical 
distance first, and temporal distance later the defence thus argued that London 
had no shared moral responsibility with either the local Colonial administration in 
Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion, or with its successor, the Government of 
Kenya, after the Independence Act of 1963. National self-determination for 
Kenya, included accepting the momentous task of cleaning up the debris and 
disorder created by somebody else.257 
This was the same UK Government whose members, in 1959, had called the 
Overseas Civil Service “a Service of which the nation has reason to be proud”; 
whose MPs paid “tribute to my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary and to 
the Governor [who] are to be congratulated on the humane way in which they 
have handled this problem [the supposed problem of Kenyan independence 
fighters]”; the imperial system in which John Peel MP was applauded in the 
House of Commons for saying: “ […] we who sit in the air-conditioned ease of 
 
 
256 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2011), Approved Judgement, § 11. 
257  See W. Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History (1940), https://folk.uib.no/hlils/TBLR- 
B/Benjamin-History.pdf , accessed 15/01/19. 
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this Chamber might remember occasionally the discomfort, danger and 
difficulties experienced by many dedicated members of the Colonial Service. While 
weakness must not be condoned, let us not forget how much we owe to the 
loyalty, courage and perseverance of people overseas, and how much the future 
of the Commonwealth still depends upon the continued demonstration of those 
qualities.”258 Given the wealth of historical evidence produced by the claimants 
to show that the UK Government – a temporally continuous institution - was 
considerably more involved in colonial activities in Kenya than it liked to admit in 




In the appeal hearing of 2012, time played an even bigger role. Abandoning all 
attempts at arguing in terms of historical substance, the UK Government chose a 
procedural argument to defend itself against the historical damages claim. The 
Amended Defence of 2012 makes extensive use of the Limitation Act 1980 to 
argue that the Mau Mau veterans have simply exceeded the “special time limits in 
respect of wrongs causing personal injuries or death”, which are usually three 
years.259 The defending lawyer, Mr Mansfield QC, even does the maths for the 
audience: “The first allegations in respect of which the claims are brought begin 
with the arrest of the Third Claimant, Mr Nyingi, in December 1952. They end 
with the release of the Fifth Claimant, Mrs Ngondi (now deceased) in mid-1959. It 
seems to be common ground, therefore, that the primary limitation periods in 
respect of the claims by the Second to Fifth Claimants respectively ended in 
September 1960 (Mr Nzili), 3 March 1962 (Mr Nyingi) and on dates in 1963 
 
 
258 All three statements from the HC Hola Camp debate, 27 July 1959 c. 195 ff., 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/jul/27/hola-camp-kenya-
report. 259  https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58, § 11. 
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(which are unclear) (Mrs Mara and the late Mrs Ngondi). The period of delay is, 
therefore, from between 1960/1963 to the issue of these proceedings on 23 June 
2009, a period of approximately 50 years in duration. The events to be 
investigated at any trial would extend back to 1952 at least, a period of 60 years or 
more by the likely date of trial.”260 Without making any explicit judgement as to the 
invalidity of the claimants’ case, the government defence illustrates its power by 
meticulously quantifying the temporal delay. The summation of all the years in 
which the government was not threatened in its authority by a personal damages 
claim from the colonial period strengthens that very authority. The state’s 
authority seemingly grows with every uncontested minute. Some of these 
uncontested minutes were, of course, purposefully created by the government: 
in addition to the ordinary statutes of limitation in Britain, it was part of the 
“transfer of power” in East Africa that the newly independent Government of 
Kenya proscribed all collective gathering or activities of (former) members of the 
Mau Mau movement until 2003 – 40 years from the Act of Independence. That 
temporally defined restriction on the right of assembly certainly played its part in 
preventing Mau Mau veterans from mounting any collective action against 
either the Kenyan or the British state. The former colonial power gave itself a 
time of peace.261 In this reading, every year that passes strengthens the (alleged) 
perpetrator and weakens the case of the victim. And yet, when brutalities of 
the colonial system can finally be contested in court, the government’s lawyer, 
Mr Mansfield QC, submits “that the period from independence in 1963 to 2003 
was significant in giving rise to the significant forensic 
 
260 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2012), Approved Judgement, § 11. 
261 Of course, there are practical reasons for prescription, above all the limited resources (staff, 
space, time) of the legal system. It is true that many valid, and perhaps more urgent cases, could 
never be heard if the judiciary assessed every single case that is brought before a court. This is also 
mentioned by some opponents of historical redress, as discussed in chapter 1. 
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prejudice which, he submits, the defendant now faces and for which it is in no way 
responsible.”262 Was it really “in no way responsible” for the delay? 
The UK government is not even attempting to answer this question (I will return to 
it below). Instead, the FCO lawyer’s main strategy of defence in this second trial is 
to talk as little as possible about the circumstances surrounding the alleged torts of 
1956-59, and instead focus on the time between those torts and the present 
trial. The simplest, most natural argument is that “all relevant witnesses who would 
have been able to give evidence as to matters of ‘high policy’ from the civilian or 
military side are now dead.”263 The most important word here is “relevant”. Who 
counts as a “relevant witness”? The government points out that they include “the 
three Secretaries of State for the Colonies (Lyttleton, Lennox- Boyd and Macleod), 
the three Commanders in Chief (Erskine, Lathbury and Tapp), the Governor 
for the bulk of the emergency period (Baring), the principal Ministers and Civil 
Servants of the Colonial Administration and the principal Civil Servants in the 
Colonial Office.”264 It is remarkable that for the British administration “all 
relevant witnesses“ are the ones who designed and implemented abusive 
counter-insurgency operations to defend the Empire. Relevant are those willing 
– even in the face of the most damning evidence of administrative abuse of 
power for human rights violations – “to demonstrate more than one side to the 
story sought to be advanced on behalf of the claimants”. More than one side to 
the story, the history of direct orders of torture, could only be given by 
“witnesses from the highest echelons of government and the military who 
could explain the background to what had 
 
 
262 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2012), Approved Judgement, § 34. Emphasis added. 
263 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2012), Approved Judgement, § 35. 
264 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2012), Approved Judgement, § 61. 
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been written at the time.”265 Since that process is not possible in 2012, the 
 
government resisted the claimants’ desire for a full trial. 
 
The fact that some of their victims – Mr Mutua, Mr Nzili etc. – are still alive and 
standing before them at the Royal Courts of Justice, ready to give testimony, 
does not even seem worthy of a comment.266 When the claimants point out that 
they have not only identified live witnesses in Kenya and the UK, but also 
gathered extensive documentary evidence of the period – sometimes penned by the 
“relevant witnesses” mentioned above – the government’s defendant stays firm: 
“No, a fair trial is not possible”, says the FCO, even as it acknowledges the 
existence of some documents and some witnesses, but the system of which the 
claimants complain has to be established from the bottom to the very top of 
government in the United Kingdom. That, it is argued, is no longer possible, nor 
therefore is a fair trial possible.267 
Against this discourse of the inevitability of natural death and the ever increasing 
historical force of British institutions, the claimants invoke the power of the 
individual. Their best route to a full trial is to ask the Court, represented by 
Justice McCombe, to exercise its discretion under section 33 of the Limitation 
Act 198 (“Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of personal 
injuries or death”268) to permit the claims to proceed despite the usual statutes of 
limitations. 
Let me underline that this is a state using its own legal system to protect itself 
and its historical ideology. The authority and standing of the British Civil 
 
265 Mutua et al. v. FCO (2012), Approved Judgement, § 59. 
266 M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford, OUP, 2007). 
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Service269 – including what was known as the Overseas Civil Service (OCS) – is at 
risk, if the government loses this argument. If the procedural objection to a full 
trial fails, a full investigation might reveal more than necessary. But revealing only 
exactly as much as necessary is a political imperative . This brings us to Achille 
Mbembe’s paradox of the archive: “On the one hand, there is no state without 
archives - without its archives. On the other hand, the very existence of the archive 
constitutes a constant threat to the state.” The main reason for this lies in the 
relationship between time and the state: “More than on its ability to recall, the 
power of the state rests on its ability to consume time, that is, to abolish the 
archive and anaesthetise the past. The act that creates the state is an act of 
'chronophagy'. It is a radical act because consuming the past makes it possible 
to be free from all debt. […] This violence is defined in contrast to the very 
essence of the archive since the denial of the archive is equivalent to, stricto sensu, a 
denial of debt.”270 The archive is the state’s best defense – until the repository 
of information becomes a threat to existence. 
In the Mau Mau scandal, we can observe the tipping point. In the first trial the 
state remained strong, arguing that it had fulfilled its historical mission by leading 
Kenya to full independence after a structured programme of political and 
economic modernisation. In the second hearing, however, the contradictions of 
British colonialism became apparent through the unexpected release of 
incriminating information which more than compensated for the absence of live 




269  HC Hola Camp debate, 27 July 1959, c. 195 ff., https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
hansard/commons/1959/jul/27/hola-camp-kenya-report., accessed 10/01/21. 
270 A. Mbembe,”The Power of the Archive and its Limits“ in Hamilton et al. (eds.), Refiguring the 
Archive (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2002), 22-25. See also: J. Derrida, Mal d’Archive : Une impression freudienne 
(Paris, Galilée, 1995) 
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What was its mission? In the trial and the loud public debate which it generated, we 
observe the seesaw of British imperialism tipping back and forth between good 
and evil. 
As a guide through this process of revelation, we can take the three most 
important questions posed by Justice McCombe.: (1) What (if anything) and 
when did the Colonial Office know? (2) Was there a system, some “common 
design” between the Colonial Office in London, the Colonial Government in 
Kenya and the local security forces? (3) Did the people in charge act promptly 
once they found out or was there a cover-up? 
The first question can be answered without difficulty, since it was already 
answered by the parliamentarians in 1959.271 Despite the wide geographic 
distance between London and the Governor’s office in Nairobi, let alone the 
detention camps on the Mwea plain, the imperial administration in London was 
very well informed. Just weeks before the Hola Camp Massacre, for instance, in 
which 11 detainees were murdered by British officers and one of the claimants of 
the 2011 trials suffered severe injuries, Mr. Sullivan, the Commander of the Camp 
wrote to his superiors in London: “As you know, I have for some time been 
anxious about a situation which has been developing at Hola where in the old 
closed camp there were 208 detainees […] amongst whom were 66 able- bodied 
men who refused to work and from whom trouble has always been considered 
likely.” The Commissioner of Prisons went on to say: “The plans Mr. Cowan worked 
out could be undertaken by us but it would mean the use of a certain degree of force in which 




271  HC Hola Camp debate, 27 July 1959 ff., https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
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situation should be brought to the notice of the Security Council and a direction 
given on what policy should be adopted with these recalcitrant or unmanageable 
detainees.”272 The officer on the ground foresaw that in the execution of the 
Cowan Plan “someone might get hurt or killed.”. Mr Campbell, the Assistant 
Commissioner for Prisons, Mr Lewis, the Commissioner for Prisons and Mr 
Cusack, the Minister of Defence, all received the note but delayed their 
response in the hope that the tense situation in the colony would ease with time. 
Did they have a duty to act on that piece of information? What would have been 
the appropriate time to intervene? 
The second question – about common design – flows from the first and was 
answered by the court. The remaining historical evidence shows a clear 
command structure from Whitehall to the Mwea plain. Dozens of military 
personnel and civil servants were engaged in almost daily communication to 
make the machine of Empire work. The judge in 2012 was convinced that “a 
persistent pattern of abusive treatment of detainees throughout the period of the 
emergency [was] brought to the knowledge of all levels of the Colonial and UK 
governments”.273 Although the British defence tried to perpetuate the myth of 
the soldier fighting on the frontier of civilisation without much instruction from the 
metropole, this is simply not an accurate representation of the sophisticated 
imperial system maintained by the OCS. 
The most important question, however, is the third one: how much did the 
responsible actors know and what did they do to disseminate or suppress that 
 
 
272 Sullivans’ Situation Report of 14 February 1959. Telegram reprinted in Conroy Report, Presented at 
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knowledge? Here, the eerily meticulous FCO records give a clear indication of 
orchestrated whitewashing and cover-ups. A month after the Hola Camp 
Massacre in March, the Governor and Colonial Secretary exchanged the 
following telegrams on 29 April 1959 and 1 May 1959: 
The Governor wrote to the Colonial Secretary on 29 April 1959: “As you know, I 
have in the past advised you to resist demands for a judicial enquiry. For this 
there have been, among others, two main reasons […] (i) The prisons and 
rehabilitation staff in detainee camps have a hard and thankless task. A large 
scale and highly publicised enquiry would undoubtedly have a bad effect on their 
morale […] (ii)The main aim of policy, both for political and humane reasons 
should, I have always felt, be to get the detainees down the ‘pipe-line’ and on to 
release after an adequate check […] An enquiry of the nature already mentioned is 
bound to hold up this process […] The Hola affair is by far the worst which has 
occurred in Kenya and troubles me greatly. […] In these circumstances I think 
we should look carefully at our policy and actions for the future […] Our main 
objective must therefore be to maintain Hola and its appendages.” The 
Colonial Secretary replied to the Governor, “We had also been turning over how 
best to meet the inevitable demand for an ‘impartial judicial enquiry’ with a bias to 
raking up muck which will break upon us as soon as the Hola verdict is 
announced […] We agree with you that the aim of any enquiry should be to set 
Hola on its feet. An enquiry would not spotlight the tragedies but would 
overhaul the future administration of detention camps (but not prisons) where 
those who are virtually irreconcilable will stay with a view to ensuring that 
inspection and other arrangements are now in force to prevent a repetition of 
past tragedies” When this inquiry was mandated and the resulting Conroy Report was 
distributed to MPs, it emerged that key figures in the chain of command – 
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above all Mr Lewis and Mr Cusack were sent into early retirement. Without loss of 
their government pension, these men could stay in the comfort of their homes 
while parliamentarians could not force them to return for a disciplinary 
procedure. In addition to the disappearing documents, the British leadership 
practiced institutional memory management by physically removing individuals 
from office. 
Some of these reports were already publicly accessible in 2009, when litigation 
began, but ultimately it was the tireless work of the historians on the claimants’ 
team, which unveiled the extent to which the administration in 1959 had 
operated the same kind of history management in 1959 as they would 50 years 
later. Most surprisingly, it was established that the predecessors of the FCO had 
purposefully and systematically altered the evidence of British wrongdoing by 
removing up to 20,000 documents from 37 colonies at the time of 
decolonisation. These classified documents, which did not appear in the 
National Archives’ official catalogue until 2012 , were kept at an underground 
facility in Hanslope Park, which also houses MI5 and MI6 files. In Kenya’s 
particular case, “some 294 boxes, containing about 1500 files, were returned to 
the UK. […] They included Executive Council and War Council records, 
minutes of the Council of Ministers, Intelligence Committee minutes and 
minutes of the Complaints Coordinating Committee.” – information that could 
hardly be “overlooked” as the government’s defence argued at the 2012 court 
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objectionable part of the large-scale cover-up of the Ends of Empire. Some 13 
boxes of additional “Top Secret” papers, containing sensitive material including 
intelligence reports, names of security officers and the like “became separated 
from the Hanslope archive at some time after they were reviewed during the 
1980s and later destroyed.”16 Whitehall had planned and executed the systematic 
“disappearance” of potentially incriminating records from the colonial period. 
When the newly independent Kenyans asked London for their administrative 
documents in 1967, 1974 and 1982, they were simply told that these papers were 
the property of Her Majesty’s Government, which would not return them. An 
internal note, however, revealed the following rationale: “The vast majority of the 
files concern the Emergency (e.g. intelligence reports and summaries, African 
associations, activities of Africans, unrest in districts etc. collective punishment, 
detainees and detention camps) […] Many others are no doubt connected with 
the Mau Mau”.275 According to the Cary Report, a court-mandated investigation into 
the FCO’s documentation practices, these interactions with former colonies 
were standard political procedure. As the Empire was disintegrating after World 
War II, and while PM Macmillan broadcast his famous “Winds of Change” speech 
(1960), colonial officials worldwide were busy editing the historical record. A 
Colonial Office guidance telegram of 3 May 1961 on the “disposal of classified 
records and accountable documents” urged that successor governments should 
not be given papers which “might embarrass HMG or other Governments; 
might embarrass members of the police military forces, public servants or 
others e.g. police informers; might compromise sources of intelligence 
information; or might be used unethically by Ministers in the successor 
 
 
275 FCO 31/211, Folio 4, National Archives. 
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Government.”276 This is an extraordinarily wide definition of what could be 
deleted from the ostensibly complete boxes that were shipped to former colonies as 
well as from the boxes that were sent to the officially complete National 
Archives in Kew. This practice is problematic for three reasons: it distorts the 
record of the past, restricts the possibility for political and scientific transparency in 
the present, and potentially limits the full exercise of civic rights in the future. Even 
the historians who were investigating human rights abuses on behalf of the 
court had not been able to “to take up the offer of full access by the time of the 
hearing”.277 
Instead of a complete picture of their imperial past, most Britons nowadays are 
spoon-fed a national narrative of centuries-long sacrifice, civilisation and 
adventure in the British Empire. Those administrations which want to reap the 
social benefits of a coherent societal narrative without destroying their archive 
altogether have “sought to 'civilise' the ways in which the archive might be 
consumed”, writes Mbembe, “not by attempting to destroy its material 
substance but through the bias of commemoration. In this framework, the 
ultimate objective of commemoration is less to remember than to forget.” […] 
This commemoration in classrooms, national museums, and the national media 
allows for a simple absorption of the myth of a liberal Empire. “Learning to forget is 
all the easier if, on the one hand, whatever is to be forgotten passes into 
folklore […], and if, on the other hand, it becomes part of the universe of 
 
276 Cary Report On Release of the Colonial Administration Files (2011) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cary-report-on-release-of-the-
colonial- administration-files, accessed 20/08/20. 
277 “The defendant contends that it has fully and properly complied with its 
standard disclosure obligation under the Civil Procedure Rules and, to its credit, it has offered 
full access to the Hanslope material for the claimants’ advisers, including the historians. 
However, it had not been possible for the advisers to take up this 
opportunity of full access by the time of the hearing.” Mutua et al. v. FCO (2012), Approved 
Judgement, § 48. 
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commodification. Thus we pass from its consumption by a Leviathan seeking to 
liberate itself of all debt (that is, to acquire the right to exercise absolute violence) to 
its consumption by the masses - mass consumption.”278 The historic violence of 
the British state is now transformed by a national heritage industry which 
Historic England points out “is an important economic sector producing a total 




The modern state is pure knowledge administration.280 What we have seen in 
this section is how a single lawsuit led to the mobilisation of the state’s full power 
with the ultimate aim of preserving the status quo. When there is a leak in the 
archive - an invitation to question the continuous national narrative of progress 
through conquest - the state will mobilise all its resources, to make sure it is 
managed correctly – with denials followed by apologetic investigation, followed by 
the absolute silence of a government check. “Kew’s playing field is weighted toward 
the historical winners rather than the losers, who together are overdetermined 
through the archival process of selection and exclusion of documents that was 
a hallmark of British colonial retreat and the subsequent maintenance of 
Britain’s records”, Elkins summarises. It should not come as a surprise, then, that 
“these same archives lend themselves to the re-creation of a carefully tended 







278 Mbembe, The Power of the Archive and its Limits. 
279 Historic England, Heritage and the Economy 2019, via 
https://historicengland.org.uk/content/heritage-counts/pub/2019/heritage-and-
the- economy-2019/ , accessed 05/02/2021. 
280 A. Mbembe, The Power of the Archive and its Limits. 
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162  










Official history in Britain has always underplayed moments of rupture to 
emphasise continuity. Even though there is some natural, politically inflected 
diversity of schools, British historiography is remarkably unified when it comes to 
the general structure, shape and direction of the nation’s history: British history 
is linear, forward-looking and remarkably stable. The Glorious Revolution of 
1688, for instance, was ‘glorious’ because it was a restoration rather than a 
radical overhaul.282 Even large-scale upheaval has been subsumed under the shared 
belief in incremental progress. What kind of progress does Britain enjoy or 
create? Where does it come from and where will it lead? How can an abrupt 
ending of Britain’s historical trajectory be avoided? These were pressing 
questions in Victorian England – when both Empire-building and 
historiography were at their peak – and remain important today. 
In examining some of the most influential responses to these questions about 
British progress, I hope to unveil some important themes that characterise the 
British approach to history and history-making today. I propose three themes 
linked to three authors, and the three orthodox parts of time. The past weighs 
heavily on the other elements of time through the Burkean theme of inheritance; 
the present is a site of continuous and active improvement, as in Macaulay’s 
 
 
282 J.G.A. Pocock (ed.), Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, PUP, 1980). 
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vision of civilisation as redemption; the future is usually anticipated with joy, 
because ever since Seeley, the belief in quasi-mechanical progress has remained 
strong. These themes connect the arguments of legal practitioners in the 
previous section with the words and actions of politicians in the next. They do 
not only provide the established vocabulary to talk about British history; they 
also frame the intellectual context in which contemporary battles for historical 







A. Past: The weight of inheritance 
 
 
The most famous conservative characterisation of British history is undoubtedly 
Edmund Burke’s: “You will observe that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of 
Right it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our 
liberties as an entailed inheritance that we have from our forefathers and are to 
transmit to our posterity—as an estate specially belonging to the people of this 
kingdom […]. By this means our constitution preserves its unity in the great 
diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a 
House of Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties 
from a long line of ancestors.”283 Burke, who prefers the real achievements of 
Britain’s long history to any abstract (continental) conception of rights, is a firm 
believer in British continuity. He sees the arc of history as a unified whole – 
 
 
283 E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London, Penguin, 1982 [1790]). 
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“People who never look back to their ancestors will not look forward to 
posterity” – and asks us to trust in the organic evolution of British civilisation. 
Against the abstractions of the French revolutionaries, or the new social classes 
clamouring for more rights in late Georgian and early Victorian Britain, he urges his 
audience to believe in organicism. It is not violent upheaval, but “the idea of 
inheritance” which provides “a sure principle of conservation and a sure 
principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement”. 
How can improvement be obtained without any conscious intervention in the 
course of history? The old, unwritten English Constitution “follows the pattern of 
nature” whereby “we receive, hold, and transmit (i) our government and our 
privileges in the same way as we enjoy and transmit (ii) our property and (iii) our 
lives. The (i) institutions of policy, the (ii) goods of fortune, and (iii) the gifts of 
providence are handed down to us, and from us, in the same course and order.” 
Even if that doesn’t sound nearly as promising as the great reform movements of 
revolutionary France, Haiti or the insurrectionaries of 1848, Burke insists that his, 
the traditional English method will ultimately get us further. Why? Because his 
theory of change is firmly grounded in the past, a past which has value because 
it frames our reaction to the present. For the aristocratic Burke, reverence for 
the past feeds a healthy scepticism towards radical change. This, he contends, is 
what saved Britain when France went astray: “Thanks to our sullen resistance to 
innovation”, he writes in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, “thanks to the cold 
sluggishness of our national character, we still bear the stamp of our forefathers. 
We have not, as I conceive, lost the generosity and dignity of thinking of the 
fourteenth century; nor as yet have we subtilised ourselves into savages. We are 
not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the 
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disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress amongst us.”284 Burke 
repeatedly expresses general disagreement with the French way of breaking with the 
past: “With them it is a sufficient motive to destroy an old scheme of things, 
because it is an old one. As to the new, they are in no sort of fear with regard to the 
duration of a building run up in haste; because duration is no object to those who 
think little or nothing has been done before their time, and who place all their 
hopes in discovery.”285 Duration, however, matters a lot in Burke’s conception 
of history: If any old prejudices were delivered as part of the great 
intergenerational scheme of inheritance, he suggests that good Englishmen not 
only accept, but “cherish” them, “[…] and the longer they have lasted, and the 
more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them.”286 Layers of time 
slowly grow on top of each other until they build the solid rock of British history. We 
are to accept that past as a whole, with all its problems and benefits, because the 
generations that flourish and falter, passing on their inheritance in a quasi- 
natural ritual of transmission, are ultimately guided by Providence. 
Britain’s inheritance is not merely weighty, but special. And with faith in that 
exceptionalism, the British can march through history with a level of confidence 
that other nations lack. “When antient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the 
loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to 
govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer”287 – this famous 
statement suggests more than anything else, perhaps, that the British do have a 
compass and do know what port to steer to. It is divine Providence that guides 
this old nation, gives meaning to the weight of history and the work of the 
 
284 Burke, Reflections, 127. 
285 Burke, Reflections, 130. 
286 Burke, Reflections, 129. 
287 Burke, Reflections, 116 
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generations who preceded us. There is no radical reordering of the British system of 
justice, no radical overhaul of history, because the time-honoured social order is 
sanctioned by Providence. The correct course to contentment is to change 
continuously, but with as little upheaval as possible. Nothing should get lost in the 




B. Present: Actively civilising Whig history 
 
 
Against this conservative vision, the more energetic, teleological, Whiggish 
tradition shifts the emphasis from the past to the present. The historians whom 
Herbert Butterfield famously accused of “emphasis[ing] certain principles of 
progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the 
glorification of the present.”288 – Stubbs, Trevelyan and Macaulay289 - chart the 
progression of British liberty from the English Civil War to the Great Reform 
Act of 1832. For them, no economic downturn and no military defeat is fatal, 
since British history corrects itself to ensure improvement in the long run. 
Macaulay, for example, confidently wrote in 1841: 
“It can easily be proved that, in our own land, the national wealth has, 
 





288 H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London, 1931), preface. 
289 T.B. Macaulay, The History of England (London, 1848); W. Stubbs, The constitutional History of 
England, 3 vols, 5th ed. (Oxford, 1891-98); G.M. Trevelyan, History of England (London, Longman, 
1973 [1926]). There is, of course, a more radical vision of Whig history – represented admirably 
by E.P. Thompson – which stresses Peterloo rather than Waterloo, the Miners’ Battle of 
Orgreave rather than Thatcher’s Big Bang. “History from below” gives voice to a different cast of 
historical actors 
to keep the establishment’s triumphant narratives in check. And still it is possible to see 
remnants of teleological continuity in this alternative struggle too. Even if the focus may 
sometimes lie on different events or different actors the British narrative is characterised by an 
effort to connect the dots to form a neat historical timeline. 
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This progress, having continued during many ages, became at length, about the middle of the 
eighteenth century, portentously rapid, and has proceeded, during the nineteenth, with accelerated 
velocity. In consequence partly of our geographical and partly of our moral position, we have, 
during several generations, been exempt from evils which have elsewhere impeded the efforts and 
destroyed the fruits of industry. While every part of the Continent, from Moscow to Lisbon, 
has been the theatre of bloody and devastating wars, no hostile standard has been seen here 
but as a trophy. While revolutions have taken place all around us, our government has never 
once been subverted by violence. [...] The consequence is that a change to which the history of 
the old world furnishes no parallel has taken place in our country.”290 
Three points must be highlighted here: first, the long timespan. Macaulay’s long 
historical arc of “at least six centuries” suggests a very broad vision of history, a 
history that can be taken as a whole.291 Second, that historical whole has meaning. 
Meaning mustn’t come from external divine Providence; the coherence of the 
story itself can provide insights and lessons (e.g., Britain prospers precisely 
because there is no real revolution). The secularisation of Christian eschatology 
discussed in chapter 2 is clearly apparent in this political reformulation. Third, the 
external historical narrative meets the internal structure of time. The “progress” 
which Macaulay observes like a physicist in a laboratory has not just “continued 
during many ages”, but also become “portentously rapid” and has “proceeded” 
through the Victorian era “with accelerated velocity.” The significance of the 
political concept of “history” is reinforced by the scientific, 
 
 
290 Lord Macaulay, The History of England (London, 1848), via 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm, accessed 
01/09/20. 
291 As modernists and postmondernists suggest in the twentieth century, See chapter 7. 
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mechanical vocabulary of “speed”292. History in the nineteenth century is seen as a 
scientific process, whereby careful observation and targeted intervention can edit 
and enhance the desired result. The pride of the present connects past 
achievements to future possibilities – and that trust in continuity is supported 
further by a belief in exceptionalism that increases as we widen our lens to 
capture the imperial dimension of this tradition. 
 
 
C. Future: The imperial machine 
 
 
Sir John Seeley’s influential lectures on the Expansion of England are famous for their 
teleological drive, summarised in the proposition, encountered in chapter 3, that 
“the story [of the British Empire] ought to end with a moral”. And yet, I would 
like to focus on something different: the picture which Seeley draws of his 
opponents. His target are the historians and citizens who do not take the 
British Empire seriously enough, because they see it as an external fact rather 
than as a core political project. The opening of his first lecture is symptomatic: 
“There is something very characteristic in the indifference which we show 
towards this mighty phenomenon of the diffusion of our race and the expansion of 
our state. We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a 
fit of absence of mind.” How could anyone conquer half the world “in a fit of 
absence of mind”? Or in a succession of, as Seeley repeatedly suggests, 
“accidents” and “facts”? “While we were doing it [imperial expansion]”, he 
suggests, the English weren’t thinking about it systematically, “nor have we even now 
ceased to think of ourselves as simply a race inhabiting an island off the 
 
292 D. Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton, PUP, 2005), esp. ch. 
5: “Escape Velocity: Ancient History and the Empire of Time”, 119-147. 
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northern coast of the Continent of Europe.” Seeley, who is convinced that “the 
history of England lies not in England but in America and Asia”, is dismayed at 
such imperial reticence. And yet, the externalisation of Empire-building was a 
choice: “we did not allow it to affect our imaginations or in any degree to change 
our ways of thinking”. 
This choice is highly significant. To me, it suggests that agency is underplayed in a 
vision of the Empire as a quasi-autonomous machine. The imperial machine 
requires no systematic direction from the state – it works even in spite of British 
sluggishness. Even Seeley, criticising others for their lack of moral commitment to 
the Empire, is not willing to place collective political agency at the heart of the 
imperial project: “So decided is the drift of our destiny towards the occupation 
of the New World that after we had created one Empire and lost it, a second grew 
up almost in our own despite.”293 It is not conscious volition but “the drift of our 
destiny” which decides that after the loss (again an impersonal biological term 
instead of something more human like “failure”) of the First British Empire in 
the West, a second, Eastern Empire would “grow up” (again, an organic simile) 
“almost in our own despite”. In contrast to the French state, which spelled out 
its imperial aims very systematically, the expansion of England was characterised by 
anti-systematicity. This has two advantages: first, it encouraged private 
economic and scientific ventures which reduced cost and risk for the state. 








293 J. Seeley, The Expansion of England (1862), Lecture 1, via 
https://archive.org/stream/expansionofengla00seeluoft/expansionofengla00seeluoft_djvu.txt 
, accessed 20/01/19. 
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made it easier to manage setbacks since there was no standard against which to 
measure success.294 
British imperialism was never a premeditated system, but the combined result of 
incremental individual actions. This conception of almost accidental imperialism 
remains useful to the British government until today. We have already seen in 
section I of this chapter that the FCO’s defence lawyers were adamant that there 
was no systematic collaboration between the Colonial Office in London, the 
Colonial Government in Nairobi and the rural detention camps. This lack of 
systematicity breaks the chain of responsibility and weakens the plaintiff’s charge of 
“common design” in the brutal suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion. We shall 
see in the final section III of this chapter that the Foreign Secretary William Hague 
also made use of this strategy in defending the compensation settlement as a 
temporary solution to an isolated “incident” of British imperial practice. The 
rejection of systematicity allows the British to protect themselves in the present 




The different English historical schools have had varying impacts on the English 
legal system, but there are significant parallels between the incremental mode of 
English historiography and the traditional organicism of English Common Law. 
The lawyers and legislators involved in the Mau Mau affair followed in the 
footsteps of a deep-seated national historical imagination. This imagination is 
nurtured by an intellectual tradition which combines three elements: (1) A 
passive confidence in the stability and longevity of British institutions – with the 
 
 
294 This is in great contrast to France and the United States, who publicly set themselves standards 
by which national progress was to be measured. See chapters 5 and 6. 
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monarchy playing a central role; (2) a self-understanding of Britain as a chosen 
actor in the historical present with special duties to spread its attained level of 
civilisation to those ‘fallen behind’ or with less experience; (3) a vivid belief that 
Britain is destined for open-ended progress, which – crucially - is coupled with a 
rejection of rationalist systematicity. What does this cultural heritage of 









Given the evidence we have seen so far, I suggest that in Britain’s malleable 
historical environment, uncomfortable truths which challenge the established 
narrative are absorbed comparatively easily. The trick is to admit that British 
history was never supposed to be perfectly neat or virtuous. The general 
direction may be progress, but some mistakes are bound to be made. An essential 
solution to this problem is the conception of history as a scientific learning 
process, where trial, error and improvement optimise and develop Britain’s 
institutions (as well as those nations under their ‘tutelage’). British history is 
bloody and fraught with setbacks. So are the French and American historical 
trajectories. But in great contrast to the nations which we are going to encounter in 
chapters 5 and 6, the British want continuity at all cost. No colonial drama – from 
the Bengal famine 1943 to the Windrush scandal 2018 – is big enough to rock the 
steady ship of British continuity. This (illusion of) continuity is achieved through 
quiet document management, incomplete transfers of power and late- imperial 
“development assistance”. All of these policy tools, accompanied, of 
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course, by rhetoric suggesting that the country is willing to learn from mistakes. 





If we return to the Mau Mau case we shall see that the parliamentary debate in 
which Foreign Secretary William Hague presented and defended the extrajudicial 
settlement of claims, revives the three themes we have already encountered to 
make sense of this historical experience: a conservative veneration of British 
institutional heritage and values; variations on imperial risks and exceptional 
mistakes; a desire to look forward to a better future. The essential element 
leading from step 2 to step 3, from the past to the future, is the willingness to 
learn from mistakes. 
Let us take a first look at Foreign Secretary William Hague’s carefully scripted 
statement defending the Mau Mau Settlement in Parliament on 6 June 2013. It 
offers a good example of how to weave something as radical as forced historical 
(dis)closure into a pre-existing narrative. First, he acknowledges the facts of the 
case neutrally: “During the emergency period, widespread violence was 
committed by both sides, and most of the victims were Kenyan. Many thousands of 
Mau Mau members were killed, while the Mau Mau themselves were 
responsible for the deaths of over 2,000 people, including 200 casualties among the 
British regiments and police.” Then comes the statement of regret, just short of an 
apology: “I would like to make it clear now and for the first time on behalf of Her 
Majesty’s Government that we understand the pain and grievance felt by those 
who were involved in the events of the emergency in Kenya. The British 
Government recognises that Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms 
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of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration. The British 
Government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place and that they marred 
Kenya’s progress towards independence. Torture and ill treatment are abhorrent 
violations of human dignity, which we unreservedly condemn.” Then back to 
business: “We continue to deny liability on behalf of the Government and 
British taxpayers today for the actions of the colonial administration in respect of 
the claims, […] We do not believe that claims relating to events that occurred 
overseas outside direct British jurisdiction more than 50 years ago can be 
resolved satisfactorily through the courts.” Spatial and temporal distance seem to 
be equated with moral distance. This itself is part of a tradition of exoticisation and 
dehumanisation of societies on the far-flung edges of the Empire, which we 
encountered in chapter 3. And yet the government sees that further trials might risk 
more embarrassing revelations which could feed a growing public debate on the 
ghosts of Empire.295 The aim is therefore to shut down the historical crisis 
before it becomes too large and leaves a mark on the British story of steady 
progress: “I can announce today that the Government have now reached an 
agreement with Leigh Day, the solicitors acting on behalf of the claimants, in full 
and final settlement of their clients’ claims. The agreement includes payment of a 
settlement sum in respect of 5,228 claimants, as well as a gross costs sum to the 
total value of £19.9 million. The Government will also support the construction 
of a memorial in Nairobi to the victims of torture and ill-treatment during the 
colonial era. The memorial will stand alongside others that are already being 
established in Kenya as the country continues to heal the wounds of the past. 




295 See the success of Akala’s Natives (London, 2019) and S. Sanghera’s Empireland (London, 2021). 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement), accessed 15/01/21. 
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place in Kenya. The Government of Kenya, the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission and the Mau Mau War Veterans Association have long been in 
favour of a settlement, and it is my hope that the agreement now reached will 
receive wide support, will help draw a line under these events and will support 
reconciliation.”296 The British government wants to “draw a line” under these 
conflicts, and help Kenya with a one-off memorial as it “continues to heal the 
wounds of the past”, because the British supposedly don’t have any past that 
should heal. From the British perspective this settlement should close the 
inconvenient accounts of the past. 
A discourse analysis of the parliamentary debate which followed Hague’s 
statement aims to show that the Foreign Secretary’s statement did indeed 
appease the upheaval caused by the shocking Mau Mau revelations. This illusion of 




A. The weight of a special inheritance 
 
 
Let us begin with the British self-understanding as a long-standing beacon of 
justice, human rights and effective government. Both sides of the house make 
this clear in the following exchange between Foreign Secretary William Hague and 
Jeremy Corbyn (Labour):”it is important for us to recognise—as we do, across 
the House—that torture and inhuman and degrading treatment can never, and 
should never, be part of our response to any outrage, however terrible. That is 
because we uphold our own high standards of human rights, and also because 
 
296 The Rt. Hon. William Hague, Foreign Secretary, Statement of Mau Mau Claims 
(Settlement), 6 June 2013, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement), accessed 15/01/21. 
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it is not an effective way in which to respond to any such outrages. It is very 
important that we express our own regret and acknowledge mistakes that were 
made, even though terrible acts were carried out on both sides.” Corbyn 
responds: “There are serious lessons to be learnt. When we deny rights and 
justice, when we deny democracy, when we use concentration camps, our 
actions reduce our ability to criticise anyone else for that fundamental denial of 
human rights. That lesson needs to be learnt not just from Kenya, but from 
other colonial wars in which equal brutality was employed by British forces.”297 The 
Foreign Secretary seems to find it important to “acknowledge express our own 
regret and acknowledge mistakes that were made” primarily “because we uphold 
our own high standards of human rights”. This is primarily a question of integrity, 
of coherence and credibility on the world stage. Corbyn points the finger 
deeper into the wound by stating that “When we deny rights and justice, when we 
deny democracy, when we use concentration camps, our actions reduce our ability 
to criticise anyone else for that fundamental denial of human rights.” The question 
doesn’t seem to concern human rights as such, but human rights as an essential 
component of the benevolent, civilised and civilising image that Britain has of 
itself. It is an image that is highly effective in foreign policy, if the illusion of 
integrity can be maintained. Falling below the most basic standards of human 
interaction by torturing illegally detained political prisoners, for Hague is not 
problematic because of any abstract violation of rights, but because “it is not an 
effective way” to deal with one’s colonial subjects. British values of justice, here, 
are not seen as a true moral standard, but as a convenient element in the foreign 
policy toolkit, which increases “our ability to criticise anyone else for that 
 
297 The Rt. Hon. Jeremy Corbyn, HC Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 6 June 2013, c 1696, via 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
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fundamental denial of human rights”. Norms are invoked and instrumentalised to 
further political goals. Before we move on, it is important to highlight some of 
the qualifyers which Hague inserts to depict Kenya in the 1950s: he calls the 
independence movement “terrible” an “outrage” and stresses that “terrible acts 
were carried out on both sides”. A few lines later, he recognises the “British 
personnel which was called upon to serve in difficult and dangerous 
circumstances.” “Dangerous” because it was Africa or because the British 
colonial system had provoked a violent revolt of the colonised? The latter would be 
impossible to admit because “many members of the colonial service 
contributed to establishing the institutions that underpin Kenya today, and we 
acknowledge their contribution.”298 In only a few lines of parliamentary debate, we 
have a patriotic reference to British justice, to its “high standards” of human rights 
and to the admirable overseas civil servants who sacrificed themselves to share 
their European expertise and “establish the institutions that underpin Kenya 
today”. A long arc is drawn from the deep heritage of British rights to their 
overseas implementation by brave Britons and the resulting institutions on which 
modern Kenya is built. 
This shared sense of purpose is reinforced by a remarkable cross-reference: In 
2013, the Labour MP David Winnick refers to the other big debate on Kenya in 
1959 and says: “Although I would not normally quote Enoch Powell […] in the 
debate on 27 July 1959 on the murder of 11 African detainees, he said: ‘We 
cannot say, ‘We will have African standards in Africa, Asian standards in Asia and 




298 The Rt. Hon. William Hague, Foreign Secretary, Statement on Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 6 June 2013, 
c 1692, via https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
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of all places, fall below our own highest standards in the acceptance of 
responsibility.”299 This is a verbatim reference of a political opponent. The unity and 
continuity of the house of Commons on matters of imperial policy trumps 
partisanship. The internal reference to the tradition of the House suggests a 
certain moral continuity between politicians of different historical periods. This is 




B. An exceptional present 
 
 
Against that continuity, the ideas of emergency and exception are used to 
characterise (even justify?) any behaviour that strays from the great British norms of 
justice. In the nocturnal emergency [!] debate on the Hola Camp Massacre in 1959 
Christopher Armstrong, for example, urges his fellow parliamentarians to “keep a 
sense of perspective about the Hola incident”. More specifically, he says: “I would 
ask the House to consider carefully whether, from the point of view of the service 
itself, it is not fair to compare this incident with a disaster such as an air crash or railway accident, in 
which many people—often entirely innocent people—lose their lives due to a 
human error of judgment or a misunderstanding.”300 “Do you hit them on the 
head through an error of judgment?”,301 the opposition shot back. And yet 
Armstrong is not the only one diminishing the importance of the “incident” by 
comparing it to “an air crash or a railway accident”. This metaphor is remarkable 
for three reasons: first, a locomotive is a machine inescapably 
 
299 The Rt. Hon David Winnick, HC 6 June 2013, c 1698. 
300 C. Armstrong (Con, Armagh), HC Hola Camp debate, 27 July 1959, c. 216, via 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/jul/27/hola-camp-kenya-
report., accessed 10/01/21. 
301 C. Pannell (Lab, Leeds West), HC Hola Camp debate, 27 July 1959, c. 204, via 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/jul/27/hola-camp-kenya-
report., accessed 10/01/21. 
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bound to the linear tracks of progress. It is going somewhere and that destination is 
predefined. The railway or plane cannot easily stop mid-air or turn around. 
Second, the mere fact that it is going somewhere is a feat of human invention 
and modern engineering. It is a sign of using nature (steam) to further human 
advancement, both in the narrow physical and in the broader civilisational sense. 
Third, this automatic, mechanical metaphor minimises human agency. Even if 
errors and “accidents” can occur, they are attributable to individual human 
mistakes rather than by design. Nobody would purposefully design a faulty 
railway system. On the contrary, as we saw in chapter 3, the rational railway 
timetables of the nineteenth century became symbols of the human power to 
conquer time and space. 302 This fits with the repeated rejections of systematicity or 
“common design” between offices in the trial on colonial torture. The fact that 
the British “security forces” built over a 100 detention camps and imprisoned a 
higher percentage of the “target population” in Kenya than in any other British 
colony (counterinsurgency operations were inflaming more than half of British 
dependencies after World War Two303) cannot have been part of a premeditated 
system to violate human rights. 
 
Whenever things went wrong in Kenya, or indeed in other parts of the British 
Empire, the actions were labelled as “mistakes”. Crucially, mistakes cannot be 
continuous. They are temporally discrete deviations from the norm. An 
exceptionally “difficult” relationship with the subject population may require the 
proclamation of a “State of Emergency”, a state in which the “high standards” 
 
302 See chapter 3, section II. 
303 D. French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), p. 111. See also: rs, 1989); and M.Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to 
Baghdad (Princeto, Princeton University Press, 2008); J. Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine 
to Northern Ireland (New York: (New York,Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement), accessed 15/01/21. 
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of Britain’s civilising mission are temporarily suspended. But even if mistakes 
cannot be continuous, risks can be. In extremis, imperial violence, can be 
rationalised as a “risk of doing business”. Just like anybody boarding a train 
should know that there is a risk of mechanical accidents, so imperialists – and all 
those who hope to benefit from them – should rationally acknowledge that there is 
a risk of default. This extraordinary pragmatism about the reasonable risks of 
imperialism distinguishes Britain from other modern Empires. However 
objectionable on a moral level, it is this dispassionate pragmatism that also helps a 
future-oriented recovery after disaster. 
 
 
C. Faith in the future 
 
 
After the obligatory nod to Britain’s inherited values and the framing of colonial 
injustice as temporary error, Members of Parliament on both sides of the isle, 
and in both parliamentary debates, stressed the importance of focusing on the 
future. “Although we should never forget history and, indeed, must always seek to 
learn from it”, Hague declares, “we should also look to the future, strengthening a 
relationship that will promote the security and prosperity of both our nations. I 
trust that this settlement will support that process.”304 Douglas Alexander, 
responds to Hague’s statement with remarkable optimism: “It is right that 
current and future relations with Kenya are not overshadowed by the past. So, 
along with the Foreign Secretary, I hope that today’s announcement will 




304 The Rt. Hon. W. Hague, Foreign Secretary,Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 6 June 2013, col. 1692, 
via https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement), accessed 15/01/21. 
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but not ignoring, our shared and, at times, troubled past.”305 What makes him 
think that “current and future relations with Kenya are not [or no longer] 
overshadowed by the past” and why is that “right”? Maybe because that shared 
past was “troubled” only “at times”? The eagerness to overcome the past and 
turn towards the future is apparent from the numerous questions which the 
Foreign Secretary received on this topic: “How does the Foreign Secretary 
intend to take the relationship with Kenya forward in the future?” asks Keith 
Vaz and “To what extent will this statement make it easier for our countries to co-
operate, and to do so better than before, on issues of common interest?” adds 
Hugh Bayley. Hague, who thinks that the Mau Mau settlement “should remove 
one of the areas of contention between the UK and Kenya”, hopes that his 
public acknowledgement of brutal “mistakes” in Kenya “will smooth the path for 
our effective co-operation in the future”. This, of course, is also in Britain’s 
interest, since the “shadow of the past” is not limited to High Court litigation. 
There is a real price tag for postcolonial discord. 
 
Kenya is still part of the global economic and military system which remains the 
strongest legacy of the British Empire.” “Today, we are bound together by 
commercial, security and personal links that benefit both our countries”, says 
Hague, “we are working together closely to build a more stable region [for 
example, combatting piracy in the Horn of Africa – just like the British Army has 
done since the 1880s]”. Bilateral trade between the UK and Kenya amounts to £1 
billion each year, and around 200,000 Britons visit Kenya annually.”306 
 
305 The Rt. Hon. D. Alexander, Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 6 June 2013, c 1695, via 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement), accessed 15/01/21. 
306 The Rt. Hon. William Hague, Foreign Secretary,Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 6 June 2013, col. 
1693, via https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement), accessed 15/01/21. 
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These figures could be seen as a quantitative illustration of the progress achieved so 
far, but also as a reminder of what is at stake if participants do not take up the 
continuous offer of improvement which is a key tenet of the British timescape. 
Looking towards the future is an essential part of the British attitude towards 
processing the past. This is why Hague closes with the hope that “over the coming 
years and decades” Anglo-Kenyan relations will “develop […] in a true sense of 
partnership, with the new generations moving on fully from everything that 
happened in the colonial era.”307 The phrasing suggest that “new generations” can 
almost be equated with “moving on fully”. Even if this is difficult, and perhaps 
undesirable for Kenyans who want to commemorate their struggle for 
independence, it suggests a remarkably strong British faith in the power of the 
passage of time. As time passes, witnesses die, documents disappear and 
demands for redress weaken – but for those who are optimistic enough, this 




In the end, the three strands of the British historical tradition are tied together 
by Hague: “The ability to recognise error in the past but to build the strongest 
possible foundation for co-operation and friendship in the future are both 
hallmarks of our democracy. There is a strong tradition in this House going all the 
way back to the eighteenth century. In the 1780s, Edmund Burke called 
Governments to account for colonial misdeeds in India and sought to bring 
Warren Hastings to trial. There is a long and proud history of this House 
asserting itself on the errors [!] that have been made during our imperial rule of 
 
307 The Rt. Hon. William Hague, Foreign Secretary,Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 6 June 2013, col. 
1699, via https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
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other countries, and our recognition of these errors today is part of that long 
tradition.”308 The obligatory conservative nod to Burke (another internal 
reference within the House of Commons!), the “ability to recognise error in the 
past” and the commitment “to build the strongest possible foundation for co- 
operation and friendship in the future” are all portrayed as natural. If other 
countries had committed enough colonial “errors” to design a whole system to 
“process” them, that standardisation of history management would be worrying 
– not least because it would suggest that colonial crime was part and parcel of the 
imperial project. In Britain, however, this uncanny expertise in history 






The examination of the Mau Mau trial for historical redress (section I), the 
intellectual tradition of teleological history (section II) and the political fallout of 
the Mau Mau memory in the House of Commons (section III) all illustrate, 
each in their own way, three features of the British national timescape which I have 
found to be particularly salient and resistant throughout the ages: a monarchical 
belief in stability, an imperialistic appetite for risk-taking that might end in 
emergencies which have to be managed efficiently, and an almost unfettered 
Whiggish belief in England as a force for good in the world. 
Not only the building of empires, but even the act of learning from their failures 




308 The Rt. Hon. William Hague, Foreign Secretary, Statement of Mau Mau Claims (Settlement), 
6 June 2013, col. 1698, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-06- 
06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement). 
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of colonies creates a great number of potential conflicts when the sun sets on 
the Empire. The British, however, have managed to craft a national timescape 
that seals fractures (at least superficially) and manages to incorporate almost any 
historical revelation into the national story of a calm people continuously 
progressing in world history. 
184  





“S’il reste que c’est le temps qui amène progressivement l’oubli, l’oubli n’est pas sans 
altérer profondément la notion du temps. Il y a des erreurs optiques dans le temps comme 




The French colonial Empire, in contrast to the British, was never embraced 
wholeheartedly either by the incessantly changing governments or by the largely 
indifferent population. This is not only because, as Tocqueville observed, “land is 
the natural theatre of her power and glory […] the sea has never excited, nor will 
it ever excite, those national sympathies and that sort of filial respect that 
navigating or commercial peoples have for it”. 310 Militarily inferior to the British 
from the Battle of Plassey (1757) to the Fashoda Incident (1898), the French 
focused their attention on a few key territories – Algeria, Lebanon, Indochina – and 
operated a wholly different style of colonial administration, which came at a much 
higher human and financial cost. The usual pattern was to replicate the French 
politico-legal tradition overseas, which meant reaching deep into the everyday 
lives of subjects through centralisation, standardisation and heavy law 
enforcement. Although Tocqueville was at pains to point out that “when it 
comes to the daily activities of colonists and colonial agents, “the Metropole 
neither can nor should control them” because “all the great colonising nations 
 
 
309 M. Proust, A la recherche du temps perdu vol. 6 : Albertine disparue (Paris, Gallimard, Folio, 1992 [1919] 
), 174. 
310 A. de Tocqueville, « Quelques idées sur les causes qui s’opposent à ce que les Français aient de bonnes colonies » (1833), 
transl. in : J. Pitts, Tocqueville : Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore, JHUP, 2003), 2f. 
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exercise this minimal control”,311 the French colonial model was about much 
more than the extraction of natural resources or labour. In addition to the 
geographic position and its administrative tradition, France was constrained by a 
powerful ideological force: the inescapable heritage of the 1789 Revolution. 
Given that it called itself “the home of Human Rights”, how could it disregard 
them in its international politics? Although the French Revolution could be 
construed as a motor of overseas expansion by subsuming brutal warfare under the 
banner of the “civilising mission”, the proselytising zeal of its missionaries was 
always haunted by the revolutionary paradox: can the promise of liberty justify 
terror? This chapter is about the “dirty war” in Algeria and the distinctively 




Algeria was the French equivalent of British India, colonised early (1830) and tied 
to the mother country through a series of economic and cultural connections 
which far surpassed the links with other conquered territories. Algeria was not 
only a part of the French imagination – see Nerval and Flaubert312 – but 
officially incorporated into the territory of metropolitan France.313 The brutal 
battles which the French army fought from 1954 to 1962 to keep Algeria, 
however, were hardly mentioned during the post-war boom period which the 
French like to call “les Trente glorieuses” (roughly 1945-1975). Preoccupied with 
economic and artistic progress, French textbooks lauded high- speed trains (TGV) 
and Nouvelle Vague cinema as expressions of the exceptional French genius, 
but remained silent on the history of the French 
 
 
311 Tocqueville, Quelques idées sur les causes qui s’opposent à ce que les Français aient de bonnes colonies. 3. 
312 E. Said. Orientalism. 25th anniversary edition (London, Penguin, 2007 [1978], ch. 4. 
313 This led to the tongue-in-cheek maxim “The Mediterranean is France’s greatest river.” 
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colonial Empire.314 French decolonisation had not gone as planned. Unlike the 
British Commonwealth, which prolonged some of the British Crown’s colonial ties, 
the former French colonies generally showed little interest in cooperation,315 let 
alone gratitude – as the statesmen of the nineteenth century had expected. 
In contrast to Britain, there was no public glorification of “the good old days of the 
Empire”, but there was no sufficiently critical analysis either. The “pieds- noirs”, 
French settlers in Algeria, made their first appearance in textbooks in 1971; but 
it was not until 1983, under President François Mitterrand, that public teaching 
about “les évènements en Algérie” became obligatory. Bloody battles like the 
Massacre of Philippeville (173 killed, 2000 wounded) or the Battle of Algiers 
(3000 independence fighters “disappeared”) were simply labelled as “events” or 
“operations”, morally and legally neutral expressions which formed the 
cornerstone of the official culture of forgetting until 1999, when the term 
“Guerre d’Algérie” was approved by the Senate.316 The real turning point in 
French memory politics, however, was 2002, when General Aussaresses – a key 
figure of the Algerian War - was taken to court by the League of Human Rights. 
This chapter will take the Aussaresses trial as a starting point for an analysis of 
French relationship with historical time. As in the previous chapter, there are 
three sections – trial., tradition, truth – in which I first look at the colonial 
General’s trial; then investigate the intellectual conflicts that have divided France 
since its revolutionary watershed and finally, ask what this means for the 
emergence of uncomfortable historical truths which seem all but impossible to 
integrate into the nation’s official narrative. 
 
314  https://www.franceculture.fr/histoire/non-la-guerre-dAlgérie-nest-pas-cachee-aux-eleves- 
mais-le-sort-des-harkis-oui, accessed 20/09/20. 
315 Françafrique is an important exception. 








It was only at the turn of the millennium that the French were confronted with 
their imperial past in the form of 82-year-old General Aussaresses, who had 
fought in the French counterinsurgency operations in Indochina (1946-1954) 
and Algeria (1954-1962). He wrote in his memoirs Services spéciaux: Algérie 1955- 1957 
(2000) that French colonialism was necessary to extend the civilising mission of 
the French Revolution worldwide.317 Shocked by the publication of this 
autobiography, which described and defended all governmental techniques of 
French colonialism – including a widespread system of torture in French 
counterinsurgency operations - the French public watched in disbelief as the 
retired General said on national TV that he had killed 24 FLN fighters with his 
own hands during the Battle of Algiers.318 Even after his raped prisoner, 
Louisette Ighilahriz, and his superior, General Massu, revealed the scale of 
inhumane practices during the Algerian War,319 Aussaresses insisted that he had 
done nothing but his patriotic duty. The French were vexed by new questions: 
could it be that the lauded “peacekeeping operations” in North Africa were the 
most cruel part of French colonialism? Had the French flag in fact spread 






generaux_3625269_1819218.html , accessed 22/09/20. 
318  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGrO0b4xDLU&ab_channel=InaHistoire, accessed 
22/09/20. 
319 E.g., summary executions, electroshocks and family separations. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/le-monde-2/article/2008/05/22/jacques-massu-le-
general- repenti_1048161_1004868.html, accessed 22/09/20. 
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The legal battle to suppress the circulation of Aussaresses’ book reveals the 
enormous tensions that became apparent in France at this moment of national 
historical reckoning. Only a few months after publication, the Ligue des Droits de 
l’Homme (LDH), a powerful civil society organisation with the historic mission “to 
save the soul of France from great peril”320, took Aussaresses and his editors to 
court. There were public hearings in 2002, 2003 and 2004, before the dispute was 
resolved by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2009. Before we 
enter the courtroom, however, we should take a closer look at the book which 
became the object of such fierce litigation. 
Released on 3 May 2001 by Éditions Plon, this tell-all book on the twilight of French 
colonialism was initially limited to 25,000 copies, but went through multiple 
reprints, accompanied by extracts published in Le Monde which animated an 
unprecedented public debate. According to the publishers’ blurb, Aussaresses – 
described as one of the French Republic’s “best secret agents”, “a living legend” 
and “a novelistic hero” – dared to tell an “often difficult truth […] without any 
false shame or complacency” regarding the torture and summary executions in 
Algeria. It was “an essential testimony with momentous revelations”.321 
 
 
320 Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, “Le Premier Manifeste de la LDH”, via https://www.ldh- 
france.org/1898-LE-PREMIER-MANIFESTE-DE-LA/, accessed 22/02/21 
321 « De 1955 à 1957, la République française a dépêché en Algérie l’un de ses meilleurs agents 
secrets, Paul Aussaresses. Même si son nom est encore inconnu du grand public, dans les cercles 
très fermés des services spéciaux, cet ancien parachutiste de la France Libre, baroudeur de la guerre 
d’Indochine et fondateur du 11e choc (le bras armé du Sdece), était déjà considéré comme une 
légende vivante. Mais, sans l’avoir aucunement cherché, ce héros de roman se 
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These revelations described in graphic detail the frontline of French colonialism. 
Shortly after his arrival in Algeria, for example, Aussaresses summarised the 
situation: “One thing is clear : our mission imposes on us results which often 
require torture and summary executions.”322 A few pages later he opened the 
torturer’s mind to the reader: “I felt neither hatred nor pity. It was an emergency 
and I had in my hands a man directly implicated in a terrorist act: any means 
were acceptable to make him speak. It was the circumstances which demanded 
it.”323 The “circumstances” which allegedly justified systematic detention and 
torture were those of a colony in which a privileged European elite (about 1 
million) was endangered by a native struggle for independence. The FLN was 
kidnapping and killing civilians and – interestingly - invoked the language of the 
French Revolution to justify its “terror”.324 The FLN was turning against the 
coloniser on his own terms. 
There were so many of those “terrorists”, wrote Aussaresses that it was 
“impossible to return them to the ordinary judicial circuit.”325 Consequently, he 
continued, “summary executions were an integral part of the inevitable tasks of 
maintaining order. [Against the FLN terror the French military] had established a 
counter-terror.”326 This exceptionally tense situation suspended any moral 
 
trouva entraîné dans une mission qui allait s’avérer la plus difficile de toutes. L’objectif ? Lutter par 
tous les moyens contre la rébellion, et le terrorisme érigé en système par le FLN. […]Sans fausse 
honte et sans complaisance, Paul Aussaresses ose dire une vérité souvent difficile, parle de la torture 
et des exécutions sommaires. Un témoignage essentiel, des révélations capitales. » 322 « (...) Une 
chose est claire : notre mission nous impose des résultats qui passent souvent par la torture et les 
exécutions sommaires. », Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux, 35. 
323 « Il y avait urgence et j’avais sous la main un homme directement impliqué dans un acte  
terroriste : tous les moyens étaient bons pour le faire parler. C’étaient les circonstances qui 
voulaient çà. », Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux, 45. 
324 See T.S. Johnson, The French Revolution in the French-Algerian War (1954-1962): Historical analogy and the limits of 
French historical reason. doct. diss. (New York, 2016) 
325 « Il était impossible de les remettre dans le circuit judiciaire. Ils étaient trop nombreux et les 
rouages de la machine judiciaire se seraient grippés.», Aussaresses, Services Speciaux, 153. 
326 « Par conséquent, les exécutions sommaires faisaient partie intégrante des tâches inévitables de 
maintien de l’ordre. C’est pour ça que les militaires avaient été appelés. On avait instauré la contre-
terreur, mais officieusement, bien sûr. » Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux, 155 
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limits: “It did not take me long to convince myself that these exceptional 
circumstances explained and justified their methods. […] Torture became 
legitimate when urgency imposed itself.”327Aussaresses did find these methods 
“surprising”, and yet he used the state of exception to torture “with disgust, 




This publication led to a fierce legal dispute which on the surface concerned 
Aussaresses and his publishers’ freedom to express views that the General’s 
detractors considered an ignoble incitement to brutality. On a deeper level, 
however, the battle pitted those who thought that the book exposed necessary 
truths about the French past against those who saw the undermining of France’s 
historical narrative as a potential threat to the country’s internal cohesion and 
security. 
Importantly, and in stark contrast to the British Mau Mau trial, the Algerian side 
was never consulted. Whereas the British conversation about colonialism was 
initiated by an external impulse – an international lawsuit against the British 
administration – France’s reckoning with colonialism was a peculiarly internal 
affair. A French publisher released the eyewitness account of a French soldier 
and French civil society organisations responded with a lawsuit. Although some 
French media outlets interviewed Algerian survivors of the war, no court called 
upon them as witnesses. This is revealing in itself. In a debate which ultimately 
 
 
327 « Je ne tardai pas du reste à me convaincre que ces circonstances (N.B. : des circonstances 
exceptionnelles) expliquaient et justifiaient leurs méthodes. Car pour surprenante qu’elle fût, 
l’utilisation de cette forme de violence, inacceptable en des temps ordinaires, pouvait devenir 
inévitable dans une situation qui dépassait les bornes (...) La torture devenait légitime quand 
l’urgence s’imposait.» Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux,. 30. 
328 « Une petite minorité d’entre eux (N.B. : des soldats) l’a pratiquée, avec dégoût certes, mais 
sans regret », Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux, 32. 




turned out to be about the role and standing of France in World History, France 
was its own judge. The legal battle extended over four rounds of litigation and 
only the last, taking place at the ECHR, offered an external opinion. Despite 
being slightly different from the British debate in terms of participants, I believe 
that this French debate about colonialism reveals important features of the 
French approach to historical time. 
In the first of four trial rounds (2002), the plaintiffs were the Ligue des Droits de 
l’Homme (LDH), the Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié des peuples (MRAP) and the 
Christian advocacy group against detention and torture (ATAC). Their charges 
were twofold : first, Aussaresses’ book was a distasteful and dangerous “incitement 
to torture” which should be banned from circulation; second, Aussaresses and 
his publishers, Olivier Orban and Xavier de Bartillat of Éditions Plon, were guilty 
of destabilising public order by releasing – and glorifying – testimonials which 
ran counter to French republican values enshrined in the 1789 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen and all subsequent French constitutions. The legal basis 
for these charges was the Law on Press Freedom of 29 July 1881, which 
proscribed the incitement to war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as 
“those who directly provoke crimes or offenses which undermine the 
fundamental interests of the nation”.329 The same law also 
 
 
329 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 relative à la liberté de la presse. Chapitre V, Article 24 : « Seront punis de cinq ans 
d'emprisonnement et de 45 000 euros d'amende ceux qui, par l'un des moyens énoncés à l'article 
précédent, auront directement provoqué, dans le cas où cette provocation n'aurait pas été suivie 
d'effet, à commettre l'une des infractions suivantes : […] 2° […] Ceux qui, par les mêmes moyens, auront 
directement provoqué à l'un des crimes et délits portant atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux de la nation prévus par le titre Ier du livre IV 
du code pénal, seront punis des mêmes peines. 
Seront punis de la même peine ceux qui, par l'un des moyens énoncés en l'article 23, auront fait 
l'apologie des crimes visés au premier alinéa, des crimes de guerre, des crimes contre l'humanité ou des crimes et délits de collaboration avec 
l'ennemi. Seront punis des peines prévues par l'alinéa 1er ceux qui, par les mêmes moyens, auront 
provoqué directement aux actes de terrorisme prévus par le titre II du livre IV du code pénal, ou 
qui en auront fait l'apologie. […] », via 




suggested complicity and shared liability between the original author and his 
publisher.”330 This fits into a Republican tradition which defines and restricts the 
boundaries of acceptable public discourse. Aussaresses, Orban and Bartillat were 
thus collectively accused of encouraging crimes against humanity, via a 
publication which might “undermine the fundamental interests of the French 
nation.” This big claim had to be couched in the language of “press freedom” 
and “freedom of expression”, since the continental legal framework is less 
malleable than the Common Law system of torts. Nonetheless, I suggest that 
this is a clear case of public debate about historical injustice and its effects on the 
Western expectation of progress. 
This is visible in the evolution of the dispute: initially, the LDH focused on the 
first, comparatively narrow, accusation: incitement to crimes against humanity via 
print publications. Over time, however, the charge of undermining “the 
fundamental interests of the French nation” became dominant. The highly 
publicised trial turned into public discussion on France’s fundamental interests and 
identity – above all, the French Republic’s promise to deliver progress for 
everyone. Publishing revelations about the French state’s actions in Algeria, 
where the system had clearly failed to deliver progress, can be contrary to the 
interests of the nation. At its core, Aussaresses' story suggests that the French 




330 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 relative à la liberté de la presse, Article 23 : « Seront punis comme complices d'une 
action qualifiée crime ou délit ceux qui, soit par des discours, cris ou menaces proférés dans des 
lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des écrits, imprimés, dessins, gravures, peintures, emblèmes, 
images ou tout autre support de l'écrit, de la parole ou de l'image vendus ou distribués, mis en 
vente ou exposés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des placards ou des affiches exposés 
au regard du public, soit par tout moyen de communication au public par voie électronique, 
auront directement provoqué l'auteur ou les auteurs à commettre ladite action, si la 
provocation a été suivie d'effet. », via 
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1789 Declaration. The public front that united against the publishers labelled 
itself as republican and patriotic. 
The publishers, too, described their work as public service, in the interest of the 
French nation. Why? First, they were merely exercising their freedom of 
expression under the 1881 Law on Press Freedom. Second, the publication of 
this book was not merely legal; it was a long-overdue testimony which – 
according to the publishers – was “necessary for our public debate” on the 
French past. The defendants’ interpretation of the “fundamental interests of the 
French nation” was very different from that of the plaintiff’s.331 On 25 January 
2002, the court decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The General was fined 7,500 




When the defendants appealed in 2003, the main question remained whether the 
book encouraged torture – but the stakes were raised by a deeper discussion of 
the limits of state power. The petitioning publishers argument had two parts: (1) 
that neither they nor the author of their book could be accused of war crimes, 
or even incitement to war crimes, since the very notion of war crimes did not 
exist in French national law, and (2) that the 1881 Law on Press Freedom 
guaranteed them a full right of expression, which included a right to reveal 
previously unheard testimony on the nation’s colonial wars. The absence of the 
notion of a war crime in French domestic law is in itself highly significant, since it 
suggests that in this uniform republic - “une et indivisible” - internal strife could never 
escalate to the level of war crimes. 
 
 
331 Founding Manifesto of the LDH, via https://www.ldh-france.org/1898-LE-PREMIER- 
MANIFESTE-DE-LA/, accessed 22/02/21. 
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Nonetheless, the LDH argued in response (1) that any reference to war crimes 
automatically refers to international public law; (2) that Aussaresses did not 
describe his acts neutrally, but repeatedly characterised torture as “necessary” and 
“legitimate”; (3) that the publishers, despite the disclaimer on potentially 
uncomfortable scenes, did not make a sufficient effort to distance themselves 
from the material they published. The court decided in favour of the LDH and 




This autobiography was guilty of excusing crimes, which suggested a total 
absence of the French sense of justice in the colonies. The summary judgment 
reads: “The Court of Appeal considered that Mr Aussaresses justified, 
insistently, throughout the entire book, torture and summary executions, and 
made an effort to convince the reader that these proceedings were ‘legitimate’ 
and ‘inevitable’, thereby encouraging the reader to judge favourably those acts 
which objectively constitute war crimes.” Contrary to the idea that the French 
revolutionary ideal of universal justice is attainable by anyone in the world 
regardless of geographical location, and contrary to the Second French 
Republic’s promise, which annexed the Algerian coastal regions of Oran, Algiers and 
Constantine as fully-fledged départements on an equal footing with other units of the 
French Republic (1848), Aussaresses’ account suggested a total failure of justice in 
Algeria. “Justice is organised according to a model which corresponds to the 
metropole in peacetime. Here, however, we are in Algeria and a war is starting […] 
The judicial system is not made for such exceptional circumstances.”332 The 
contrasting pairs “Metropole-Algeria” and “peacetime-exceptional 
 
332 Aussareses, Services Spéciaux, 35 and 154. 
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circumstances” suggested double standards that run counter to the French 
promise of universal justice. The fact that after 114 years of French colonisation 
“barbarism” had not merely survived, but was now afflicting the highest 
echelons of French law enforcement, gave reason to believe that there were real 
flaws in the French system which seemed to have delivered anything but 
progress. 
The judge feared that this description of the past did not bode well for the 
present: “Paul Aussaresses detaches himself even less from his past when he 
suggests that such practices could once again be employed in situations of severe 
crisis; [he even says in his preface] ‘I often ask myself what would happen in a 
French town where every single day indiscriminate attacks would butcher 
innocent people. Would we not hear, after a few weeks, the highest authorities of 
the state demand that we put an end to this by any and all means?’”333 
Aussaresses suggested that even nowadays the French republic could turn into a 
state of violence, instability and injustice. Aussaresses draws connections 
between past and present. and admits to the fragility of the French system of 
governance. It is this admission of imperfection (imperfection of a political 
system that presents itself as the perfect culmination of the Enlightenment) 
which lies at the heart of the dispute about the book. Little else could explain 
the reaction of the state apparatus which pronounced: “Considering that the 
historical interest of this piece of work is unquestionable, liberty of expression 
must be exercised within the limits of the law, and notably with respect to 
 
333 (...) Paul Aussaresses se démarque d’autant moins de son passé qu’il laisse entendre que de telles 
pratiques pourraient à nouveau être employées dans des situations de crise grave ; qu’il dit en effet 
dans son avant-propos (page 10) : « (...) je me demande souvent ce qui se passerait aujourd’hui 
dans une ville française où, chaque jour, des attentats aveugles faucheraient des innocents. 
N’entendrait-on pas, au bout de quelques semaines, les plus hautes autorités de l’Etat exiger qu’on 
y mette fin par tous les moyens ? » ;Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux, 10., as cited in Orban et autres c. 
LDH (2003). 
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existing interdictions.”334 In the Aussaresses trial, the patriotic constraints which the 
law imposes on freedom of expression became more important than the 
freedom itself. 
A second appeal to the French Court of Cassation (2004) had a similar result, 
but the court arrived at it through a different argument. The high court ruling, 
delivered on 7 December 2004, followed a rather expansive interpretation of the 
key term “incitement to crimes” and sided with the LDH: “The judges highlight 
that in multiple passages of his book, Paul Aussaresses mixes his account with 
comments on the usage of torture or on the practice of summary executions, 
which […] tend to legitimate these practices and incite the reader to judge them 
favourably”. They also criticised the publishers directly for “not distancing 
themselves from the text at all and even glorifying its author by presenting him as a 
‘living legend’”. The judges ruled “that by presenting acts that constitute war crimes 
as susceptible to justification, the writings must be considered to have legitimised 
and incited those crimes; […] that the guilty intention can be deduced from the 
voluntary nature of the incriminated actions; […] that, in fact, anyone who lays 
claim to the right to information, the foundation of the freedom of expression, 
is not bound to mix his exposition of reported facts with comments which justify 
universally renounced acts that are contrary to human dignity, nor is he bound to 
glorify those acts.”335 
 
 
334 « Considérant que si l’intérêt historique de l’ouvrage est incontestable, la liberté d’expression 
doit s’exercer dans le cadre des limites fixées par la loi. » LDH et autres c. Aussaresses (2003). 
335 Arrêt de la Cour de cassation, 7 décembre 2004, « Attendu que, pour reconnaître à certains des 
propos incriminés un caractère apologétique, l’arrêt énonce que l’apologie au sens de l’article 24, 
alinéa 3, de la loi sur la presse n’est pas synonyme d’éloge ni de provocation directe 
; que les juges relèvent que, dans plusieurs passages de son livre, Paul Aussaresses assortit son récit 
de commentaires sur l’emploi de la torture ou la pratique des exécutions sommaires qui, au nom 
de l’efficacité, tendent à les légitimer et incitent à porter sur elles un jugement favorable; qu’ils 
retiennent encore que l’éditeur ne prend aucune distance vis-à-vis du texte et glorifie même son 
auteur en le présentant comme une ‘légende vivante’; […] Qu’en présentant comme susceptibles 
d’être justifiés des actes constitutifs de crimes de guerre, l’écrit doit être 
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These three French trials all arrived at the same conclusion because they follow a 
similar pattern of reasoning. That pattern is predefined by the codified laws of the 
French Republic, which specify in great detail what freedom of expression may 
and may not entail. Apart from the actual legal frameworks in place, however, 
there is the more fluid question of the power of the French state to limit public 
discourse with the ostensible aim to preserve public order. This question 
became dominant in the final appeal at the European Court of Human Rights 
(2009). 
Unconstrained by the legal conventions of the French Republic, the petitioners in 
Orban et autres c. France (2009) - now facing the whole French Republic rather than three 
civil society associations - asked for a reassessment of freedom of expression in 
France, while the French Republic clung to its powers. The trial turned into an 
interpretive exercise on how much press freedom a scarred society can bear. 
The publishers’ appeal rested on five sub-arguments, of which the last is the 
most significant for our purposes. Namely, the publishers argued they had “no 
intention” of violence or even incitement to human rights violations; instead, 
they pleaded that their wish had been to “inform, [...] reveal and contribute” to 
the illumination of “the black hole of French memory.” That kind of 




considéré comme en ayant fait l’apologie ; Que l’intention coupable se déduit du caractère 
volontaire des agissements incriminés ; […] Qu’en effet, celui qui se réclame du droit à 
l’information, fondement de la liberté d’expression, n’est pas tenu d’assortir l’exposé des faits qu’il 
rapporte de commentaires propres à justifier des actes contraires à la dignité humaine 




cePage=Search , accessed 23/02/21. 
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which the state should allow for the (re)surfacing of uncomfortable colonial 
truths. 
What did the French Republic argue in response? That French courts were 
simply exercising their reasonable margin of manoeuvre, covering the three 
criteria that any intervention into fundamental rights must fulfil: foreseeability, 
necessity and proportionality. France made two key arguments in response to 
the complaint. It justified its intervention against the plaintiffs’ freedom of 
expression as necessary, given that it was based on “an imperative social need” for 
tranquillity since “the memory of the conflict remains alive and painful”336. In this 
fragile context of unexamined, untreated collective wounds the state’s 
intervention was proportional to the gravity of the publishers’ act; since the 
publication of the book constituted “a disturbance to public order”. The state is 
thus perfectly clear about its intentions: in the context of a nation that has not 
yet to come to grips with its colonial past, the publication of a text which sheds 
light on that obscure past constitutes a dangerous disturbance of public order – a 
superficial order which the state has sought to maintain by carefully controlling 






336 EHCR, Orban et autres c. France (2009): “Le Gouvernement estime que la condamnation des 
requérants répondait à un ‘besoin social impérieux, notamment parce que ‘la mémoire des 
tortures pratiquées par certains militaires français reste encore très vive et douloureuse chez ceux 
qui les ont subies’” via 
https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CEDH/HFJUD/CHAMBER/2009/CEDH001-90662, 
accessed 01/03/21. 
337 Law No. 2005-158 of 23 February 2005 regarding recognition of the Nation and national 
contribution in favour of the French repatriates, via 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000444898/?isSuggest=true, 
accessed 23/07/21. 
338 See an attempt by the Macron government in 2020 to restrict access to government 
documents from 1940 to 1970 classified as “secret” when these had previously been freely 
accessible to researchers: https://histoirecoloniale.net/Des-historiens-protestent-contre-la- 
fermeture-de-l-acces-aux-archives.html; https://histoirecoloniale.net/Pour-l-acces-aux- 
archives-Un-nouveau-recours-depose-au-Conseil-d-Etat.html , accessed 24/02/21. 
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The European court – which had granted France an exceptional margin of 
intervention on previous occasions339 – was sceptical of this defence. “In 
publishing this work, the petitioners have simply delivered this testimony to the 
public” (Jersild v. Denmark 1994). But the publication of a testimony of this kind 
– which, according to the publisher “contributes to […] the understanding of 
the terrible complexity of an epoch which continues to inhabit our present” – 
undoubtedly inscribed itself in a “debate of general interest, a debate of singular 
importance for the collective memory”.340 
The court highlighted one of the theses advanced by the French General, namely 
that “such practices did not merely occur; they took place with the support of 
the French authorities”. In the eyes of the court, “the fact that the author does 
not place any critical distance between himself and these atrocious practices and 
that, instead of expressing any regrets suggests that he acted within the 
framework of the mission which had been assigned to him, by simply 
accomplishing his duty, constitutes an essential element of the testimony. Under these 
circumstances, the reproach which the court of appeals of Paris made to the 
petitioners in their capacity as publishers, of not having distanced themselves 
from the account of General Aussaresses, could not be justified.”341 
Nonetheless, the court did not underestimate the declaration of the government 
according to which “the memory of torture practiced by certain members of the 
French military remains very much alive and painful among those who suffered 
 
339 See S.A.S. c. France (2014) for the recognised “exception française”. 
340 ECHR, Orban et autres c. France (2009), § 49. 
341 « […] les requérants ont simplement livré ce témoignage au public (Jersild précité). Or la  
publication d’un témoignage de ce type – lequel, d’après l’éditeur, « contribue (...) à faire 
comprendre la terrible complexité d’une époque qui continue d’habiter notre présent » – 
s’inscrivait indubitablement dans un débat d’intérêt général d’une singulière importance pour la 
mémoire collective […] Dans ces circonstances, le reproche fait par la cour d’appel de Paris aux 
requérants, en leur qualité d’éditeur, de ne pas avoir pris de distance par rapport au récit du général 
Aussaresses, ne saurait être justifié ». Emphasis added. 
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from it [torture]”. The court nevertheless found that, “as in the abovementioned 
cases of Lehideux and Isomi […], the events recounted in the contentious 
publication occurred more than 40 years before its publication. […] While it is 
certain that the contentious proposal in question has not lost its capacity to 
renew suffering, it is not appropriate to judge it with the degree of severity which 
could have been justified ten or twenty years earlier; we must on the contrary address the issue 
with the distance of [the passage of] time. As the court already emphasised in the Lehideux and 
Isomi judgments, this [exercise] is part of the effort that every country is called 
upon to make in order to debate its own history openly and calmly. […] This is 
required by the pluralism, tolerance and openness without which there is no 
‘democratic society.’”342 
The ECHR therefore concluded that the publishers had indeed suffered a 
violation of their human right to freedom of expression. This infringement had 
been upheld by three French courts and defended until the last minute by the 
Republic. The fact that the system was so rigidly biased against the re-emergence of 
the colonial past might seem surprising at first. The Aussaresses trial itself was, 
of course, highly unusual. But in the end, it was the confluence of conflict and 
context which explains its oversized impact. Two factors rendered the trial 
 
 
342 « Pour autant, la Cour ne mésestime pas la déclaration du Gouvernement selon laquelle « la 
mémoire des tortures pratiquées par certains militaires français reste encore très vive et 
douloureuse chez ceux qui les ont subies ». Elle constate toutefois que, comme dans l’affaire 
Lehideux et Isorni précitée (§ 55 in fine), les événements évoqués dans l’ouvrage litigieux se sont 
produits plus de quarante ans avant sa publication. […] s’il est certain que les propos litigieux dont 
il est question en l’espèce n’ont pas pour autant perdu leur capacité à raviver des souffrances, il 
n’est pas approprié de les juger avec le degré de sévérité qui pouvait se justifier dix ou vingt ans 
auparavant ; il faut au contraire les aborder avec le recul du temps. […] cela participe des efforts 
que tout pays est appelé à fournir pour débattre ouvertement et sereinement de sa propre 
histoire. […] ainsi le veulent le pluralisme, la tolérance et l’esprit d’ouverture sans lesquels il n’est 
pas de « société démocratique » (ibidem). Sanctionner un éditeur pour avoir aidé à la diffusion du 
témoignage d’un tiers sur des événements s’inscrivant dans l’histoire d’un pays entraverait 
gravement la contribution aux discussions de problèmes d’intérêt général et ne saurait se concevoir 
sans raisons particulièrement sérieuses» EHCR, Orban et autres c. France (2009). 
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particularly shocking to the French: First, the general French population did not 
know very much about the Algerian War. This was a direct consequence of 
limited archives, limited publications and limited educational curricula. The 
restricted release of information about the past has – for centuries – been the 
French state’s preferred tool to safeguard the present. Second, what the French 
saw from the book, the trial and the many public interventions of professional 
historians, suggested that Revolution and Terror might not be separable after all. 
The two problems are linked. Had the public known how brutal the colonial 
independence struggles of the French Empire had been, they might have lost 
faith in the foundational idea of modern France: that the Revolution of 1789 
changed the world forever, and for the better. This innocent idea is examined in 








The moment in which an oppressed people liberated itself by reconfiguring the 
entire national power structure in 1789 remains the cornerstone of the French 
historical imagination. Tocqueville’s sense of a watershed is highly characteristic: “In 
1789 the French made the greatest effort which any people has ever embarked 
upon in order to, as it were, cut their destiny in half, and to separate by an abyss that 
which they had been until then, from whom they wanted to be henceforth.” 
The objective was to separate themselves from their past. “With this objective in 
mind”, Tocqueville continues, “they took all kinds of precautionary measures to 
avoid bringing anything from the past into their new condition. They imposed on themselves all 
kinds of constraints to fashion themselves 
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differently from their fathers; they did not forget anything to render themselves 
unrecognisable.” Nostalgic Tocqueville wants to cross that artificial “abyss” to 
“penetrate the core of this ancien regime, so close to us in terms of years passed, 
but so far because the Revolution hides it from us.”343 The fact that the 
revolution is able to “hide” the newly named “Ancien” regime suggests the 
success of the people who “cut their destiny in half” in order to replace “who 
they were” with “who they wanted to be”.344 It was the Enlightenment vision of 
history as a malleable process (see Chapter 2345) that allowed for the conceptual 
possibility of shaping one’s own national history by becoming the person or 
people one wishes to be.346 The rupture of the Revolution has defined French 
political discourse since then. Section A looks first at the French Revolution as a 
historical watershed that haunts political discourse on all sides; then at the 
relationship between revolution and colonialism. Section B shows how 
colonialism could be construed as a natural extension of the universal 
enlightenment proclaimed by the Revolution, before section C examines the 








343 : « Les Français ont fait en 1789 le plus grand effort auquel se soit jamais livré aucun peuple,  afin 
de couper pour ainsi dire en deux leur destinée, et de séparer par un abîme ce qu'ils avaient été 
jusque-là de ce qu'ils voulaient être désormais. Dans ce but, ils ont pris toutes sortes de 
précautions pour ne rien emporter du passé dans leur condition nouvelle; ils se sont imposé 
toutes sortes de contraintes pour se façonner autrement que leurs pères; ils n'ont rien oublié 
enfin pour se rendre méconnaissables. […] J'ai entrepris de pénétrer jusqu'au cœur de cet ancien 
régime, si près de nous par le nombre des années, mais que la Révolution nous cache. » 
A. Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (Paris, 1840) Part II, ch. 8, via 
https://www.institutcoppet.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/De-la-
d%C3%A9mocratie-en- Am%C3%A9rique.pdf, accessed 01/06/19. 
344 A. Tocqueville, L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution (Paris, Gallimard, 1967 [1856]), preface. 
345 See chapter 2, section III. 
346 E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton, PUP, 2009), esp. ch. 5: “The conquest of the 
historical world”. 
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The French Revolution became a cornerstone of French identity long before it 
was over. Historians, politicians and public figures on the right (from 
Tocqueville to Chirac) criticise that rupture, while the left (from Sieyès to Marcel 
Gauchet) elevates it to explain France’s role as a pioneer in world history. On the 
right, the French Revolution has long been presented as a Jacobin conspiracy, 
with the Terror already starting on 14 July 1789 and carried through the ages by 
the so-called Rights of Man. These supposedly serve as little more than an excuse 
for violence - from the French Commune of 1871 all the way to the Soviet 
Gulags.347 On the left, by contrast, revolutionary memories are revived whenever 
political change is on the horizon. In the works of Antoine Casanova, Claude 
Mazauric, Michel Vovelle and hopeful politicians from Adolphe Thiers to Victor 
Hugo, the Revolution is a permanent call to action against fascism, imperialism 
and exploitation.348 The higher cause of liberation from bourgeois domination 
justifies the excesses of the Terror. This reading of French history as permanent 
revolution was particularly powerful in 1830, 1848, 1871 and 1968; it continues to 
be upheld by radical democrats like Etienne Balibar, who maintain that “It is 









347 See R. Gildea, The Past in French History (New Haven, YUP, 1994), ch. 1: “Revolution”. 348 A. 
Casanova & C. Mazauric, Vive la Révolution, 1789-1989 (Paris, Messidor, 1989); M. Vovelle, La 
Révolution française. Images et récits, 1789-1799 (Paris, Messidor, 1986). 
349 E. Balibar, “Marxism and the Idea of Revolution: the Messianic Moment in Marx”, in: 
Trüper, Chakrabarty & Subrahmanyam (eds.), Historical Teleologies in the Modern World. 
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Between these two poles, there is a third camp, François Furet and Mona 
Ozouf’s revisionism.350 The basic idea is that the endless disputes over the true 
nature of the Revolution are now over because France has progressed and joined 
post-ideological nations. The trick here is to satisfy both camps by splitting the 
Revolution into the Good Revolution of 1789 and the Bad Revolution of 1793. 
Even a cursory glance at Furet’s supposedly neutral chapter on the Revolution in 
Pierre Nora’s epochal Lieux de Mémoire, however, reveals that the Revolution 
– both good and bad - continues to mesmerise the French imagination: “If the 
Revolution is at the origin of the political civilisation in which we still live, 200 
years after she appeared on the stage of History, it is primarily because she 
wanted it”, Furet writes. “Through the voices of her principal actors, and the act of 
a people, she [the Revolution] thought of herself as a foundational event, 
uniquely memorable: the regeneration of humanity through the liberty of the 
individual, finally conquered from the secular forces of oppression. Before her [the 
Revolution], the past is but an ‘Ancien Régime’, a lapidary expression which deletes 
from national memory all that which preceded her, feudalism and monarchy. It 
is thus she [the Revolution] which comes to occupy the whole space of history as the necessary 
instrument of her redemption. She is now the only one to be commemorated, celebrated, 
fêted – as if to conjure up indefinitely that which she abolished.”351 The 
Revolution, which acquires consciousness and “thinks 
 
 
350 F. Furet, Penser la Révolution française (Paris, 1978) ; F. Furet & M. Ozouf (eds.) Dictionnare critique de la 
Révolution française (Paris, Flammarion, 1988). 
351 : « « Si la Révolution française est à l’origine de la civilisation politique ou nous vivons  encore, 
deux cent ans après qu’elle est parue sur la scène de l’histoire, c’est d’abord, qu’elle l’a voulu. A 
travers la voix de ses principaux acteurs, et le geste d’un peuple, elle s’est pensée elle- même comme 
un événement fondateur, mémorable par excellence : régénération de l’humanité par la liberté de 
l’individu enfin conquise sur les puissances séculaires de l’oppression. Avant elle, le passé n’est 
qu’un « Ancien Régime », définition lapidaire qui efface de la mémoire nationale tout ce qui l’a 
précédée, féodalité et monarchie ensemble. C’est donc elle qui vient occuper tout l’espace de 
l’histoire comme l’instrument nécessaire de son rachat. Il n’y a plus qu’elle à remémorer, à fêter, à 
célébrer, comme pour conjurer sans cesse le retour de ce qu’elle 
205  
itself as a foundational event” to “regenerate humanity”, has acquired a historical 
personhood of its own. Note that the Revolution has become the grammatical 
subject of the sentences, suggesting self-awareness and reflection by the reflexive 
verbs “to constitute oneself”, “to think oneself”, and, of course, by the all- 
powerful phrase “because she wanted it”. After having designated everything 
that preceded her as an “Old regime”, she starts a new era in which she “occupies 
the whole space of history”. The French conception of past, present and future is 
coloured by an extraordinary event that seems to stand above history. 
In contrast to the English Revolution, which ultimately strengthened the 
monarch, and the American Revolution, which was anti-monarchical but still 
deeply religious, the French Revolution is the first pure revolution, not reliant on 
any transcendent support. Or is it? Furet’s next paragraph suggests that the 
Revolution becomes its own religion: “With the French Revolution, the sacred has 
not merely been separated from the political; there is a transfer of functions from 
one to the other. The Church had entrusted her hand to the monarchy, and 
now she pays the price. But more profoundly and beyond the fate of institutions, 
the Revolution delivers the actions of Man from all subordination and gives him full sovereignty over the final 
ends of history: that is how the revolutionary involvement in politics enters the domain of 
the religious, by substituting its terrestrial offer for that of God. […] It is this 
philosophical radicalism which is the most profound characteristic of the 
Revolution, the distinctive feature when compared with the English and 
American revolutions.”352 Can this autonomous revolution have a will of its own? 
 
a aboli. » F. Furet, « L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution », in : P. Nora (ed.), Les lieux de mémoire. Vol. II : 
La Nation (1997), 2302ff. 
352 « Avec la Révolution française, le religieux n’est pas seulement séparé du politique ; il s’opère un 




Tocqueville most probably doubted it, but he still applied the “tabula rasa” 
principles of the Revolution to justify French colonialism in North Africa: 
Writing his First Letter on Algeria (1837), where he had seen “les Arabes de la Bible 
et des Patriarches”,353 he recommended the French shock therapy of “burning 
all written documents, administrative registers, original files or others which could 
have perpetuated the traces of what was done before us.” Wherever French 
imperialism goes, the past is abolished. The clean slate of the revolutionaries is 
then mixed with progressive developmentalism: “The conquest initiated a new 
era, and fearful of mixing the past and the present in an irrational manner, we 
even destroyed a great number of streets in Algiers, in order to rebuild them 
according to our method, and we gave French names to all those to whose 
subsistence we consented.354 The desire to rebuild the world “according to our 
own method” went so far as to include a semiotic reorganisation of space and 
language. The colonisers copied the chronology of the revolutionaries and 
“initiated a new era” in which “a powerful and civilised people like ours exercises 
through its intellectual superiority alone an almost 
 
 
monarchie, et elle en paie le prix. Mais plus profondément au-delà de ce qui arrive aux 
institutions, la Révolution délivre l’action des hommes de toute subordination et lui donne 
souveraineté entière sur les fins dernières de l’histoire : l’investissement politique 
révolutionnaire envahit par là le domaine du religieux, en substituant son offre terrestre à celle de 
Dieu. Inversement, la tradition catholique constitue le môle de la contre-révolution. C’est cette 
radicalité philosophique qui est le charactère le plus profond de la Révolution française, son trait 
distinctif par rapport aux révolutions anglaise et américaine. » Furet, Révolution, 2303. 353 A. de 
Tocqueville, Première lettre sur l’Algérie, via 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/De_tocqueville_alexis/de_la_colonie_algerie/lettre_1_s
u r_algerie/lettre_1_sur_algerie.html , accessed 25/08/20. 
354 : « [L’état décida de] brûler tous les documents écrits, registres administratifs, pièces  authentiques 
ou autres, qui auraient pu perpétuer la trace de ce qui s'était fait avant nous. La conquête fut une 
nouvelle ère, et de peur de mêler d'une façon irrationnelle le passé au présent, nous détruisîmes 
même un grand nombre des rues d'Alger, afin de les rebâtir suivant notre méthode, et nous 
donnâmes des noms français à toutes celles que nous consentions à laisser subsister. » A. de 
Tocqueville, Deuxième lettre sur l’Algérie, via 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/De_tocqueville_alexis/de_la_colonie_algerie/lettre_sur_
a lgerie/lettre_sur_algerie.html , accessed 26/08/20. 
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invincible influence upon such small barbarous groups.” The colonisers 
“educated” and “civilised” the “poor Arabs” by giving them a new present. 355 They 
burnt all the “irrational” documents of the past, since the pre-revolutionary past was 
turned into a realm of irrationality by a Revolution which announced a new era of 
Reason. 
Paul Ricœur highlights the shift from a political to a philosophical periodisation of 
history: “The modern epoch designates not only the present epoch, but the epoch 
of the triumph of Reason. […] It is self-referential and self-validating [and] characterises 
itself as superior solely by laying claim to the present.”356 As discussed in 
chapter 1, the present has higher value than the past because the modern era 
equates the passage of time with improvement.357 “The French Revolution, 
mother of all ruptures” in Ricœur ’s characterisation, has a unique role in the 
emergence of this modern, liberal vision of time, because it did not just change 
the future. It actually “opened a new future” in which the secularised promise of 
redemption could reach all men through a new socio-political order.358 
Because the “new era” of the French could bring Enlightenment to all, it carried 
within it a justification for deep reform at home and expansionism abroad, which I 
will discuss below. 
 
355 « On doit viser avant tout à ce que ces Arabes indépendants s'habituent à nous voir nous 
mêler de leurs affaires intérieures et se familiarisent avec nous. Car il faut bien s'imaginer qu'un 
peuple puissant et civilisé comme le nôtre exerce par le seul fait de la supériorité de ses 
lumières une influence presque invincible sur de petites peuplades à peu près barbares […] », 
Tocqueville, Deuxième lettre sur l’Algérie. 
356 « […] ’époque moderne n’y désigne pas seulement l’époque présente, mais l’époque du 
triomphe de la raison. La périodisation est philosophique. Peut-on encore l’appeler 
chronologie ? En fait, la modernité est autovalorisante et autoréférentielle. Elle se caractérise elle-
même comme époque supérieure en se désignant comme présente à ce titre unique. » Ricœur , 
Mémoire, histoire, oubli, 395. Emphasis added. 
357 See ch. 1, section III. 
358 See Ricœur on « […] les promesses de rédemption déversées sur l’humanité à venir par la 
Révolution française, mère de toutes les ruptures. », Histoire, mémoire, oubli, 395f. 
359  https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/grands-discours- 
parlementaires/jules-ferry-28-juillet-1885, accessed 26/03/21. 
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For now, we can only highlight that this promise of universal enlightenment set a 
high bar – perhaps too high for French international relations. Whenever 
things went awry, politicians were criticised for not exporting the authentic 
revolution. What the authentic revolution really is, remains to be resolved. And yet 
we can certainly say that almost any discussion of French history revolves around 
the triumph and trauma of the Revolution. Its inherent tensions between old and 
new, stability and movement make it almost impossible to think of French 




B. The paradox of enlightened expansionism 
 
 
Is it justifiable to break fundamental human rights in a colonial operation which 
has the declared aim of spreading those human rights to the world? Can one 
civilise others with methods which (temporarily) contravene the norms of 
civilisation itself? The French have always been aware of the potential 
incompatibility between human rights and expansion. And yet there have been 
many different answers to the problem of revolutionary expansion. A fateful 
parliamentary debate on 28 July 1885, in which Prime Minister Jules Ferry made the 
case for French colonialism on “moral” grounds, will be our basis for 
illuminating this paradox. 
According to Jules Ferry, “the policy of colonial expansion may be justified by 
three types of ideas: economic ideas, highly significant ideas about civilisation, and 
ideas of a political and patriotic nature.”359 In his speech he would like to focus 
360  https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/grands-discours- 
parlementaires/jules-ferry-28-juillet-1885, accessed 26/03/21. 
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on the second type, by answering “the humanitarian and civilising aspect of the 
 




Ferry: “We have to speak up more honestly: it must be said openly that the 
 
superior races do in fact have a right vis-à-vis inferior races.” 
 
Maigne: “Oh! You dare say that in the country where the rights of Man were 
proclaimed!” 
Guillotet: “This is the justification for slavery and the slave trade! […]” 
 
Ferry: “I repeat that the superior races have a right, because they also have a 
 
duty. They have the duty to civilise the inferior races.” 
 
Fabre: “This is excessive! You end up abdicating the principles of 1789, of 1848 
[…] you end up consecrating that the law of [monarchical] grace may 




Here we see the open defence of racial hierarchies to support colonial expansion. 
We see the trick of refashioning the “right” of superior races as a “duty to 
civilise” supposedly inferior races. Colonialism is turned from a privilege of the 
powerful into a quasi-humanitarian duty which – crucially – could be compatible 
with the Revolution’s promise of universal enlightenment. 
In a second step, the passage of Liberal Time has a role to play. “These duties 
[the duties of superior races]”, Ferry says, “have often been disregarded in the 
361  https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/grands-discours- 
parlementaires/jules-ferry-28-juillet-1885, accessed 26/03/21. 
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history of previous centuries. When the soldiers and explorers of the Spanish 
introduced slavery in Central America they certainly weren’t accomplishing their 
duty as men of a superior race. But in our days, I maintain that the European 
nations deliver themselves of their superior duties of civilisation with 
magnanimity, grandeur and honesty.”361 In the dark, Early Modern past, 
conquerors did not recognise their duties, but in the modern present, illuminated 
by the French Revolution, the duties become clearly visible and then 
magnanimous nations fulfil them (in order to maintain their reputation and self- 
image as magnanimous). The transition to a new historical stage thus implies a 
transition to a new era of morality. The distancing from old-fashioned Spanish 
colonialism suggests that the passage of time engenders an increase in virtue, at 
least among the “civilised” peoples of the earth. That virtue must be shared: 
“Could you deny, could anyone deny that there is more justice, more material 
and moral order, more equity, more social virtues in North Africa since France 
made her conquest?”, Ferry asks. “When we went to Algiers to destroy piracy 
and assure the liberty of commerce in the Mediterranean, did we do the work of 
crooks, of conquerors, of devastators?”. No, the prime minister highlights 
civilisational advances by reference to “more material and moral order” - like 
Seeley before and Waldron after him. This advancement is the expression of 
France’s unique role in the movement of History: “In the times in which we find 
ourselves, nations are great only through the activity that they develop; it is not 
through the rayonnement [influence, glow] of their institutions that they are great at 
this hour. […] Shining our light into the world without acting, without getting into 
the affairs of the world, […] living like this, for a great nation believe me, 
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amounts to abdicating, and in a shorter time than you could believe, it would be 
descending from the first place to the third or fourth. I cannot, I cannot, 
gentlemen, and nobody could, I imagine, envisage a like destiny for our country.” 
The fact that Ferry thinks he can envisage a destiny – any destiny at all – at this 
moment is testament to the profound transformation which the French 
Revolution effected with regards to the French (and ultimately Western) 
conception of time: time now became visible and foreseeable to the bare human 
eye (this is the secularisation of Providence, no external agency required). For 
Ferry and his colleagues of the Parti Colonial, France carries within it the power to 
shape History. That power, the republican colonialists suggest, should be used to 
emancipate less fortunate nations while also consolidating France’s position at 
“the first place” of History, at the forefront of progress. 
Georges Clemenceau was not impressed by this usage of revolutionary heritage. 
For him, colonialism was not an extension, but an aberration of the 
achievements of 1789: “Is colonisation a duty of civilisation? […] I don’t even 
want to judge the core of the thesis which has been presented here, which is 
nothing but a proclamation about the primacy of might over right. The history of 
France since the Revolution is a living protest against such unequal 
pretensions!”362 This is the typical left critique of the misappropriation of the 
revolutionary imaginary to justify colonial excess. But is that classic objection from 




362 “La colonisation est-elle un devoir de civilisation? […] Je ne veux pas juger au fond la thèse qui a 
été apportée ici et qui n'est pas autre chose que la proclamation de la primauté de la force sur le 
droit ; l'histoire de France depuis la Révolution est une vivante protestation contre cette inique 
prétention !”, G. Clemenceau, “La colonisation est-elle un devoir de civilisation ? », Assemblée 






C. The insufficiency of colonial critique 
 
 
The leftist critique of the French civilising mission which ultimately grew into a 
(comparatively small) anti-colonial movement, culminated in Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
preface to Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.363 Sartre writes: “Europeans, open this 
book and step inside. After a few steps into the night you will see some 
foreigners united around a fire, come closer, listen […] a fire, which is not yours, 
illuminates them and warms them. You, at a respectful distance, you will feel 
ephemeral, transitional, nocturnal: each in turn; in this darkness from which a 
new dawn will rise, you are the zombies.”364 The metaphorical pair of light and 
darkness returns, but this time to suggest that it is the Europeans whose turn 
has come to fall into the darkness of oblivion. The colonised who, by the mid- 
twentieth century, are warmed and illuminated by a fire which no longer 
emanates from Europe, are starting a revolt against the Empire of 
Enlightenment. 
Before believing that the French have successfully identified the double 
standards that characterised the colonial project, however, we should remember 








363 F. Fanon, Les Damnes de la terre (Paris, 1961). 
364 « Européens, ouvrez ce livre, entrez-y. Après quelques pas dans la nuit vous verrez des 
étrangers réunis autour d'un feu, approchez, écoutez : […] Les fils vous ignorent : un feu les 
éclaire et les réchauffe, qui n'est pas le vôtre. Vous, à distance respectueuse, vous vous sentirez 
furtifs, nocturnes, transis : chacun son tour ; dans ces ténèbres d'où va surgir une autre aurore, les 
zombies, c'est vous. » J.-P. Sartre, Préface aux damnés de la terre (Paris, 1961). 
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First, it is no secret that the most radical critiques of French colonialism did not 
come from within France, but from the very places France had sought to civilise. 
Albert Camus had experienced colonialism as a pied-noir in Algeria, Frantz Fanon had 
grown up in Martinique before moving to France, just like his compatriot Aimé 
Césaire; Achille Mbembe offered his Critique of Black Reason from Cameroon and 
Alain Mabanckou, who was recently invited to a prestigious lectureship at the 
Collège de France, writes critical novels which are firmly anchored in his 
Congolese experience.365 Most of these authors followed the French national 
curriculum like their metropolitan counterparts, but their geographically 
marginal positioning opened external perspectives in French history which are 
suppressed in the metropole. The force of that systematic suppression of 
discourses which could delegitimise the French state by questioning its 
philosophical foundation is highlighted by the relative temerity of the 
metropolitan anti-colonialists. 
Second, it is essential to underline that the metropolitan anti-colonialists did not 
attack the core of French imperial ideology. The French left criticised only the 
implementation of the values of the Revolution, not those values themselves. If 
anything, it is the Catholic, monarchical right which regularly questions the 
principles of modern, secular republicanism. The left, however critical it has 
become in denouncing the effects of French colonialism, has not openly denied the 
singular importance of the French Revolution as a moral event. The expansion 
of French civilisation, then, is not evil in itself; what is regrettable are the methods 
employed to spread the gospel of 1789. This means that the 
 
 
365 A. Camus, L’étranger (Paris, Gallimard, 1942) ; A. Césaire, Discours sur le colonialisme (Paris, Présence 
Africaine, 1962) ; A. Mbembe, Critique de la raison nègre (Paris, La Découverte, 2013) ; 
A. Mabanckou, Les Petits-fils nègres de Vercingétorix (Paris, Seuil. 2002). 
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proponents and opponents of French colonialism still meet on the common 
ground of venerating the Revolution that gave life to modern France. This 
indelible rupture which defines the French timescape severely limits criticism of the 
colonial project. The effects of this restricted space of historical action can be 








“With independence,” Todd Shepard writes, “Algeria became the first dramatic 
failure of French state institutions on French territory to convince people to 
identify themselves as French.”366 The Algerian War showed that the Republic is 
precisely not – “une et indivisible”, as all constitutions from 1791 to 1958 say. It 
showed that the colonial Republic had not brought liberty, equality and 
fraternity for all. It showed, above all perhaps, that France was not in command of 
“her” destiny. This is much more than a problem of public policy. In Pierre 
Nora’s famous phrase, Algeria was “our very own War of Secession., that is to say, 
a form of civil war and a moment of profound crisis for the national 
conscience.”367 Algerian Independence tore the national tissue apart, politically and 
psychologically, since it disproved some core assumptions about the French 
relationship with History. In this section I want to suggest that the re-emergence of 
uncomfortable historical truths is deeply problematic for French official 
history, since it is a history in which the national timescape is irreparably broken 
 
366 T. Shepard The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press. (2006), 20. 
367 « Puis vinrent les guerres coloniales et, plus grave encore, la guerre d’Algérie, notre guerre  de 
Sécession à nous – c’est-à-dire une forme de guerre civile et de crise intense pour la conscience 
nationale. » 367 P. Nora, Présent, Nation, Mémoire (Paris, 2011), p. 9. 
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by the pivotal event of the French Revolution. There can be no aspiration to 
British continuity, because the whole point of the French Revolution is that it 
shows Man’s capacity to break with his unjust past. That rejection is justified by 
exceptional enlightenment which allows Man to see and to build a new and 
better future. It is extremely difficult, however, to deliver perfection 
continuously. This section examines, in light of the collapse of French Algeria, 
(1) how the French state tries to maintain the illusion of perfection through 
systematically closing access to the past; (2) how mistakes in the present are 
minimised by minimising agency in the state apparatus, and lastly, (3) how the 









The French state manages its past through two institutions: archives and 
amnesties. Both help to create distance between past and the present, sometimes 
by total severance of the chains of information and responsibility. 
 
The periodic use of amnesty laws is so widespread in France that entire research 
groups investigate this “national specificity”.368 Since the Wars of Religion, every 
major change in French politics – from the uprisings of 1848 to the Paris 
Commune of 1871 and the barricades of 1968 - has been sealed with an amnesty. 




368 See, for example, S. Gacon, L'Amnistie: De la Commune à la guerre d'Algérie (Paris, Seuil, 2002) ; J. 
Danet et al., Prescription, amnistie et grâce en France (Nantes, UP, 2006). 
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Ricœur writes, that it has become “a traditional political act”.369 In France, even 
breaking with the traditions of the past has become a tradition. In the case of 
the Algerian conflict, amnesty laws were issued in March 1962, April 1962 and 
December 1964. The laws were worded broadly to “grant amnesty regarding any 
acts committed within the framework of the peacekeeping operations against 
the Algerian insurrection.”370 This may calm matters temporarily but its long- 
term effects can be highly problematic. Amnesties prolong a state of exception: 
“Isn’t the defect of this imaginary unity that it deletes from official memory the 
examples of crimes which could have protected the future from the errors of the 
past? Isn’t it a matter of denying public opinion the benefits of disagreement, of 
condemning competing memories to an unhealthy subterranean life, of placing the 
relationship with the past outside of the field of forgiveness?”371 Amnesty laws 
suppress not only condemnation, but healthy public debate. They are a legal way of 
sealing off the past. Has a duty to remember in France been replaced by a duty to 
forget? Such a commandment to forget, Ricœur responds, “would be the 
equivalent of forced amnesia. If it crossed the line between amnesty and 
amnesia […], private and collective memory would be deprived of the salutary 
identity crisis which allows for a lucid reappropriation of the past and of its 
traumatic charge. The institution of amnesty can only respond to a plan of urgent 
societal therapy, under the sign of utility, not truth.”372 By circumventing a 
 
369 Ricœur , Histoire, mémoire, oubli, 588. 
370  JORF, see also 2 articles: https://www.cairn.info/revue-histoire-de-la-justice-2005-1-page- 
271.htm#no1 and 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24274054?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 
371 « Mais le défaut de cette unité imaginaire n’est-il pas d’effacer de la mémoire officielle les 
exemples de crimes susceptibles de protéger l’avenir des erreurs du passé et, en privant l’opinion 
publique des bienfaits du dissensus, de condamner les mémoires concurrentes à une vie 
souterraine malsaine (place le rapport au passé hors le champs du pardon) », P. Ricœur , Histoire, 
mémoire, oubli. 588. 
372 «Qu’en est-il dès lors du prétendu devoir d’oubli ? », asks Ricœur « […] un tel commandement 
équivaudrait à une amnésie commandée. Si celle-ci pouvait aboutir ‘ et malheureusement rien ne 
fait obstacle au franchissement de la mince ligne de démarcation 
217  
“salutary identity crisis”, amnesties are supposed to preserve the purity of the 
present by suppressing the resurfacing of truth. Amnesty laws, however, are only 
one of France’s legal ways of rejecting the past. 
Despite the existence of large archives, the historical documents of the French 
state are not easily accessible. First, there is the problem of declassification. In 
Britain, government papers have been released to the public since the Public 
Records Act of 1838. Since then, successive reforms in 1877, 1898, 1958 and 
1967 have cut the declassification period from 50 to 30 years and, most recently in 
2010, to 20 years.373 That means that even documents classified “confidential”, 
“secret” or “top secret” may be consulted by members of the public. Of course, 
the discovery of the “Migrated Archives” on the end of Empire, which I 
discussed in chapter 4,374 revealed that the British government had not released all 
declassified documentation to the public. And yet Britain’s public record 
management allows broad access in the name of transparency and accountability. In 
the United States, the vast majority of government papers are automatically 
declassified after 25 years. Executive Order 13526, revised under the Obama 
administration in 2009, even expanded the list of publicly accessible documents to 
include some records on national security and transnational crime. The 
rationale was publicly stated: “Our democratic principles require that the 







entre amnistie et amnésie, la mémoire privée et collective serait privée de la salutaire crise d’identité 
permettant une réappropriation lucide du passé et de sa charge traumatique. En deçà de cette 
épreuve, l’institution de l’amnistie ne peut répondre qu’à un dessein de thérapie sociale d’urgence, 
sous le signe de l’utilité, non de la vérité. », P. Ricœur , Histoire, mémoire, oubli, 589. 
373  http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/legislation/public-records- 
act/history-of-pra/ , accessed 24/02/21. 
374 See ch. 4, section I. 
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Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information both within the 
 
Government and to the American people.” 375 
 
In France, by contrast, the declassification term is either 25 or 50 years, 
depending on how “sensitive” the information contained in the document is. 
The National Archives can only be accessed upon approval of a prior written 
request and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps a separate archive which is 
notoriously inaccessible, even to specialist historians.376 Despite public 
professions that “archives must be made fully accessible”, as stated in the 2008 
Law on Archives,377 the state’s legislation has repeatedly restricted access to 
essential information. The colonial records of Madagascar, Indochina and 
Algeria, for example, were declassified around 2012 (50 years after the Evian 
Accords) and then reclassified through a General Inter-Ministerial Instruction on 
the Protection of National Defence Secrets in 2020.378 That instruction gave the 
state additional discretion, since it declared that (1) all internal documents created 
after 1934 would receive an a posteriori reclassification as “secret”, (2) the 
decolonisation documents had to be reclassified and released one by one while 
(3) not publishing the criteria along which such declassification and 
reclassification decisions would be made. 
This, of course, squarely obstructs the work of historians, who will have to wait for 
years to obtain a complete file – if their file is deemed to be publishable. The 
Association of French Archivists (AAF), the Association of Contemporary 
Historians in Higher Education (AHCSR) and others quickly released a press 
 
 
375  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified- 
national-security-information , accessed 24/02/21. 
376 See, for example, the preface of Todd Shepard’s, The Invention of Decolonization. 
377  https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000019198529/ , accessed 24/02/21. 
378  https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000042520705 , accessed 24/02/21. 
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statement in which they denounced the regulation’s creation of “a category of 
non-publishable archives” constructed by the “arbitrary selection” of 
bureaucrats who “violate and disdain the law”.379 Within a few weeks, the 
campaign, supported by the major newspapers, collected enough signatures to 
file a formal complaint with the Conseil d’État, France’s supreme administrative 
court. According to this complaint, the Inter-Ministerial Instruction on the 
Protection of Defence secrets was “illegal” and should be annulled because it 
allows non-specialists to arbitrarily restrict how much historical information the 
public could access. This, according to the historians, infringes on article 15 of the 
foundational Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and violates article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.380 The issue is far from settled, but the 
battle lines are drawn very clearly: The state wants to ensure the “protection” of 
its historical secrets in the name of “public order”, while researchers believe 
that the lifting of such protection will finally allow for an “informed” and 
perhaps “contradictory” examination of the nation’s recent past. The 
Aussaresses trial, publishing previously unheard testimony, was a watershed in 
the story of modern France. Its long legal, cultural and political aftershocks 












379  https://histoirecoloniale.net/Pour-l-acces-aux-archives-Un-nouveau-recours-depose-au- 
Conseil-d-Etat.html , accessed 24/02/21. 
380 Full text of the constitutional complaint: 
https://histoirecoloniale.net/IMG/pdf/lire    le_recours_au_conseil_d_etat_sur_la_nouvelle_i 
gi anonymise_.pdf , accessed 24/02/21. 
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During the crisis of 1961/62, as French politicians from all camps realised that 
Algeria could not be retained, they offered neither values nor ammunition. 
Instead, they awkwardly apologised to the French people by altering the nature of 
history. Rather than suggesting, as usual, that France had a privileged position in 
History that allowed it to effect world-historical change, politicians of all 
stripes adopted “the notion that the historical category ‘decolonisation’ was a 
causal force with an all but irresistible momentum.”381 This embrace of historical 
determinism allowed for a smoother exit in which responsibility and 
accountability were minimised for all actors. The mantra “le courant de 
l’histoire” (the tide/stream/current of history) became a catchphrase without 
further elaboration. Decolonisation simply became another inevitable stage of 
historical development. General de Gaulle’s famous address after the signing of the 
independence agreement in 1962 can be taken as an example: 
“Throughout its life, France has traversed periods in which the general evolution of things required 
renewal from her, renewal failing which the penalty would be decline and death. […] Such was the 
case when the Revolution installed liberty and equality in the interior, and intervention abroad, 
because democracy, competition and conversion responded to the political, economic and social 
character of the new period which was starting. That is certainly the case today too, because the era 
in which we find ourselves – an era which marks the acceleration of scientific and technological 
progress, the need for social improvement, the appearance of a host of new states and the ideological 
rivalry – 
 
381 Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 6. 
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that era imposes on us, in our relations with others but also within ourselves – an immense 
renovation. The question now is to accomplish this mission without France ceasing to be France. 
In these demands there is nothing that is not necessary and at the same time worthy of France.” 
382 
It seemed like history itself was guiding the ceasefire negotiations at Evian. 
France was receiving “requests”, “demands” and “missions” from history itself. 
This was both flattering and exonerating, On the one hand, France’s direct link to 
historical evolution underlined the special status of the nation that had engaged 
in national renewal for the sake of mankind. On the other hand, the mere 
execution of the demands of history could not be judged unfavourably by voters or 
international observers. Only History itself would be the final judge of French 
success. “History’ was no longer to be debated,” Shepard suggests, “its demands 
needed to be applied and Algeria decolonised.”383 By turning the rather descriptive 
term “décolonisaton” into a historical category in its own right, the French had 
managed to circumvent their ethical dilemma: “In Algeria, as elsewhere, 
decolonisation now appeared as a whole consistent with a narrative of progress – 
the ongoing extension of national self-determination and its corollary values: 





382  General de Gaulle’s speech after the Evian Accords on 05/02/62: “La France, au long de sa 
vie, a traversé des époques où l'évolution générale requérait d'elle le renouvellement, sous peine de 
déclin et de mort. […] C'est certainement le cas aujourd'hui, parce que l'ère où nous nous trouvons 
et que marque l'accélération du progrès scientifique et technique ; le besoin de promotion 
sociale, l'apparition d'une foule d'Etats nouveaux, la rivalité idéologique des Empires, nous imposent, 
au-dedans de nous-mêmes et dans nos rapports avec les autres, une immense rénovation . La question est de l'accomplir sans que la 
France cesse d'être la France. Je le dis une fois de plus, cette transformation implique d'inévitables remous en 
secourant quelque peu le navire. […] En fait et en dépit de tout, nous voguons à pleine voile 
vers les buts que nous nous sommes fixés […]. », via https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-
media/Gaulle00075/discours- du-5-fevrier-1962.html , accessed 28/0920. 
383 Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, (2006), 82. 
384 Shepard, Invention of Decolonization (2006), 6. 
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This highly effective conceptual trick returned when the revelations of the early 
2000s sparked a new academic and legislative interest in the Algerian War. 
Although legislators on the left actively tried to introduce legal changes that 
would restore the importance of the Algerian experience to French history, the 
language employed betrays a curious lack of critical agency. The official name 
change from “évènements en Algérie” or “opérations de maintien d’ordre 
effectuées en Afrique du Nord” to “Guerre d’Algérie” in 1999, for example, is 
introduced as an act to catch up with the “slow evolution” of historical 
knowledge. “A quarter century has passed without full recognition of the 
sacrifices which our soldiers made in this conflict”, the bill opens, “this situation is 
rightly considered as a denial of what the veterans did out of duty to the 
nation”.385 Far from being an admission of historical guilt, this bill is framed as a 
fulfilment of patriotic duty. 
After the Aussaresses revelations, a parliamentary commission formed in 2002 
examined the possible introduction of “a National day of remembrance and 
reverence in honour of the memory of the civil and military victims of the 
Algerian War and the fighting in Morocco and Tunisia”.386 The report opens 
solemnly: “Forty years after the signing of the Evian Agreements, it is time for 
France to look her history in the face and to permit the work of memory to 
realise itself with the necessary rigour and serenity”, but it is astounding that two 
whole paragraphs are dedicated to assuring the readers that a national day of 




385  https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/propositions/pion1558.asp , accessed 24/02/21. 
386 Rapport no. 3527 (pour instaurer une Journée nationale du souvenir et de recueillement à la 
mémoire des victimes civiles et militaires de la guerre d'Algérie et des combats du Maroc et de 
Tunisie) par Mme Marie’Helène Aubert, http://www.assemblee- 
nationale.fr/11/rapports/r3527.asp, accessed 29/09/20. 
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1962, the authors write, “the arms were silenced [silenced themselves], but the 
French army was not defeated. In proceeding, according to the Evian 
Agreements, with the application of the ceasefire on Algerian territory, France did 
not concede militarily. She merely undertook a political measure of 
decolonisation.”387 To “effect decolonisation” is apparently still not a military or 
political retreat, but a neutral act of dutifully following the demands of history. A 
similarly bizarre absence of agency can be observed when the authors urge the 
parliamentarians to accept the report’s recommendations in order for “the work of 
mourning and of memory to finally effect itself”. The repeated use of 
intransitive verbs suggests that there is no external actor. Memory works itself 
(and the French Republic) out of this uncomfortable impasse. France’s historical 
agency is inflated in moments of victory, but when the exceptional Republic 
suffers a defeat, agency is diminished. This is a way of diminishing the risk of 
blame and guilt, while preserving the idea of France’s special link with History. The 
“grande nation” looks to History for advice and will, if necessary, undergo the 
process of memory and commemoration like a dutiful patient. When the “tide 
of history” calls for decolonisation, the French “permit” (a very soft verb) that 













387 : “Quarante ans après la signature des accords d’Evian, il est temps pour la France de 
regarder son histoire en face et de permettre au travail de mémoire de s’effectuer avec la rigueur et 
la sérénité nécessaires. […] les armes se sont tues, mais l’armée française n’a pas été défaite. En 
procédant, conformément aux accords d’Evian, à l’application du cessez-le-feu sur le territoire 
algérien, la France ne s’incline pas militairement ; elle effectue une démarche politique de 
décolonisation.” 
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C. Shaping the future by recycling the Revolution 
 
The latest round of the French dialogue with the past in the Macron era shows 
that memory hasn’t completed its work yet – but also that an artificial 
acceleration of this project is ill-advised. Any modification of France’s 
relationship with History must stay within the parameters defined by the 
Revolution. 
The presidential campaign in 2017 was marked by Emmanuel Macron’s surprise 
visit to Algiers. The candidate went further than anyone before him by saying: “I 
think it is unacceptable to glorify colonisation […] It’s a crime, a crime against 
humanity, a real barbarity […] France installed the Rights of Man in Algeria, but she 
forgot to read them.”388 It is indicative of the French collective trauma that even a 
totally new political player couldn’t get around the traditional narrative that the 
French had brought human rights to North Africa. Macron’s novel turn was that 
he said the French had “installed” Human Rights in Algeria, but had “forgotten 
to read them”. The word “forgotten” is remarkably soft here, suggesting a 
temporary mistake rather than wilful disregard. Yet this wasn’t enough to 
appease the outraged public who immediately called him “unpatriotic”. The 
more “patriotic” version was offered by the right-wing Front National’s Marine Le 
Pen, who first denied French responsibility in the Rafle du Vel d’Hiv of 1942 
(where 13.000 Jews were rounded up by Parisian police to be sent to concentration 




388 E. Macron in Algiers : “Je pense qu’il est inadmissible de faire la glorification de la  colonisation. 
[…] C’est un crime, c’est un crime contre l’humanité, c’est une vraie barbarie. […]  La France a 
installé les droits de l’homme en Algérie, mais elle a oublié de les lire », via 
http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2017/02/15/en-Algérie-emmanuel-macron-qualifie-la- 
colonisation-francaise-de-crime-contre-l-humanite_1548723, accessed 03/08/18. 
389  https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/04/10/rafle-du-vel-d-hiv-la-faute-de-le- 
pen_5108861_3232.html, accessed 03/08/18. 
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brought great benefits, especially in Algeria.”390 The statement played to the 
sentiment of “nostalgérie”, an almost British idealisation of European life on the 
frontline of imperialism. This was so well received that Macron was ultimately 
forced to formally retract his critical statement. 
Once in power, President Macron made further moves towards examining the 
Algerian trauma. In spring 2020, for example, he charged Benjamin Stora, a top 
specialist on Franco-Algerian memory cultures, to draft a report with new 
recommendations, because “for too long, the subject of colonisation and of the 
Algerian war has blocked the construction of a shared destiny in the 
Mediterranean.” The aim of that report is decidedly forward-looking: to allow the 
youth which “have no responsibility whatsoever for yesterday’s 
confrontations”, “those who now carry the future of our countries in their 
hands”, to “write their own history without stigma”.391 Stora’s response to that 
request includes a call to open archives, to change history teaching in secondary 
schools and to establish a “Memories and Truth Commission” (many memories 
but only one truth!) similar to those used in democratic transitions from South 
Africa to Timor-Leste. In some sense, Macron wanted to start his own 
revolution, breaking with the past of silence and secrecy, in order to create a 





390  http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-la-colonisation-a-beaucoup-apporte- 
notamment-a-l-Algérie-19-04-2017-2120773_20.php , accessed 03/08/18. 
391 « Je souhaite m’inscrire dans une volonté nouvelle de réconciliation des peuples français et 
algériens. Le sujet de la colonisation et de la guerre d’Algérie a trop longtemps entravé la 
construction entre nos deux pays d’un destin commun en Méditerranée. Celles et ceux qui 
détiennent entre leurs mains l’avenir de l’Algérie et de la France n’ont aucune responsabilité dans 
les affrontements d’hier et ne peuvent en porter le poids. Le devoir de notre génération est de 
faire en sorte qu’ils n’en portent pas les stigmates pour écrire à leur tour leur histoire. » 
B. Stora, Rapport sur les questions mémorielles portant sur la colonisation et la guerre d’Algérie (2021), 
https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/278186.pdf , accessed 
01/04/21. 
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But the President has learnt from the skirmishes of the campaign that any change 
must be phrased and framed in the values of the great Revolution. While Black 
Lives Matter activists were tearing down statues across the US and the UK, he 
proposed a different, state-led strategy for France: “I see us dividing ourselves on 
all matters and sometimes even losing the sense of our History. Reuniting 
around republican patriotism is a necessity. We are a nation in which every 
person – no matter their origins, their religion – has to find their place. Is this 
true across the world? No. […] I tell you very clearly tonight, my dear 
compatriots, that the Republic will not efface any trace or any name from its 
history. The Republic will not remove any statue. Instead, we must lucidly look at 
our history together, all our histories, all our memories […] We will no longer build 
our future in disorder. Without Republican order there is neither security nor 
liberty.”392 When people have lost “the sense of our history” – because in France 
there should only be one sense - republican “rassemblement” becomes a political 
necessity. Against the fragmentation of memory (“communautarisme memoriel”)], 
the head of state proposes a state-led approach, in which French exceptionalism 
is enhanced by “building our future” within the existing order. It is this order 








392 « Je nous vois nous diviser pour tout et parfois perdre le sens de notre Histoire. Nous unir 
autour du patriotisme républicain est une nécessité. Nous sommes une Nation où chacun, 
quelles que soient ses origines, sa religion doit trouver sa place. Est-ce vrai partout et pour tout le 
monde ? Non.[…] . Je vous le dis très clairement ce soir mes chers compatriotes, la République 
n’effacera aucune trace ni aucun nom de son Histoire. La République ne déboulonnera pas de 
statue. Nous devons plutôt lucidement regarder ensemble toute notre Histoire, toutes nos 
mémoires, […] Nous ne bâtirons pas davantage notre avenir dans le désordre. Sans ordre 
républicain, il n’y a ni sécurité, ni liberté. », Président E. Macron, 
« Adresse aux Français », 14/06/2020, via https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel- 




To conclude this chapter, I would like to underline how different the French 
timescape is from the British. Instead of omnivorous continuity, French history is 
“cut in half” (Tocqueville) by the Revolution of 1789. It is the enduring 
influence of that Revolution, its vocabulary, imagery and institutions which make it 
so difficult to accept the ambivalent nature of the civilising mission. That 
makes the French timescape much less flexible than the British one. In Section I, I 
looked at the momentous trial of General Paul Aussaresses and his publishers who 
were accused of “incitement to war crimes” for having revealed the truth about 
torture during the Algerian War of Independence. The fundamental insight is 
that three French courts successively declared the accused parties guilty because they 
were showing the dark side of the French civilising mission, while the ECHR 
opined that the publishers were exercising their freedom of expression in a way 
that is “necessary in democratic societies”. The French state guards its past tightly 
because any revelation of injustice threatens the legitimacy of the progressive 
Republic. Section II captured the enduring force of the French Revolution on 
the French historical imagination and asked whether Enlightenment was 
compatible with Empire.393 An examination of historical parliamentary records 
suggested that it was not, although France continues to justify its foreign policy 
in those terms. The final section III asked what this enormous tension between 
a virtuous revolutionary rupture on the one hand, and a promise of perpetual 
progress on the other, mean for the emergence and absorption of 
uncomfortable truths. The conclusion is that France has great difficulties 
dealing with past injustice, because the national timescape continues 
 
 
393 S. Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton, PUP, 2003). 
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to be dominated by the revolutionary motif of Man rejecting his past to create a 





6. AMERICAN SYNTHESIS: PROGRESSIVELY 
REFOUNDING THE REPUBLIC 
 
 
“America, it is to thee, 
 
Thou boasted land of liberty,— It is 
to thee I raise my song, 





This chapter explores conceptions of Liberal Time in the context of real political 
debates about historical injustice in the United States. In these debates, I see the 
possibility of a synthesis between the French and British historical model. If 
France focuses on rupture and Britain on continuity, the American case is 
exciting because it might combine the two: there is a tension between the radical 
(re)founding of “the first new nation” and the linear promise of continuous 
progress thereafter. From the very beginning, the Founding Fathers stressed the 
unique nature of the American project: “Hearken not to the voice which 
petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your 
adoption is a novelty in the political world”, writes Madison in Federalist No. 14, “why 
is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may 
comprise what is new? […] Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole 
human race, they [the early settlers] pursued a new and more noble 
 
 
394 James C. Whitfield, America (1853), in: K. Young (ed.), African American Poetry: 250 Years of Struggle and 
Song: An Anthology of African American Poetry (New York, 2020) 36f. 
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course.”395 In 1776, the Thirteen Colonies declared their independence from all 
systems of absolutism, imperialism and oppression. This anticolonial innocence 
was then enshrined in the 1787 constitution. Yet the image of a clean slate in 
world history sits uneasily with the facts of American history before and after the 
revolution. This hinges on the unique feature that the US is both a colony and a 
colonial power. 
At least three persistently painful elements of the American past should be 
highlighted: (a) the institution and legacy of slavery,396 (b) the territorial conquest of 
the West, (c) the informal Empire of dependent territories, military bases and 
economic dominance that underpin America’s global hegemony today.397 Recent 
commentators like Greg Grandin have pointed out how all these elements were 
interlinked and carefully crafted into a universalist narrative of progress that was 
meant to conceal them all.398 Edward E. Baptist’s The Half Has Never Been Told 
(2016) and Adam Rothman’s Slave Country (2005) are the most important 
contributions showing how slavery became essential to the development of 
American capitalism and how politicians of all stripes decided to “protect and 





395 The Federalist no. 14, via https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed14.asp, accessed 
25/02/20. 
396 The moral problem of celebrating American republicanism while continuing slavery was noticed 
early on. The Baptist preacher and pamphleteer John Allan, for instance, wrote in 1774: “Blush 
ye pretended votaries for freedom! Ye trifling patriots! You are making a vain parade of being 
advocates for the liberties of mankind, who are thus making a mockery of your profession by 
trampling on the sacred natural rights and privileges of Africans; for while you are fasting, praying, 
nonimporting, nonexporting, remonstrating, resolving, and pleading for a restoration of your 
charter rights, you at the same time are continuing this lawless, cruel, inhuman and abominable 
practice of enslaving your fellow creatures!”, see B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution, Fiftieth Anniversary Edition (2018 [1968]), 230-36. 
397 D. Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire (New York, 2019); A. Rana, Two Faces of American Freedom 
(Cambridge MA, HUP, 2010). 
398 G. Grandin, The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America 
(New York, Macmillan, 2019). 
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expansion through expropriation of Native Americans.399 When it comes to the 
transition between step 2 (westward expansion) and step 3 (overseas 
imperialism), Aziz Rana is the most lucid guide. In his Two Faces of American Freedom, 
he writes: “The actual history of the sustained shift from settler to civic imagination 
over the first half of the twentieth century highlights the extent to which civic 
arguments were constructed by settler elites themselves. Ideas of American 
exceptionalism and universalism were at root the product of debates about how an 
essentially completed settler project could transform itself into a global power, 
especially against the backdrop of a closed frontier at home and both bloody 
European rivalries and non-white political assertiveness abroad.”400 Once the 
domestication of the “Wild West” faced its end at the Pacific, the Turner Thesis – 
America will be virtuous only as long as it has its “endlessly revitalising frontier” – 
required that the frontier of modern civilisation be expanded overseas.401 US 
soldiers spread into all corners of the world that were “liberated” by American 
capitalism. Politicians of the American Century “reimagined the fundamental 
meaning of the national past” and “called on all communities within the 
country—regardless of their own histories of expropriation or enslavement— 
to participate in an ongoing narrative of American identity”, the narrative of an 
endless egalitarian promise.402 This promise remained a political imperative even 
as America quietly acquired one colonial territory after the next, as Daniel 
Immerwahr traces in How to Hide an 
 
 
399 E.E. Baptist, The Half has never been told: Slavery and the making of American Capitalism (New York, Basic 
Books, 2014); A. Rothman, Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South ( Cambridge 
MA, HUP, 2005). 
400 A. Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge MA, HUP, 2010), 30ff. 
401 J. M. Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" and Other 
Essays. With commentary by John Mack Faragher (New Haven, YUP, 1994). 402 A. Rana, 
“Colonialism and Constitutional Memory”, UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 5 (2015), 287. 
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Empire.403 Why did the empire have to be hidden from public view? Why were the 
American contradictions between freedom and oppression carried through every 
wave of expansion? Why could the revolutionary spirit of liberation not live on 
forever as America expanded its reach? And what happened to the imperative 
of continuous progress when the limits of its universalism were exposed? 
We shall analyse this mighty tension between rupture and continuity in the usual 
three steps: In section I, we will look at legal action that revealed and questioned the 
national historical myth, in this case the two recent Supreme Court disputes around 
McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020) and Shelby County v. Holder (2013). Section II illuminates the 
American timescape further by analysing the 1619 Project as a public history 
initiative which highlighted the strength of the orthodox American timescape 
characterised by novelty, exceptionalism and providential progress. Finally, Section 









In contrast to the previous chapters, we are going to examine more than a single 
trial. This is not just due to the extraordinary richness of American self- 
examination in recent years, but also because of the special place which the law 





403 D. Immerwahr, How to hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States (New York, Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 2019). 
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Court is not merely a court, it is the conscience of the nation.404 Guarding, 
explicating and reinterpreting the founding values of the 1787 Constitution, this 
court is at the heart of the process by which America constructs itself. Its 
judgements attract worldwide commentary and attention, often acting as an 
indicator for the socio-political state of the nation as a whole. In this first section we 
shall therefore look at two cases in which private citizens clashed with public bodies 
in order to demand the fulfilment of a historical promise. That promise, in both 
cases, was made by the Federal Government. Although the outcome of the trials 
is different – once in favour of the citizen, once in favour of the state 
– what interests us here is how the Supreme Court openly deliberates the 
significance of such historical promises. The first case is McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020); 
the second Shelby County v. Holder (2013). After an initial survey, we are going to draw 
the conclusions of both cases together to show the continuous power of 
progress (as idea and ideal) in American constitutional law. 
 
 
A. McGirt v. Oklahoma 
 
Petitioner Jimcy McGirt had been convicted of three serious offences by the 
state court of Oklahoma but then argued in post-conviction proceedings “that 
the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is an enrolled member of 
the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and his crimes took place on the Creek 
Reservation.” His appeal rested on the federal Major Crimes Act (MCA) which 
states that Indians who commit certain enumerated offenses against other 
Indians on Indian territory shall be subject to federal trials, since they are not 
 
 
404 R. G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court. 6th edition (Chicago, 2016 [1960]); M.J. Klarman, From 
Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New York, OUP, 2004). 
405 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _ (2020), syllabus, § 1. 
234 
 
subordinate to the states. A previous decision in Negonsott v. Samuels (1993) 
confirmed that state courts generally have no power to try Indians for wrongs 
committed in “Indian Country”. The real question facing the Supreme Court 
was thus not whether McGirt had actually committed any of the offences but 
whether he had committed them in “Indian Country.” The historical boundaries of 
the Creek Reservation cover 41 per cent of present-day Oklahoma. Should that 
state and the federal government continue to respect the boundaries which it 
negotiated with the Native Americans after their forced relocation in 1832? Are 
the state’s actions today limited by what they promised in the nineteenth- 
century treaties with the Creeks (1830, 1832, 1833, 1866) or is there some 
reconfiguration of rights and duties as time passes? Can the federal government’s 
duties to respect the sovereignty of Native Land somehow be alleviated with the 
passage of time? 
Justice Roberts, who admits that “the stakes are not insignificant”,405 answers 
this question of continuous and equal sovereignty for Indians with two further 
questions: (1) Did Congress establish a sovereign reservation for the Creeks? (2) 
Does that Indian reservation persist? The judge’s reasoning on the first question 
points towards the importance of beginnings in American constitutional law, 
especially for those who subscribe to the conservative legal philosophy of 
Originalism and the method of strict textualism. The court’s reflections on the 
second question indicate the persistent strength of Darwinian evolutionary 
theory in the new federal government’s dealings with old inhabitants of North 
America. 
406 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _ (2020), syllabus, §1. 
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Let us start with the first question: Did Congress establish a sovereign reservation for the Creeks? 
Here, the historical evidence speaks for itself: all the treaties concluded between 
the federal government and the Creek nation include phrases that suggest that 
the cession of land east of the Mississippi would be compensated for with a 
“permanent home” for the tribes West of the Mississippi. For our purposes, 
however, it is interesting how Justice Gorsuch frames his exposition in terms of 
an intergenerational promise: 
“On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced to leave their ancestral lands 
in Georgia and Alabama, the Creek Nation received assurances that their new lands in 
the West would be secure forever. In exchange for ceding ‘all their land, East of the 
Mississippi river,’ the U. S. government agreed by treaty that ‘[t]he Creek country west of the 
Mississippi shall be solemnly guaranteed to the Creek Indians.’ […] The government 
further promised that ‘[no] State or Territory [shall] ever have a right to pass laws for the 
government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves.’ […] Today we 
are asked whether the land these treaties promised remains an Indian reservation for 
purposes of federal criminal law. Because Congress has not said other-wise, we hold the 
government to its word.”406 
On the far end of the Trail of Tears there was a “promise” made by the US 
government. What exactly that promise could be, and whether its content was 
actually what the Creeks wanted is not specified. Two centuries later, the 
Supreme Court revitalised that promise by summarising the judgement in a 
single phrase: “we hold the government to its word.” This metaphor of 
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collective, transhistorical and public promising invites further investigation. It is 
also worth asking: why now? Why should this court at this historical moment 
take the corrective action which was missing – or merely delayed? – before. 
Justice Gorsuch makes no effort to hide the fact that the federal government’s 
prolific record of promise-making was accompanied by an equally copious 
record of promise breaking: “While there can be no question that Congress 
established a reservation for the Creek Nation, it’s equally clear that Congress has 
since broken more than a few of its promises to the Tribe. Not least, the land 
described in the parties’ treaties, once undivided and held by the Tribe, is now 
fractured into pieces. While these pieces were initially distributed to Tribe 
members, many were sold and now belong to persons unaffiliated with the 
Nation.” The fracturing of the moral promise – enshrined in a series of contracts 
– is accompanied by the physical fracturing of the Indian territory. The first 
question then – did Congress establish a reservation? – is answered in the 
affirmative. But going beyond that, the decision’s tone is rather remonstrative. 
Why? Because with every broken promise, the credibility of the promisor breaks 
too. The Supreme Court feels compelled to “hold the government to its word”. 
Such honest corrections are deemed necessary to reinforce the credibility of the 




The second question about the continuous existence of the Tribe and its land 
claim, is slightly trickier. Most of the treaties between the Federal Government and 
Native tribes include ominous clauses about the risk of natural changes in the 
Indian populations which might invalidate their claim to land. In the statute that 
precipitated the negotiations with the Creeks in 1830, for example, Congress 
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authorised the President “to assure the tribe […] that the United States will 
forever secure and guaranty to them […] the country so exchanged with them”. 
“[A]nd if they prefer it,” the bill continued, “the United States will cause a patent or 
grant to be made and executed to them for the same; Provided always, that such lands 
shall revert to the United States, if the Indians become extinct, or abandon the 
same”.407 In a subsequent agreement the right to self-government (and thereby 
federal trials) “guaranteed by the United States shall be continued to said tribe of 
Indians, so long as they shall exist as a nation, and continue to occupy the 
country hereby assigned to them.”  
These kinds of clauses are not new. They appear and reappear in most Anglo-
Saxon settler colonies. The settlers justified their presence through the myth of 
civilisational inferiority of non-Europeans and their territorial expansion through 
the natural depopulation of the Natives, who often contracted European diseases 
like smallpox. The legal affirmation of such myths until the end of the nineteenth 
century is already worrying. A much more serious problem, however, is that caveats 
like the two phrases cited above leave the door wide open for people who want 
to read them as a negative incentive to more, not less colonial violence. Again, 
if the firmness of agreements depends on the firmness of the tribe’s natural 
reproduction, the state has an interest in the physical decline of the tribe. Forced 
migration, natural depopulation through illness and even genocide would then 
become options to advance the interests of the new state. And this is exactly what 
happened on the imperial frontier of the ever-expanding United States.408 These 




407 Indian Removal Act of 1830, § 3, 4 Stat. 412 
408 P. Hämäläinen, Lakota America: A New History of Indigenous Power (New Haven CT, YUP, 2019); F. 
Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel  Hill, 2010 [1975]). 
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If they are not corrected soon enough, these unintended consequences may 
acquire a life of their own. This harm of perverse incentives and unintended 
consequences is particularly dangerous in the Common Law. If the legitimacy or 
very existence of a rule depends not only on its repeated enforcement, but also on 
its enactment over time, any act of non-compliance that goes unnoticed risks 
destabilizing the original law. If we talk about longer timespans (say, a century), the 
first few acts of non-compliance could multiply so freely that non- compliance 
could effectively become new custom. Any transgression is the seed of a new rule. 
Legal scholarship and practice are still divided on how long it takes for a practice to 
change from use to custom. 409 Yet this is not the most important question for 
political theorists. What we should focus on is: What happens if - contrary to 
the liberal paradigm of progress - social norms evolve in an increasingly unjust 
direction, so that the likelihood of the original injustice’s being recognised as 
such decreases with time? Would that not counteract the victim’s legitimate 
expectation to fight for justice in her legal system? For her, the reliability of the legal 
system effectively diminishes over time. The harm of non-recognition of injustice is an enormous risk in the 
Common Law tradition. Does that not add to the injustice she has suffered? The 
victim’s increasing invisibility adds to the severity of the crime. Yet there is a 
paradox in rectifying this additional injustice: The longer a victim waits, the more 
convincing her complaint about increasing invisibility will be; but if she waits too 







409 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The structure of legal argument (Cambridge, CUP, 2006), ch. 6.4. 
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Justice Gorsuch is aware of this problem, but trusts that the American division of 
legal labour between the states and the federal government is an insurance 
mechanism against the abuse of state power through the mere passage of time: 
“The Legislature wields significant constitutional authority when it comes to tribal relations, 
possessing even the authority to breach its own promises and treaties. […] Under our 
Constitution, States have no authority to reduce federal reservations lying within their borders. Just 
imagine if they did. A State could encroach on the tribal boundaries or legal rights Congress 
provided, and, with enough time and patience, nullify the promises made in the name of the United 
States. That would be at odds with the Constitution, which entrusts Congress with the 
authority to regulate commerce with Native Americans, and directs that federal treaties and statutes 
are the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’ It would also leave tribal rights in the hands of the very 
neighbours who might be least inclined to respect them. […] But wishes don’t make for 
laws.”410 
This passage of the McGirt decision is very explicit about arguments and 
methods where the mere passage of time legalises previously unjust acts.411 The 
passage of time in this (and many other Western legal systems) could solidify the 
position of the historical victor, by rendering previously illegitimate acts 
legitimate. This, of course, requires a linear conception of time, with time slices 
increasing in value as we move to the future. Despite this huge risk, the judge 
professes a profound faith in the institutions which protect the United States’ 
moral identity. For him, promises made “in the name of the United States” 
 
410 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _ (2020), syllabus, III A. 
411 This is obviously relevant to Waldron’s comments about supersession through the passage of 
time. Justice Gorsuch clearly identifies the “moral hazard objection”, discussed in chapter 1, when 
he writes: “A State could encroach on the tribal boundaries or legal rights Congress provided, 
and, with enough time and patience, nullify the promises made in the name of the United States.” 
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cannot be broken, because “that would be at odds with the Constitution”. The 





B. Shelby County v. Holder 
 
In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was still constitutional. The “still” is 
very important because the claim of Shelby County (Alabama) rested on two 
parts. One pointed to the unequal treatment of southern states to argue that this 
violated the constitutional principle of “equal sovereignty” between states. The 
other part questioned this unequal treatment further because the “exceptional 
circumstances” which justified exceptionally intrusive federal measures in 1960s 
Alabama – widespread race-based voter discrimination and disenfranchisement 
– no longer obtained in the twenty-first century. This was thus a critique against a 
time-bound measure, which had supposedly outlived the specific historical 
circumstances for which it had been designed. 
Shelby County became the basis for a contest about broad, transhistorical 
principles. In contrast to more specific cases like Farmer-Paellmann v. Fleetboston Financial 
Corp. et al. (2002)412 and Pigford v. Glickman (1999),413 Shelby County’s outcome affected 
not only an entire category of citizens currently living in the jurisdictions targeted 
by the Voting Rights Act; the decision affected all future 
 
412 Farmer-Paellmann v. Fleetboston Financial Corp. et al. (2002); 
https://edition.cnn.com/2002/LAW/03/26/slavery.reparations/, Transcript of the first 
hearing at https://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/032702_reparations.pdf, accessed 
01/10/20. 
413 Pigford v. Glickman (1999), https://casetext.com/case/pigford-v-glickman-7 ; 
https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS20430.pdf; 
https://www.nationalblackfarmersassociation.org/about_us, both accessed 30/09/20. 
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persons in those states who might be subjected to racial discrimination in the 
electoral process. It was therefore a judgement about the past (what did we 
promise?), the present (have we delivered on our promise?) and the future (have we 
come far enough to decide that this promise will no longer be needed in the 
future?). Let us attempt to answer these questions by focusing on the summary 
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts on 25 June 2013: 
“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an 
extraordinary problem. Section 5 of the Act required states to obtain federal permission before 
enacting any law related to voting—a drastic departure from basic principles of federalism. And 
§4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some States—an equally dramatic departure from 
the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine, but Congress 
determined it was needed to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, ‘an insidious and 
pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and 
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.’ [...] As we explained in upholding the law, ‘exceptional 
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.’ Id., at 334. Reflecting the 
unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled to expire after five years. [...] Nearly 
50 years later, they are still in effect; indeed, they have been made more stringent, and are now 
scheduled to last until 2031. There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally 
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions. By 2009, ‘the 
racial gap in voter registration and turnout [was] lower in the States originally covered by §5 than 
it [was] nationwide.’ [...] Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that African American 
voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by 
§5, with a gap in the sixth State of less 
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than one half of one percent. [...] At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one 
doubts that. The question is whether the Act’s extraordinary measures, including its disparate 
treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short 
time ago, ‘the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”414 
This is merely the summary of the court’s reasoning, but we may already subject it 
to the three questions about the past, present and future of the American 




What did we promise? 
 
The 15th Amendment already promised in 1869 that “the right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.” That same 
amendment also authorised Congress to enforce the principle with 
“appropriate” legislation. Half a century later, the goal of race-blind 
enfranchisement had still not been achieved. The 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
was explicitly established “to enforce the fifteenth amendment”. It implicitly 
followed the language and reasoning of that constitutional amendment 
(especially in section 2 of the Act), and was an unusual piece of legislation since it 
departed from the principles of equal sovereignty between states. The particular 
measures outlined in section 4 (coverage formula to identify states “lagging 
behind”) and section 5 (requiring those covered jurisdictions to obtain 
“preclearance” from the Attorney General or the District Court of Washington 
 
414 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf, accessed 
20/06/21. 
415 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), § 1. 
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D.C. before changing voting rules) were considered particularly intrusive. Why was 
this “strong medicine”, as Roberts calls it, justified at that particular time? Roberts 
explains: “Congress determined it was needed to address entrenched racial 
discrimination in voting, an insidious and pervasive evil. […] Exceptional 
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate. […] 
Reflecting the unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled to 
expire after five years”.415 
The simile of “medicine” is telling. Race-based voter discrimination is portrayed as 
an illness, an external “evil” that afflicts the American body politic. As the 
“exceptional condition” of the patient does not improve with the usual, mild 
measures, an exceptional regime of strong medicine is prescribed. As with all 
strong medication, the expectation in 1965 was that the treatment would be 
short, temporally restricted to only 5 years. The restrictions introduced by the 
Voting Rights Act were introduced to heal the American patient quickly – but 




Have we delivered on our promise? 
 
The restrictions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act were reaffirmed and renewed in 
1970, 1975, 1982 and 2006. When it was first introduced, section 4 was seen as a 
temporary corrective measure. “Nearly 50 years later, they are still in effect”, Justice 
Roberts writes, “indeed, they have been made more stringent, and are now 
scheduled to last until 2031.” From the present point of view of a patient who 
can only dimly remember his exceptionally bad condition 50 years ago, this 
416 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), § 5. 
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is too long. The extension of medical treatment suggests not only that his health 
has not improved enough since 1965, but also that full healing will not arrive 
anytime soon. The extension until 2031 suggests pessimism about the patient’s 
overall health. Dismayed, the patient insists that he is feeling better, that his 
condition in 2013 cannot be compared with the critical emergency of 1965: 
“There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these 
measures no longer characterise voting in the covered jurisdictions. [...] African 
American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the 
six States originally covered by § 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half 
of one percent.”416 
Like in the British and French trials, in which exceptional political measures were 
justified by a “state of emergency” or a “state of war”; the American patient was 
willing to accept the exceptionally strong medicine only for so long as he 
declared himself to feel exceptionally ill. Once he is no longer exceptionally ill, just 
ill, the assessment of available medicines should change too: “In 1966, the 
coverage formula was ‘rational in both practice and theory.’ [...] It looked to 
cause (discriminatory tests) and effect (low voter registration and turnout), and 
tailored the remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both.” 
“Coverage today”, by contrast, “is based on decades-old data and eradicated 
practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter 
registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been 
banned for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in covered 
States have risen dramatically. In 1965, the States could be divided into those 
with a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and 
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those without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that 
distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the 
Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”417 As a firm presentist, the 
patient does not want to be held back by old data. Instead, he insists his scars 
have already healed, “today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines”. 
That assessment of American social cohesion could certainly be disputed - 
including by current data418 - but the American patient is already thinking of a 






Have we come far enough to decide that this promise will no longer be 
needed in the future? 
Have the changes initiated by the VRA had a sufficiently positive impact on 
American voter registration and participation to allow for even more positive 
extrapolations about the future? This is where the opinions of the majority and 
the minority diverge. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts declares that 
“Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; [because] its formula can 
no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.” The two 
words “no longer” do all the work here. According to Roberts, the American patient 
was once ill enough to require disproportionally intrusive treatment – but this is no 
longer the case. While “voting discrimination still exists […] the exceptional 
emergency of the 1960s has been overcome. Any new measures to 
 
 
417 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), 3. 
418 Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/bigideas/why-we-need- 
reparations-for-black-americans/, accessed 25/11/2020. 
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increase minority voter participation would have to respect the principle that 
‘current burdens must be justified by current needs.’”419 It is important that this 
reasoning connects past, present and future on a typically liberal line whereby 
value increases as we approach the future. How could something as important as 
the future be guided by something as outdated as the past? American citizens are 
confident enough in their melioristic projections that they can abandon worries 
about “exceptional emergencies” and instead envisage a world in which 
exceptional interventions will no longer be needed. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg penned a dissenting opinion, in which a less 
melioristic vision of historical development appears: “Throwing out 
preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop 
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm 
because you are not getting wet.” She continues: 
“The sad irony of today’s decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the VRA has proven 
effective. The Court appears to believe that the VRA’s success in eliminating the specific devices 
extant in 1965 means that preclearance is no longer needed. […] With that belief, and the 
argument derived from it, history repeats itself. The same assumption—that the problem could be 
solved when particular methods of voting discrimination are identified and eliminated—was 
indulged and proved wrong repeatedly prior to the VRA’s enactment. Unlike prior statutes, 
which singled out particular tests or devices, the VRA is grounded in Congress’ recognition of the 
‘variety and persistence’ of measures designed to impair minority voting rights. […] In truth, 
the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle second-generation barriers is powerful 
evidence 
 
419 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
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that a remedy as effective as preclearance remains vital to protect minority voting 
 
rights and prevent backsliding.” 420 
 
We see a more pragmatic vision of historical development here: instead of 
automatic progress, it takes ingenuity and innovation to face the ever-changing 
winds of evil. Like a sturdy umbrella, the VRA protects American states from 
“backsliding” (back into the darkness of the past), and like a sturdy umbrella it 
can and should be used again whenever it rains – which, in the socio-political 
ecosystem of the United States, could be anytime. Ginsburg does not forget, 
however, that the VRA is not an umbrella like any other. It is more like a family 
heirloom or a Thanksgiving recipe, passed down through the generations, ready to 
be used whenever one misses the spirit of home: “The VRA is no ordinary 
legislation. It is extraordinary because Congress embarked on a mission long 
delayed and of extraordinary importance: to realise the purpose and promise of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. For a half century, a concerted effort has been made to end 
racial discrimination in voting. Thanks to the Voting Rights Act, progress once the 
subject of a dream has been achieved and continues to be made.”421 
In America, “Progress once the subject of a dream” can be achieved. The power of 




C. Progress in American constitutional theory 
 
What should we make of the role of progress in American constitutional theory? 
The two trials show two different outcomes - once in favour, once against 
 
 
420 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), Justice Ginsburg, dissenting opinion, 2. 
421 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), Justice Ginsburg, dissenting opinion, 3. 
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historically marginalised groups - but in both cases the decision is in favour of the 
progress paradigm built into the American idea of the state. 
In the case of Jimcy McGirt, the reasoning centred on President Andrew 
Jackson’s promise of giving the Indians their own America (as if it wasn’t theirs 
already) to pursue their own version of the American Dream (why not their own 
dream? And why does everyone need a future-focused dream?). In 1830 
President Jackson defended his Indian Removal Act thus: “It will separate the 
Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the 
power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under 
their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening 
their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the 
Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage 
habits and become an interesting, civilised, and Christian community.”422 Much of 
the language here is objectionable. Yet it seems to me that the main strategy of 
President Jackson was to defend Indian Removal by couching it in the 
language of progress – not just for the white settlers who would be able to 
advance westwards, but also for the Indians who could imitate other Americans by 
receiving “virgin land”, pursuing self-government and building a “civilised” 
community directed by the goal of improvement. In order to allow this 
development, which could also “retard the progress of decay”, the Federal 
Government set some boundaries for itself in the 1832 Treaty with the Creeks. 
Although it was not hidden that “the United States are desirous that the Creeks 
 
 
422 President Jackson's Message to Congress "On Indian Removal", December 6, 1830; Records 
of the United States Senate, 1789‐1990; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, 
1789‐1990; National Archives and Records Administration (NARA] via: 
https://www.nps.gov/museum/tmc/MANZ/handouts/Andrew_Jackson_Annual_Message
.p df , accessed 20/06/21. 
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should remove to the country west of the Mississippi, […] at the expense of the 
United States” (Art. 12) the sovereignty of the new territory was established thus: 
“The Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guaranteed to the 
Creek Indians, nor shall any State or Territory ever have a right to pass laws for the 
government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves” (Art. 
14). These kinds of assurance of non-interference were repeated in the 1866 Treaty 
in which “the United States guarantees them quiet possession of their country” 
and promised financial assistance “to enable the Creeks to occupy, restore, and 
improve their farms, and to make their nation independent and self- sustaining” 
(Art. 3). However mischievous its motives and however ignorant of the Creek 
social system the federal government was, it is remarkable that the treaties do 
promise the Indians that they, too, can live the American dream of political 
independence and economic growth. 
A conviction of McGirt by the state of Oklahoma, rather than the federal 
government, however, would suggest a continuation of the inferior status of a 
tribe that – by now – should be respected as a grown-up, a self-governing entity, an 
governance unit enjoying “equal sovereignty” among other states. There are two 
promises by which the US government bound itself across time: one concerns 
its dealings with the Creek nation, where it repeatedly promised them the 
American dream of self-government; the other concerns a promise that 
America gave itself as early as 1776: that the newly liberated colonies would be 
virtuous, honest and enlightened. It is the second promise – the promise of 
staying true to the founding principles of the American Republic, which limits the 
scope for breaking the first promise with the Creeks as America evolves from a 
Republic into an Empire. The larger promise of world-historical progress 
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constrains (and gives weight) to all the smaller promises that America makes on its 




Turning to Shelby County, a similar double bind can be identified. There is the 
initial promise of equality through the Declaration of Independence and then 
the correction and reaffirmation of that principle through the 15th Amendment 
to the Constitution which affirms after the Civil War and Emancipation that 
“the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude”. The VRA is a fulfilment of the promise of equal 
participation in the political process, but sections 4 and 5 suggest that the work is 
unfinished. 52 years later, the Supreme Court’s majority opines that the specific 
promise of race-blind enfranchisement has been fulfilled. The dissenting opinion 
penned by Ruth Bader-Ginsburg, by contrast, spells out very clearly that partial 
progress on the specific promise of 1965 cannot allow the federal government 
to be self-congratulatory or complacent about the larger promise of true equality 
between all citizens of the United States. The question “Have we come far 
enough?” can never be answered in the affirmative in a nation which 
– from the start – gave itself the objective not only of perfection, but of 
 




My main conclusion from this legal section is that chances for historical redress in 
the US are framed and constrained by a conscious self-construction of 
America’s identity as progressive. There is an expectation of progress against 
which socio-political development are assessed, and this expectation is built into 
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the highest level of decision-making. Since the idea of progress is constitutive of the 
foundation of America (see chapter 3 and section II below), it should not 
surprise that it might be built into constitutional law. 
Outside of constitutional law, however, there are constant reminders of the 
doubts, contradictions and failures of the American founding promise. One such 
reminder is the 1619 Project, a radical overhaul of the American moral system 
proposed by an African American journalist. Her battle with established 
narratives of New World progress might give an indication of the strengths and 








A. Adapting the founding myth 
 
 
The ongoing and intensifying debate on slavery reparations, and the role of 
African Americans in American history more widely, shows that reaching a 
unified commitment to engage critically with the failures of American progress is 
very difficult. Few recent media publications have agitated the American public 
like the 1619 Project.423 Since its first appearance in the New York Times Magazine on 
20 August 2019, mentions of the phrase “slavery reparations” in US media have 










primaries for the 2020 Presidential election mentioned it at least once during 
their campaign. And arguably the most prolific individual user of the phrase 
“1619 Project” has been Donald J. Trump, who “hates” it.425 What is this project 
and why has it had such an enormous impact on the American reckoning with 
history? The project’s self-description is as follows: “The 1619 Project is an 
ongoing initiative from the New York Times Magazine that began in August 2019, the 
400th anniversary of the beginning of American slavery. It aims to reframe the 
country’s history by placing the consequences of slavery and the contributions 
of black Americans at the very centre of our national narrative.”426 This project 
started as a special issue of the New York Times Magazine handed out for free on the 
streets of New York City to mark the 400th anniversary of the arrival of slaves in 
America. 17 essays, one interview and one photo essay online soon made it more 
interactive – and as public engagement intensified, the project was supplemented 
with podcasts, documentaries and even classroom packs and an alternative 
curriculum designed in collaboration with the Pulitzer Centre.427 
 
The task was momentous: to consciously alter our historical vision by 
“reframing” the whole of American history around (a) a new starting date; (b) a 
new group of black founders and (c) the idea of bondage rather than liberty. 
Nothing could be further from the standard American narrative of continuous 
liberation from 1776. The authors even issued “a word of warning”: “There is 




com.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=160171292850104612730147397801 426  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html, 
accessed 01/07/21. 
427 https://pulitzercenter.org/lesson-plan-grouping/1619-project-curriculum, accessed 
03/02/21. 
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is, unfortunately, as it must be. American history cannot be told truthfully 
without a clear vision of how inhuman and immoral the treatment of black 
Americans has been. By acknowledging this shameful history, by trying hard to 
understand its powerful influence on the present, perhaps we can prepare 
ourselves for a more just future. That is the hope of this project.”428 Like in the 
court judgements above, there is both disappointment and hope in this 
statement. But what is most interesting for me is the sense of historical necessity: 
The “gruesome” and “disturbing” material will be disturbing precisely because it 
will shake readers’ preconceived ideas of America and the goodness of 
American history. In this context, 400 years after the first slave ship landed on the 
new continent’s shores, the old story must be revisited. The content of the 1619 
Project is “unfortunately, as it must be”. It is a public health warning before a 
cathartic exploration of the depths of the American self-understanding. 
 
The 1619 Project’s main editor, Nikole Hannah-Jones, inaugurates this collective 
catharsis thus: “The United States is a nation founded on both an ideal and a 
lie.” The rest of her opening essay elaborates on that tension between America’s 
multiple histories: “Our Declaration of Independence, approved on July 4, 1776, 
proclaims that ‘all men are created equal’ and ‘endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights.’ But the white men who drafted those words did not 
believe them to be true for the hundreds of thousands of black people in their 
midst. ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’ did not apply to fully one- 
fifth of the country. Yet despite being violently denied the freedom and justice 
promised to all, black Americans believed fervently in the American creed. 
 




Through centuries of black resistance and protest, we have helped the country 
live up to its founding ideals. And not only for ourselves — black rights struggles 
paved the way for every other rights struggle, including women’s and gay rights, 
immigrant and disability rights. […] What if America understood, finally, in this 
400th year, that we have never been the problem but the solution?”.429 
 
 
The scepticism about the American founding myth which lies at the heart of the 
1619 Project, is not entirely new. It follows in the footsteps of Frederick 
Douglass, who shocked his audience on 4 July 1852 by declaring “I say it with a sad 
sense of the disparity between us. I am not included within the pale of this 
glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable 
distance between us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not 
enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and 
independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The 
sunlight that brought life and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to 
me. This Fourth [of] July is yours, not mine.”430 It follows the path of James 
Baldwin, Malcom X, Toni Morrison and Ta-Nehisi Coates, who felt left out of the 
American story of progress and showed that another America exists behind the 
stars and stripes.431 Baldwin, for instance, wrote in 1963 that “in spite of the 
Puritan-Yankee equation of virtue with well-being, Negroes had excellent 
reasons for doubting that money was made or kept by any very striking 
 
 
429 Nikole Hannah-Jones, “Our democracy’s founding ideals were false when they were 
written. Black Americans have fought to make them true.”, via 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-
american- democracy.html, accessed 30/07/21. 
430 F. Douglass, What to the slave is the fourth of July, via 
https://masshumanities.org/files/programs/douglass/speech_abridged_med.pdf , accessed 
01/10/20. 
431 From J. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (London, 2017 [1963]) to I.X. Kendi, How to be an antiracist (New 
York, 2020). 
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adherence to the Christian virtues”. Instead, the entire political system 
perpetuated white privilege: “white people, who had robbed black people of 
their liberty and who profited by this theft every hour that they lived, had no 
moral ground on which to stand. They had the judges, the juries, the shotguns, 
the law—in a word, power. But it was a criminal power, to be feared but not 
respected, and to be outwitted in any way whatever. And those virtues preached 
but not practiced by the white world were merely another means of holding 
Negroes in subjection.”432 The judges, the juries, and the law are exactly the 
hegemonic forces we encountered in section I. These institutions still manage 
America’s relationship with History, America’s relationship with itself. In this 
context, it is even more remarkable that a non-institutional actor, The New York 
Times, managed to provoke a public historical reckoning. The newspaper 
brought the idea of alternative Americas to an unprecedented level of readers. 
The controversy which followed revealed the strengths and weaknesses of 




B. Testing the limits of progress 
 
 
The public backlash to the 1619 Project was enormous. In the course of 12 
months between June 2019 and June 2020, the American public sphere became 
even more politicised. At the elite level and on TV, there was a presidential 
campaign in which questions about race, reparations and historical justice 
surfaced like never before. At the street level, there were sustained protests in 
almost every major town, during which right-wing militia groups and liberals 
 
432 J. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time, (London, Penguin, 2017 [1963]), 28. 
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repeatedly clashed with law enforcement. The Black Lives Matter movement rose to 
particular strength, occupying state capitols and Washington’s Lafayette 
Square, taking down statues which had become public symbols of historic 
oppression and discrimination. Let us survey this spontaneous release of political 
energy, while asking ourselves: Are these the limits of the American narrative? 
 
 
On the one hand, Democratic Senator Kamala Harris praised the 1619 Project 
 
in a tweet stating “The #1619Project is a powerful and necessary reckoning of 
our history. We cannot understand and address the problems of today without 
speaking truth about how we got here.”433 The 2020 Pulitzer Prize committee 
congratulated Nikole Hannah-Jones on her “historic win”.434 Then came the 
specialist historians of the American Revolution – Gordon S. Wood, Sean 
Wilentz, Victoria Bynum, among others.435 They took issue with the 1619 
Project’s controversial statement that “Conveniently left out of our founding 
mythology is the fact that one of the primary reasons some of the colonists 
decided to declare their independence from Britain was because they wanted to 
protect the institution of slavery.” These scientific disagreements – though 
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This ranges from moderate nostalgia – “I’ve always wanted children to be 
taught—as I was—that the United States was founded on July 4, 1776, with the 
declaration of those revolutionary ideals […] Any other choice is divisive and 
arbitrary,[because] the timeless words and values of the Declaration of 1776, as 
distinct from its fallible, hypocritical author, are still worth uniting around as the 
moment our unfinished effort to form a more perfect union began.”436 – to the 
outrage of Newt Gingrich: “This is a huge undertaking with deep propaganda 
purposes. […] The Times will seek to distribute it to schools, so young people can 
be taught to think of America as defined by slavery. […] It is a terrific set up for a 
later demand for reparations […] We do not need left-wing propaganda 
masquerading as ‘the truth’. The fact is: America was defined much more in 1776 and 
1787 than in 1619.”437 As Californian schools adopted the 1619 curriculum and the 
culture wars deepened, Senator Tom Cotton drafted a bill “To prohibit Federal 
funds from being made available to teach the 1619 Project curriculum in 
elementary schools and secondary schools.” The key points of the rationale 
offered in support of this “Saving American History Act 2020” was that “(1) 
The true date of America’s founding is July 4, 1776” and that “(5) The 1619 
Project is a racially divisive and revisionist account of history that threatens the 
integrity of the Union by denying the true principles on which it was founded.”438 
 
President Trump supported this proposal and labelled The New York Times’ 
 
followers, “Marxists”, “racists” and “cultural revolutionists, like Mao”.439 When 
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asked to elaborate in an interview with Chris Wallace on 19 July 2020 the 
President said, “I just look at—I look at school. I watch, I read, look at the stuff. 
Now they want to change—1492, Columbus discovered America. You know, we 
grew up, you grew up, we all did, that's what we learned. Now they want to make it 
the 1619 Project. Where did that come from? What does it represent? I don't even 
know”.440 In order to protect the way Americans grow up, President Trump even 
announced the establishment of the “1776 Commission” to “defend the legacy 
of America’s founding, the virtue of America’s heroes, and the nobility of the 
American character.” This announcement staged in front of the National 
Archives contained all the pillars of the American timescape: foundationalism, 
exceptionalism, millenarianism, open-ended progress. Against the “Left-wing mobs 
[who] have torn down statues of our founders, desecrated our memorials, and 
carried out a campaign of violence and anarchy”, Trump – or his speechwriter - 
tells the American story in its most orthodox way: 
 
“We want our sons and daughters to know that they are the citizens of the most exceptional 
nation in the history of the world. […] To grow up in America is to live in a land where 
anything is possible, where anyone can rise, and where any dream can come true — all because of 
the immortal principles our nation’s founders inscribed nearly two and a half centuries ago […] 
On this very day in 1787, our Founding Fathers signed the Constitution at Independence 
Hall in Philadelphia. It was the fulfilment of a thousand years of Western civilization. Our 
Constitution was the product of centuries of tradition, wisdom, and experience. No political 
document has done more to advance the human condition 
 
 
440 Donald Trump interviewed on Fox News on Sunday with Chris Wallace, 19 July 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6XdpDOH1JA&ab_channel=FoxNews , accessed 20 
July 2020. 
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or propel the engine of progress. […] America’s founding set in motion the unstoppable chain 
of events that abolished slavery, secured civil rights, defeated communism and fascism, and built the 
most fair, equal, and prosperous nation in human history.”441 
 
On 19 January 2020, Trump’s last full day in office, the 1776 Commission 
published its report. Drafted by a body without a single professional historian, 
this document enshrined the everyman’s story of America: “Americans will 
never falter in defending the fundamental truths of human liberty proclaimed on 
July 4, 1776. We will—we must—always hold these truths. […] This requires a 
restoration of American education, which can only be grounded on a history of 
those principles that is ‘accurate, honest, unifying, inspiring, and ennobling.’ And a 
rediscovery of our shared identity rooted in our founding principles is the path to a 
renewed American unity and a confident American future.”442 The words 
“Founders” and “Founding” appear 59 and 40 times, respectively – in only 45 
pages. There is not a single page without the spectre of the Founding Fathers. 
This contrasts starkly with the palpable fear of a potential reversal of the 
traditional value system. The “main challenges to American Progress”, for 
example, are listed without further comment as “slavery, progressivism, fascism, 
communism, race and identity politics.”443 This summary of the fault lines of 
American historical thinking is almost comical, but the mere fact that this could be 
published with presidential approval should make us think. If the conservatives 
count “progressivism” among the core threats to national progress 
 
441 Remarks by President Trump at the White House Conference on American History, 17 
September 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president- 
trump-white-house-conference-american-history/, accessed 28/09/20 
442 The President’s 1776 Commission Report. [report revoked by President Biden as soon as he took up 
office in November 2020] 
443 The President’s 1776 Commission Report, ch. 2. 
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and the liberals defend emancipatory struggles in order to make good on the 
promise of American progress, what are the terminological and conceptual 
alternatives? Are American citizens and observers required to think and speak in the 
predefined patterns of progress? Why are more radical options unacceptable? These 
questions remain to be answered. But the upcoming 250th anniversary 
celebrations of the American Revolution in 2026 already look like a battleground for 
the soul of the nation. Will the patriotic, providential and progressive version of 




C. Reaffirming the master narrative 
 
What does the controversy of the 1619 Project mean for the orthodox double 
story of the American Founding and subsequent progress? The 1619 Project 
attacked all the five fundamental elements of America’s historical identity: (i) that 
the American colonies had been chosen by Providence and developed under its 
guiding plan; (ii) that the American Revolution had produced a radically new 
beginning, which confirmed its exceptional role as the rightful “Empire of 
Liberty” (Jefferson); (iii) that this beginning, consolidated through the Founding 
documents of the 1776 Declaration and the 1787 Constitution, had given 
posterity a moral mission (iv) that this moral mission of emancipation and 
improvement was universal; and finally (v) that the codified foundational creed 
acted as a standard against which the trajectory of American progress could be 
measured and, if necessary, corrected and improved. The revolutionary rupture 
creating a New World is followed by the extraordinary promise of perpetual 
progress. What progress really means has certainly changed over time – a 
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suburban home, gay marriage, or a black president, might be seen as progress for 
some. But America is unique in having set its own standard of success. Specific criteria that are not 
merely passed on like Britain’s inheritance of the unwritten constitution, or 
confined to symbolism like in France. The United States have set a standard 
which is inescapable in American courts, legislatures, townhalls and schools. The 
exact words of the Declaration, in particular, penetrate almost any public 
document. Most importantly, that ubiquity, the inescapability of the foundational creed 
commands action. The founding documents are an invitation to examination, correction 
and improvement. And in contrast to British politicians, who profess to learn 
from history for their own sake, Americans learn from history for the sake of 
the upholding and fulfilling the promise of the Founding. That this promise can 
never be completely fulfilled is, of course, part of the attraction. The American 
conception of history as a perpetual work in progress invites everyone to take part 
in the project of building a better future. 
The 1619 Project revealed, questioned and criticised a political mythology that had 
been centuries in the making. But in doing so, it did not reject the American 
historical project entirely. In fact, an examination of the interviews which Nikole 
Hannah-Jones, the project’s director, gave to the media and educational 
institutions worldwide reveal her distinctly American intellectual context. When 
Hannah-Jones was asked about her original decision to start this project at the 
LSE US Centre, for instance, she said: “We are a young country, we don’t get to 
celebrate the 400th anniversary of anything, I didn’t want that date [1619] to just go 
by.”444 Instead of the 1620 Mayflower Compact of the liberty-seeking 
 
 
444 Nikole Hannah-Jones at the LSE US Centre on 05/10/20, 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2020/10/202010051500/The-1619-Project-on-the-Legacy-
of- Slavery-in-the-US, accessed 23/07/21. 
262  
European pilgrims,445 she wanted to shine a light on the “Enslavement 
Compact” of 1619. The most important elements of this statement in the 
context of our analysis are the word “young” and “I didn’t want that date to just go 
by.” The first speaks to the European [!] tradition of characterising America as the 
“New World”, “virgin land” on which previously unheard-of social and 
economic patterns could emerge without the weight of history. In the larger 
scheme of world history, America was the youngest child. 
In Berkeley’s classic poem On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America (1726), we 
may see the exceptional hope and excitement with which the European topos 
of translatio imperii is applied to the New World: “In happy climes, the seat of 
innocence, / Where nature guides and virtue rules, […] There shall be sung 
another Golden Age, / The rise of Empire and of arts, / The good and great 
inspiring epic rage, / The wisest heads and noblest hearts. […] Westward the 
course of Empire takes its way; / The four first Acts already past, / A fifth shall 
close the Drama with the day; /Time’s noblest offspring is the last.”446 Of 
course, the US is a “young country” in the constitutional sense. But 
 
 
445John Quincy Adams opined in 1802 that this agreement signed on a ship was “the only 
instance in human history of that positive, original, social compact”. Until today, the 
international Society of Mayflower Descendants organises annual historical re-enactments of the 
Mayflower Landing. The compact reads: “In the name of God, Amen. We whose names are 
underwritten, the loyal subjects of our dread Sovereign Lord King James, by the Grace of God of 
Great Britain, France, and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith, etc. Having undertaken for the 
Glory of God and advancement of the Christian Faith and Honour of our King and Country, a 
Voyage to plant the First Colony in the Northern Parts of Virginia, do by these presents 
solemnly and mutually in the presence of God and one of another, Covenant and Combine 
ourselves together in a Civil Body Politic, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance 
of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, constitute and frame such just and equal 
Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions and Offices from time to time, as shall be thought most 
meet and convenient for the general good of the Colony, unto which we promise all due 
submission and obedience. In witness whereof we have hereunder subscribed our names at Cape 
Cod, the 11th of November, in the year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord King James, of 
England, France and Ireland the eighteenth, and of Scotland the fifty-fourth. 
Anno Domini 1620.” https://www.themayflowersociety.org/ , accessed 11/02/21. 




that does not mean at all that there was no American society and culture before. 
The fact that a black descendant of African slaves nowadays calls the US a 
“young country” is a testament to the ways in which American public history 
has (i) internalised the European gaze, (ii) taught European theories of 
modernity, but also (iii) turned this classification as a “new” country into a 
political asset. New countries can define themselves; they can define the dates 
that matter. The preachers of New England decided after the Boston Massacre of 
5 March 1770 that they would hold annual commemorative services to mark of the 
first violent confrontation between Boston’s merchants and British troops. The 
sermons pronounced at those services quickly became one of the most 
important ways of instigating and organising the social movement which 
ultimately became the American Revolution. And just like these preachers, who did 
not want the date of the massacre to go unnoticed, Nikole Hannah-Jones 
started her project because she “didn’t want that date [1619] to just go by”. In 
the new world, you can make your own history. 
In addition to the focus on (i) artificial beginnings and (ii) the American citizen’s 
power to shape history – his own and that of the world, there are three more 
features which the 1619 Project shares with orthodox American historiography: 
(iii) exceptionalism, (iv) progressivism and (v) universalist expansionism. When 
asked about American exceptionalism, Hannah-Jones responds: “I am obsessed 
with and appalled by the idea of exceptionalism. It is certainly exceptional to be 
founded on ideas [*quotes opening lines of the Declaration of Independence!*]. 
But it is more exceptional to sustain hypocrisy for so long.”447 Even when 
 
 
447 Nikole Hannah-Jones at the LSE US Centre on 05/10/20, 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2020/10/202010051500/The-1619-Project-on-the-Legacy-
of- Slavery-in-the-US, accessed 23/07/21. 
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highlighting serious flaws in the official version, she embraces the idea of 
exceptionalism. In fact, these very flaws built into the American political system 
from the start raise, according to her, an exceptional paradox: “What makes the US 
unique is […] we’re the only country founded on slavery. We were a brand new 
country, we had a choice […] and yet, the people who wrote the constitution were 
all slavers. That’s our founding paradox.” The return of the motif “brand new 
country” and the stark reminder “we had a choice”, indirectly raise 
expectations for improvement. But when this improvement only occurs 
incompletely – a new nation founded on liberty also relies on systematic 
oppression – the disappointed citizen calls it a “paradox”. We know through the 
historical studies of the past 50 years that there is no real paradox, at least no 
historical paradox: white liberty was sustained by black servitude.448 
If there is no historical paradox, is there a moral paradox? Why did the authors of 
the constitution choose not to extend their commitment to Enlightenment 
values to everyone? The interviewee’s incredulity suggests that the founders 
should have known better, that America should have honoured its promise of 
progress. Her public admonishment, 234 years after the signing of the 
Constitution suggests that America has indeed moved on. Far from rejecting the 
founding promise of progress entirely, this journalist responds by assembling an 
all-black team to rehabilitate the role of American blacks in the success of 
America: “As much as I hope white readers will read it and have their minds 
blown”, she says, “I hope that black people will read it, and feel a sense of 





448 See, for example, E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New 
York, Basic Books, 2014). 
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reframe the way we see ourselves in America.”449 This belated correction itself is 
 
a necessary element, almost a bridge, on America’s path to perfection. 
 
 
The last building block that makes Hannah-Jones’ project more American than 
perhaps intended, is its global reach. With customary American confidence, she 
hopes that the 1619 Project will be a model for the world. When asked whether 
this public rewriting of national history is exportable, she says: “Yes, I encourage 
imitation and adaptation. There has been a propaganda campaign to downplay 
the role of slavery in the creation of European wealth. We have to grapple with 
slavery as a Northern hemisphere. We have to grapple with the centuries-long 
cover-up.”450 This thesis has already demonstrated that cover-ups were essential to 
metropolitan narratives about imperialism. Still, it is somewhat surprising to think 
that London or Paris would immediately look to Washington to receive policy 
advice. Seen from London, America is still the enfant terrible. And yet, this journalist – 
and all American academics I have talked to – profess optimistically that America’s 
new approach to “diverse” and “inclusive” history management can be exported to 
other countries. Expansionism is therefore the fifth and final feature of orthodox 
American history, which the alternative history of the 1619 Project shares. 
 
What conclusion may we draw from this section? The alternative history of the 
1619 Project is not as different from the hegemonic history as its creators might 
 
 
449 New York Times, How the 1619 Project came together 19/08/19, via 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/18/reader-center/1619-project-slavery-
jamestown.html, accessed 04/04/21. 
450 “The 1619 Project on the Legacy of Slavery in the US”, LSE US Centre event on 5 Oct 
2020, https://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2020/10/202010051500/The-1619-Project-on-
the- Legacy-of-Slavery-in-the-US , accessed 07/10/20. 
266  
have hoped.451 Even if the content and actors of this new story differ from the 
orthodox story, the structure is strikingly similar: the rupture of a new beginning is 
followed by a continuous struggle for progress. Of course, there is still the 
problem of consent. While many white Americans immigrated voluntarily and 
participated in American life voluntarily; early African Americans were imported like 
freight, their descendants forced to build the American economy against their 
will.452 It is this element of coercion which is invoked to justify the rapidly 
proliferating calls for historical redress. The next section will return to “high 
politics” to analyse how recent legislative debates on America’s historical wrongs test 







Let’s test the strength and limits of the American timescape at the 2019 
congressional hearing for House Resolution 40. The history of this bill is 
significant. Former Rep. John Conyers, Jr. first tried to introduce this bill in 1989. 
When faced with rejection, he continued to sponsor the bill every legislative 
session from 1989 to 2017. When he died in 2019, Congresswoman Sheila 
Jackson-Lee took up the cause. It was only then that the bill was finally given a 
hearing by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties. The bill proposes “to address the fundamental injustice, 
 
 
451 The parallel between American activists and theorists of rectification are significant. Like the 
proponents of historical rectification examined in chapter 1, these activists are trapped in the 
same progressive paradigm as their opponents. See ch. 1, section III. 
452 The Great Migration, in which newly emancipated blacks travelled to the industrial cities of the 
North at the turn of the nineteenth century is an important exception. See the interactive maps at 
https://depts.washington.edu/moving1/map_black_migration.shtml, accessed 23/07/21. 
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cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery in the United States and the 13 
American colonies between 1619 and 1865 and to establish a commission to 
study and consider a national apology and proposal for reparations for the 
institution of slavery, its subsequent de jure and de facto racial and economic 
discrimination against African-Americans, and the impact of these forces on 
living African-Americans, to make recommendations to the Congress on 
appropriate remedies, and for other purposes.”453 
One could think that the mere establishment of a commission should not be too 
controversial. After all, the requested “national apology” was already offered by the 
House in 2010.454 The bill does not call for slavery reparations directly. And yet, the 
hearing on 19 June 2019 (Juneteenth), reveals how high the tensions are when 
confronting the “original sin” that haunts American progress. Although there 
are proponents and opponents of reparations at this hearing, the themes already 
identified in previous sections reappear. The distinctive angle of this discourse, 
however, makes for a somewhat external view on American progress. Judging from 
the statements made at this hearing, blacks were left out of the virtuous 
(re)founding promise in the past; left out of the progressive federal 
programmes that enabled upward mobility in the present; left out 
(disenfranchised, underrepresented) when it comes to building a better 
American future. And yet, it is remarkable how this high-level exchange among a 
broad mix of American citizens again reproduces the same teleological theme of 
improvement that might be the source of the problem. 
 
453 HR 40, via https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40, accessed 
04/01/2021. 
454 S. Con. Res. 26. via https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-concurrent- 
resolution/26, accessed 06/01/21. Importantly, the apology is includes the following disclaimer: 
“Nothing in this resolution authorizes, supports, or serves as a settlement of any claim against the 
United States.” 
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The importance of the Founding and its transhistorical demands is established by 
Rep. Mike Johnson from the very start: “What we're going to discuss here today 
centres on a regrettable and shameful portion of American history. Slavery in 
America and elsewhere was a horrific injustice. The perpetuation of which was 
opposed to the founding ideals.”455 For him, slavery breaks “the central idea of 
America, what has been called the foundational creed, which is that ‘we boldly 
declare the self-evident truths that all men are created equal and we are created with 
the same inalienable rights.”456 Yet if we look more closely, that central idea of 
America is not equality or individual liberty, but progress. Slavery is 
problematic, the Judiciary Committee’s Chair Jerrold Nadler specifies, because its 
legacies of discrimination, hate crime and poverty “all hold back our country's long 
standing efforts […] to form a more perfect union”.457 Slavery is holding back a 
nation that is defined by constant movement and improvement. They don’t just 
want to be the perfect union. The United States aims to “form” (a very active verb) 
a “more perfect” union. Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee similarly suggests that racism 
“tainted the Founding and continues to persist”.458 The word “tainted” 
suggests that the Founding was otherwise clean – which is far from certain.459 
The writer Ta-Nehisi Coates goes considerably further in his 
 
 
455 Rep. Mike Johnson at 00:11:42 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
456 Rep. Mike Johnson at 00:16:15 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
457 Rep. Jerrold Nadler at 00:22:43 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
458 Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, at 00:24:00 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
459 A. Rana, Two Faces of American Freedom; D. Stasiulis & N. Yuval-davis, Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations 
of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class (Thousand Oaks CA, Sage, 1995); J. Greene (ed.) Exclusionary Empire: 
English Liberty Overseas 1600-1900 (New York, CUP, 2010). 
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assessment before the committee, suggesting that exclusion in America was not a 
mistake, but a choice. Even once slavery officially ended in 1865, he writes, “this 
country could have extended its hallowed principles […] to all, regardless of colour. 
But America had other principles in mind. And so, for a century after the civil war, 
black people were subjected to a relentless campaign of terror.”460 If America had a 
noble identity at the founding, the history that followed it is a history of missed 
opportunities to return to the original promise of America. 
What kinds of opportunities were missed? The periods of reconstruction and 
renewal after the Civil War and the two World Wars loom particularly large as 
reminders of the US double standards. “Many of the bedrock policies that were 
designed to usher Americans into the middle class”, Jackson Lee explains, “[…] 
from the GI Bill [i.e. the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944] to social 
security [were] intentionally designed to exclude blacks”.461 African Americans were 
systematically left out of American progress. The “left behind” community of 
African Americans is not behind other ethnic groups through their own choice 
– they seem to be the only group that rarely had a choice. Instead it was the overt 
policies of the federal government that acted as tools of exclusion. Only a select 
number of citizens could be saved by the American pull of progress 
– and blacks were not among them. The economist Julianne Malveaux agrees: 
“Congress has indifferently essentially side-lined Black people from the 






460 Ta-Nehisi Coates at 00:43:50 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations , accessed 05/01/21. 
461 In Philip Roth’s The Human Stain (2000) the protagonist’s life story turns around when he lies 
about his race to benefit from the G.I. Bill’s free schooling. 
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about how to fix that.”462 “The widespread assumption that everyone can pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps” is openly called “a lie, a falsehood”.463 But the 
federal government is not merely complicit in the oppression of a minority 
group, it is complicit in the prolongation of practices that were against the 
idealistic founding principles of its nation. 
Even more remarkable then, is the desire to move on, to focus on the future. 
Joining forces with other groups “left behind” by government policies, Malveaux 
says: “Racism and enslavement was our original sin and we got to deal with 
reparations by dealing with that.”464 There seems to be an inextinguishable hope 
that America can still improve. Burgess Owens, a former footballer turned 
politician, accepts reparations not as a backward-looking, but as a forward- 
looking measure, a measure to rehabilitate the American dream: “We have a very 
special country that allows every generation to become better than the last. It 
has not ended or stopped until now.[…] let's pay reparation. That way we move 
past reparations. And then we will see: this country has given us greatness. […] 
We've become successful like no other because of this great opportunity to live the 
American dream.”465 In this forward-looking argument reparations are 
attractive because they could eliminate doubt. As Eugene Sutton, Episcopal 
Bishop of Maryland, puts it: “It’s not about money. It's about being good. 
 
 
462 Julianne Malveaux, at 03:18:20 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations , accessed 05/01/21. 
463 Rev. Eugene Taylor Sutton, at 02: 40:58 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations , accessed 05/01/21. 
464 Julianne Malveaux, at 01:44:36 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations , accessed 05/01/21. 
465 Burgess Owens, at 01:17:03 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
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There's been talk about our nation being a great nation. Or to make it great again, or 
the greatest nation of all. I'm more concerned about this nation being good. 
There is some unfinished business in this nation.”466 
This business can only be promoted through the spirit of revolution. Echoing 
the original revolutionaries of 1776 and all their successors from Abraham 
Lincoln to Martin Luther King, the witnesses repeatedly comment on their place in 
history, on the importance of this historical moment. “This hearing is urgent. It’s 
historic”, says Jackson-Lee. Danny Glover makes the parallels to the revolutionaries 
most explicit: “[…] In the moments when there were radical changes in this 
country [union leaders, civil rights leaders] raised the bar to our sense of 
revolutionary purpose”.467 This sense of revolutionary purpose, so 
conspicuously absent in the British timescape, gives the actors of this drama 
have a double role as both historical actors and observers. They know where 
history should be going and can intervene to rectify America’s position on a path to 
virtue. How else could we explain the statement: “This hearing is not on time, it's 
like overtime. It's more than time for us to deal with the injustices that African-
American people not only have experienced in history but continue to 
experience”?468 If this meeting is overdue, that means there was a right moment for 
it. America has to catch up – catch up, as the trials above indicated, with its own 
desideratum of progress. America is behind its own plan for historical 
greatness, but fortunately, its enlightened citizens have a sense of their power 
 
466 Rev. Eugene Taylor Sutton at 01:17:36 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
467 Danny Glover, at 02:28:18 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
468 Julianne Malveaux at 01:25:31 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 
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for correction. The persistent revolutionary optimism is summarised by this final 
 
plea: “I simply ask: why not? And why not now. If not all of us, then who?”469 
 
Where does that persistent hope come from? Is it genuine? Do these activists, 
priests and lawyers actually believe that the good soul of America can be saved? Or 
are they using the language of virtue, improvement and progress because it is 
politically effective? Would it be fair to say that the unique context in which the 
American historical identity evolves constrains actors, however radical, to play 
within the rules and vocabulary of a set game? 
Even as the case against American exceptionalism is mounting, it looks like the 
narrative of progress will not be abandoned. Of course, it could be argued, on 
the one hand, that the social tensions exacerbated by the Trump presidency, the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement have brought 
America to a tipping point where structural injustices can finally be addressed 
collectively. On the other hand, however, the American political tradition, with its 
set phrases and intense symbolism, seems remarkably resistant to change. 
Despite the fact that the Founding and its inheritance were fraught with 
problems, the only way left seems to be forward. Just like Lincoln claimed in 
1861 that “no oppressed people will fight, and endure, as our fathers did, without 
the promise of something better”470, Barack Obama centred his 2008 speech on 
race relations around the notion of perfectibility. The presidential candidate 
professed “a firm conviction […] that, working together, we can move beyond 
some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have no choice if we are to 
 
469 Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee at 00:24:30 of the recorded Congressional hearing on H.R. 40 via 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?461767-1/house-judiciary-subcommittee-examines-case- 
slavery-reparations, accessed 05/01/21. 




continue on the path of a more perfect union.” That improvement should be by 
“embracing the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past.” 
Regret, cynicism or fatalism were not allowed. Why? Because that would be un- 
American. In words reminiscent of the Federalist, Obama said: “America can 
change. That is the true genius of this nation. What we have already achieved 
gives us hope — the audacity to hope — for what we can and must achieve 
tomorrow. […] This union may never be perfect, but generation after generation 
has shown that it can always be perfected. And as so many generations have 
come to realize over the course of the 221 years since a band of patriots signed 
that document right here in Philadelphia, that is where the perfection begins.”471 A 
final reference to the founding moment of American liberty anchors the 
narrative arc. This arc echoes Martin Luther King’s dictum, “The arc of the 
moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice”, which Obama actually had 
stitched into a banner in the Oval Office. This structure of a clear beginning and an 
open, but decidedly positive ending is the unique characteristic of American 
historical discourse as I see it. 
“In all of American life”, Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, “there is a bias toward the 
happy ending”.472 The enormous impact which that idea of the happy ending has on 
the dissection of dark and unhappy pasts must be analysed further. My interim 
conclusion is that the imperative of progress does leave room for action; but the 
demands for change – including profound change like slavery reparations 
– must be formulated in the forward-looking optimistic narrative that binds the 
first explorers to MLK. In America there seems to be a tradition of recurrent 
 
471 B. Obama, A more perfect union, speech at Philadelphia on 18 March 2008, via 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88478467&t=1585337612707, 
accessed 25/03/20. 
472 T-N. Coates, We were Eight Years in Power (New York, 2017), 151. 
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revolution. As Arendt noticed very early on, this tradition keeps the civic spirit 
alive. But there are important boundaries which must not be crossed. Saying, as 
Baldwin and Coates have said, that there is no reason to hope for a better future, is 
unacceptable because it rejects the idea of America’s virginal goodness. It 
suggests that the system might be not accidentally, but – as the reparations bill 
reads - “fundamentally” flawed. That would entail an abandonment of the 
America’s exceptional claim to virtue. In the end, criticism may always be voiced in a 
very active public sphere – but it is the progressive timescape cultivated by the 
state which prevents a full reckoning with anything that could definitively 






“Lapses” from the American founding promise actually strengthen that promise. In 
the United States’ public history, the English tradition of imperial “mistakes” and 
“exceptions” is combined with French civic religion - which makes for rude 
awakening when things go demonstrably wrong. As long as injustices are framed as 
“exceptions” to American progress, there is a willingness to deal with them, fix 
them - to protect the foundational promise - but when historical injustice is 
shown to be constitutive of the American experience, leading to a rejection of 
the very idea of America, the system strikes back. The progressive timescape 
cultivated by the US prevents a full reckoning with anything that could 
definitively disprove the melioristic narrative structure of American public life. 
Thus, the limit of American redress seems to be hope. 
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If you still have hope in America, you have a case. A case that must be framed in 
terms that echo the exceptional expectation that America will fulfil its 
millenarian promise of freedom, justice and equality for all. H.R. Con Res 116, the 
most recent piece of legislation proposed to mend America’s relationship with 
its own past, is in many ways a summary illustration of how piecemeal progress 
works in the American ecosystem. This resolution brings both chambers of the 
legislative together to resolve “That the Congress— (1) affirms on the 400th 
anniversary of the arrival of the first slave ship, the United States’ long overdue 
debt of remembrance to not only those who lived through the egregious 
injustices enumerated above, but also to their descendants; and (2) proposes a 
United States Commission on Truth, Racial Healing, and Transformation to properly 
acknowledge, memorialize, and be a catalyst for progress toward jettisoning the 
belief in a hierarchy of human value, embracing our common humanity, and 
permanently eliminating persistent racial inequities.”473 Unlike the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, Timor-Leste or Argentina, this 
Commission has already received a more progressive, more teleological task: 
“transformation”. Reconciliation could suggest stasis, but the original 
enlightenment nation must always be in movement. Like the British, the resolution’s 
signatories want to learn from the past and move on – but unlike in the British 
case, the desired destination is already set. The Commission, which will be “a 
catalyst for progress” will accelerate America’s reconciliation with itself. It is a tool 
for “permanently eliminating persistent racial inequities”, “jettisoning the belief 
in a hierarchy of human value, embracing our common humanity”. 
 
 
473 House Con. Res. 116 “Urging the establishment of a United States Commission on Truth, 
Racial Healing, and Transformation.“, introduced 04/06/20. 
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Whether it could actually achieve this aim is far from certain. But the promise of the 
Founding exerts such a gravitational pull in the American historical imagination 
that the Commission’s destination is already set before it has taken off: The 
principle of progress in America ultimately requires a return to the beginning. 
That beginning is continuously revived through the language of the state (e.g., 
“Reconstruction”) and popular culture: After the victory in World War II, 
Philip Roth wrote that “the clock of history [was] reset and a whole people’s 
aims limited no longer by the past […] There was a big belief in life and we were 
steered relentlessly in the direction of success; a better existence was going to be 
ours. The goal was to have goals, the aim to have aims.”474 That requires an 
extraordinary amount of hope – but if you cannot muster that, your case for 
redress (however legitimate), will not be heard. In this particular timescape 
combining an exceptional origin with a continuous imperative of improvement, 

























474 P. Roth, American Pastoral (London, Vintage Books, 1997), 40f. 
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Liberal Time is the dominant temporal framework of the West. In this 
framework, time is linear, unidirectional, meaningful in itself and modifiable by 
powerful agents. These agents’ actions, however, are constrained by the liberal 
imperative of progress, which suggests that the future should be better than the 
past. There is an unequal distribution of value across the liberal timeline which is 
biased towards the future. People and peoples who make claims of justice 
about the past are therefore at a disadvantage. Part I traced the genealogy of 
Liberal Time from the Christian villages of medieval Europe to bustling 
industrial cities and the mechanisms of subjection that sustained the global 
imperial system. Part II sought to show how this conceptual and institutional 
inheritance affects legal battles for recognition and rectification of colonial 
crimes. This final chapter seeks to assess to what extent we are trapped in the 
framework of Liberal Time – and whether there is any way out of it. The chapter 
has three sections: Section I examines what the historical material presented 
throughout this thesis means for the normative problem of the “temporal trap 
of liberalism”. Section II addresses methodological sceptics and makes the case for 






475 F. Kafka, The Aphorisms (New York, Schocken, 2015 [1931]) 
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justice. Section III tries to escape the liberal trap by looking for alternatives to 








The essence of Liberal Time is the assumption that man-made historical 
development is necessarily progressive. This leads to an expectant focus on the 
future and a devaluation of the past. In Liberal Time, the past is something we 
have to outgrow and leave behind. Even if we carefully preserve some traditions (as 
the British state sometimes does), the past should not infringe on our freedom 
of action in the present, let alone our plans for the future. This temporal bias has 
important implications for the debate on historical justice. 
If we return to the chapter 1, we see Jeremy Waldron arguing against historical 
rectification on the basis that “claims about justice must be responsive to 
changes in circumstances.”476 The main point is that under the current, 
“modern” circumstances, full historical rectification is not just unfeasible, but 
undesirable. Three elements of the argument should be disentangled: First, the 
fundamentally Humean perspective on the “circumstances of justice”. For 
Hume, “the sense of justice is not founded on reason, or on the discovery of 
certain connexions and relations of ideas, which are eternal, immutable, and 
universally obligatory.” Instead, it was “a concern for our own, and the publick 
interest, which made us establish the laws of justice; and nothing can be more 
certain, than that it is not any relation of ideas, which gives us this concern, but 
 
 
476 See ch. 1, section I. 
279  
our impressions and sentiments, without which every thing in nature is perfectly 
indifferent to us, and can never in the least affect us.” Given these origins of 
justice, more flexibility is required in adjudication: “For since it is confest, that […] 
alteration […] in the temper and circumstances of mankind, wou’d entirely alter 
our duties and obligations, ’tis necessary upon the common system, […] to shew 
the change which this must produce in the relations and ideas.”477 For Hume 
and Waldron, justice should change “with the temper and circumstances of 
mankind”. 
Second, even if we accept that justice should change with the circumstances, it is 
an open question whether those circumstances have changed for better or 
worse. In theory, any historical development could be either good or bad, but it 
looks as though for Waldron, changes in circumstances in the post-contact era of 
New Zealand (his case study) are historical changes for the better. Since the 1840 
Treaty of Waitangi, which established European settlement on New Zealand, 
“European technology and farming, mining, and fishing methods have 
transformed out of all recognition the amount and the productivity of land and 
other resources available for use. Agriculture now supplements horticulture; […] 
modern road, rail, and other infrastructure have developed; cities have been built 
(and most New Zealanders — Māori and Pākehā — live in cities); and the 
technology of a fully developed commercial society has replaced the Neolithic technology that 
characterized the thousand years or so of Māori occupation. In these different 
circumstances, it boggles belief to say that what justice requires in this territory 




477 D. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford, 1896 [1739]), via 




European contact.”478 For Waldron, the linear growth towards “a fully 
developed commercial society” is so positive that it alters the balance of justice. 
The crucial question that follows then is: positive for whom? From whose 
intellectual perspective and lived experience could the European “development” of 
New Zealand be seen as “positive”? It is rather likely that the Europeanisation of 
Māori New Zealand is good from the perspective of Europeans and their 
descendants, but not for others. For Waldron, the Māori’s participation in the 
flourishing of European modernity 18.000 kilometres away from the mother 
country (not their mother country, of course, but the original settlers’) should be 
seen as an achievement. Despite documented discrimination and extermination, the 
European colonial enterprise has yielded such good results that, on the whole, 
the Māori’s participation in European visions of “development”, “has to make a 
difference to how we think about rights - even violated rights - that are alleged to 
have survived from that earlier era into the present.”479 Waldron is not claiming that 
the Māori had no rights, nor that these rights were not violated by the colonisers. 
He questions the idea that the Māori’s “alleged” rights have “survived” from  
“that earlier era [totally undefined] into the present”. But how can even violated 
rights lose some of their power through the passage of time? 
That requires a third step in the supersession argument: we should not just 
accept (1) that justice changes with the circumstances and (2) that those 
circumstances change for the better, but also – crucially - (3) that circumstances 




478 Waldron, Settlement, Return and the Supersession Thesis, 250. 
479 Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 151. 
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European progress is universal progress. In the tidal wave of European 
modernisation rights “from that earlier era” should weaken or disappear because 
everyone benefits from progress. Why would you like to reclaim something from the 
past if the present is better? The original injustice becomes invisible under the 
assumption of universal progress. Waldron defended the first element of his 
argument at length, the second element indirectly and the third not at all. Using the 
shortcut of saying that the passage of time alters historical obligations of justice 
seemed to work just fine. Indeed, in the burgeoning academic and political 
debate about the supersession of historical injustice hardly anyone noticed. 
This reveals to what extent the conceptual link between historical development, 
Europeanisation and universal progress is entrenched, even in the minds of people 
who think about justice for a living. 
A core insight from this thesis, however, is that for some people Western 
colonial progress is a disaster. The way European visions of civilisational 
development were imposed on non-Europeans through the medium of time- 
discipline and futuristic temporalities led to the extinction of invaluable lifestyles and 
traditions all over the world. Some of them were lost forever – in the name of 
progress. Others survived, but struggle to make themselves visible in a world 
biased against the “old-fashioned”, “traditional” and “primitive”. 
The persistence of the past in the present is troubling from a Western 
perspective. In contrast to the repetitive cycles of “traditional” societies, the 
linear progress of Modernity demands a series of singular acts that add up to 
individual and collective improvement. Repeating the same act without 
improvement is not stable but retrograde. Modernity demands forward-looking 
movement. Relying on a past right that was infringed in the past to make claims 
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of justice in the present is thus doubly problematic. First, the claim is an 
uncomfortable reminder (to say the least) of the persistence of an uncomfortable 
past which descendants of European settlers have sought to overcome. It makes 
the project of Modernity look incomplete. Second, the claim is made for the 
wrong reason, looking backward rather than looking forward. Traditionalists and 
nostalgics look backward, but “fully developed” societies look forward. 
This focus on forward-looking justice can be seen not only in the statements of the 
disproportionately powerful promoters of progress, but also in the those of their 
victims. The American legal disputes we encountered in chapter 6 reveal the 
strength of the European progress paradigm. In McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020), 
petitioner Jimcy McGirt asks the State of Oklahoma not to interfere with his life 
because his crimes were committed in “Indian Country”. The argument made 
before the US Supreme Court is not at all about his past misdeeds, or indeed 
about the Federal Government’s misdeeds when President Jackson signed the 
Indian Removal Act (1830) that forced all tribes East of the Mississippi to move 
westwards on the “Trail of Tears”. Instead, the petitioner in 2020 picked up the 
language of President Jackson, who painted the displacement as an invitation to 
partake in the American Dream: 
“The waves of population and civilization are rolling to the westward […] Doubtless it will 
be painful to leave the graves of their fathers; but what do they more than our ancestors did or 
than our children are now doing? To better their condition in an unknown land our 
forefathers left all that was dear in earthly objects. Our children by thousands yearly leave 
the land of their birth to seek new homes in distant regions. Does Humanity weep at these 
painful separations from everything, animate and inanimate, with 
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which the young heart has become entwined? Far from it. It is rather a source of joy that 
our country affords scope where our young population may range unconstrained in body or in 
mind, developing the power and facilities of Man in their highest perfection.”480 
McGirt rejected interference from the government for modern and thoroughly 
American reasons. He did not mobilise any traditional attachments to his land; 
instead, he played the American game, citing countless broken treaties, 
highlighting his industrious activity as a self-made businessman and underlining his 
individual right to exercise his freedoms on his own (Indian) land. 
The 1619 Project took a similar approach in claiming that American Blacks, 
historically marginalised through systematic discrimination, were the real 
Americans. Without them, it is argued, America would lack the agricultural 
power, the relentless work ethic, the musical vibrancy and the sheer sprit of 
survival that supposedly characterise the country today. The participating writers and 
journalists adopted a new Founding date (4 August 1619, the arrival of the first 
slave ship; instead of the signing of the Mayflower Compact on 11 November 
1620) and a new Liberation date (19 June 1865, Juneteenth, the emancipation of 
all slaves from internal colonial power, instead of the liberation from English 
dependency on 4 July 1776) – but ultimately preserved the basic structure of 
American time: founding-struggle-liberation-progress. When Nikole Hannah-Jones 
wrote in her controversial lead article, “Our democracy’s founding ideals were 




480 President A. Jackson, Message to Congress "On Indian Removal", 6 December 1830; Records of the 
United States Senate, 1789‐1990; Record Group 46; NARA, via: 
https://www.nps.gov/museum/tmc/MANZ/handouts/Andrew_Jackson_Annual_Messag
e.p df , accessed 30/07/2020. 
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to make them true”,481 this was not an attack on the basic conception of the 
United States as a force for progress; it was merely a recentring of the agents of 
American progress. The progress paradigm persists, both in the theoretical 




Once we learn – through the historical reconstruction of chapters 2 and 3 – that 
this progress paradigm is the result of European cultural, economic and political 
development, and, more importantly, the result of Europe’s imperialist 
interactions with the non-European world, the picture becomes even more 
complicated. If the European idea of liberal progress fuelled imperial expansion 
and was in turn strengthened by that expansion (for example, when Europeans 
sought to “prove” their civilisational superiority by comparisons with “natives”), it 
becomes doubtful that this conception of progress will help us overcome the 
historical injustices of colonialism. If the temporal conception that helped build 
Empire is also presumed to facilitate its dissolution, we may find ourselves in a 
dangerous temporal-cum-conceptual loop, unable conceptually to escape a 
temporal framework which we recognise has been the source of many wrongs. 
The main contribution of the historical reconstruction offered in this thesis is 
thus that it destabilises normative arguments about historical injustice that rely, 
wittingly or otherwise, on the assumption of progress. Once that assumption is 
revealed as the product of a purposefully exclusionary past, we must ask: can we 
nonetheless continue to draw on it when thinking and talking about social 
inclusion through historical rectification? 
 
 
481  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-american- 








The historical reconstruction and contextualisation of key concepts in the 
historical injustice debate might not convince everyone. “Why should normative 
theorists care about historical facts in the first place?”, critics like Hans-Johann 
Glock may ask.482 Why should we be aware of the facts, and of the biased way in 
which these facts were presented? 
First of all, some refinement of my methodological positioning might help. It 
has become common in Political Theory to distinguish between ideal and non- 
ideal theory. Laura Valentini has mapped the main ways of contrasting them: (i) full 
compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end-
state vs. transitional theory.483 This thesis falls squarely within the non-ideal halves 
of these pairs. My analysis and suggestions assume only partial compliance on the part 
of historical actors and contemporary justice activists. It is a realistic, rather than 
utopian theory, to the extent that it uses real-world historical data and court 
cases to offer a realistic (often pessimistic) assessment of the prospects for historical 
rectification outside of the dominant Western framework. Most 
 
 
482 Hans-Johann Glock, one of the fiercest critics of historical contextualisation in the realm of 
philosophy, quips: “[T]he distinctively philosophical disputes concern not the empirical data 
themselves, but at most the relevance they have for such problems. The genuinely philosophical 
task is not to expand the corpus of empirical knowledge, but to organize what is known in a 
coherent manner. If there is a kernel of truth to this idea, it will apply to the cultural sciences 
with a vengeance. If even neuroscience cannot solve the mind-body problem by itself, cultural 
sciences like sociology and history will be completely out of their depths. 
There is no reason why the empirical findings of these disciplines should possess greater potency 
for solving philosophical problems than those of the natural sciences. It is equally clear that such 
problems cannot be solved or dissolved simply by historical research into their origins.” H.J. 
Glock, “Analytic Philosophy and History: A Mismatch?”, Mind , Vol. 117, No. 468 (2008) 867-
897. 
483 L. Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map”, Philosophy Compass, No. 7 Vol. 9 
(2012), 654–664. 
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importantly, my theoretical observations are necessarily limited to transitional 
theory. I am not proclaiming the total solution or total failure of the historical 
injustice problem. Rather, I am highlighting an enormously important obstacle that 
hinders our attempts at taking historical injustice seriously. This is also 
important if we want to be engaged political theorists. The world is very much a 
testing ground for non-ideal theory and we need to diversify our viewpoints if we 
want to understand where we are. 
Identifying that obstacle requires historical research and reconstruction. Here 
again, I should clarify that I am deliberately combining the time-sensitive 
methods of the Cambridge School with less historicising approaches to show 
how intellectual developments of the past were incorporated by politicians and 
laws that influence our struggles today. The architecture of historical justice 
today is to a significant extent the product of past political and intellectual 
debates about imperialism, civilisation and development. Non-ideal theory can 
benefit from critical historical research. 
Once we have accepted those methodological choices, we might still ask: why 
should political theorists care about imperial, technological, social or legal 
history? Without adopting the position of political realists, three reasons come to 
mind: First, to talk about anything properly one should know its history. 
Knowing how certain terms and ideas came about and entered our political 
vocabulary and imaginary guards us from misuse and misjudgement in the 
present. This does not “solve” the philosophical issues at stake in any given 
debate; it does help us, however, in agreeing on appropriate terms of engagement 
that avoid further conceptual injustice. The danger of knowingly or unknowingly 
operating with tainted temporal terms affects everyone. Exclusive, hierarchical 
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progress was and is essential to imperial and post-imperial politics. If we are truly 
committed to historical rectification, we should try to avoid reinforcing a 
framework that is itself part of the problem. 
Second, Western legal systems operate under the developmentalist framework of 
Liberal Time. As we have seen in the three legal case studies from Britain, 
France and the Unites States, the progress paradigm is codified in law. That 
consolidation makes it very difficult to disentangle and challenge the basic 
premises of (neo)colonial behaviour. The remarkably recent “historical turn” in 
legal theory has led to the insight, in some circles, that international law was not 
Martti Koskenniemi’s “gentle civiliser of nations”, but much rather Matthew 
Craven’s instrument of historically conditioned oppression.484 Antony Anghie is 
most explicit about this: “Colonialism was central to the constitution of 
international law in that many of the basic doctrines of international law - 
including, most importantly, sovereignty doctrine - were forged out of the 
attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the 
European and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation.”485 Western 
imperial domination and Western legal systems are mutually constitutive. It 
should not be surprising then, that undoing colonial relations by using a legal 
framework that was built to support them (as some of the plaintiffs tried in our 






484 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870– 1960 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2009); M. Craven, The Decolonization of International Law: State Succession and the Law of 
Treaties (Oxford, OUP, 2007). M. Craven, “Colonial Fragments: Decolonization, Concessions, and 
Acquired Rights” in: von Bernstorff, Jochen and Dann, Philipp, (eds.), The Battle for International Law: 
South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (Oxford, OUP, 2019),102-124. 
485 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), 3. 
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Third, the persistence of exclusionary visions of historical time could be seen as a 
structural historical injustice in itself. We have seen in the case study chapters that 
activists’ demands for historical rectification are usually cast in the terms of the 
coloniser. Is that acceptable? What does that tell us about the powerful 




Before we move on, the classic objection of the ultra-progressives should be 
raised. The argument is essentially a defence of destructive progress: If some 
suffering is in the name of progress, that is still acceptable, so long as progress 
actually arrives. If it doesn’t arrive, suffering should be temporally limited. But the 
essence of this orthodox Marxist view is that progress is not limited. Since the 
late eighteenth century, that march has been illustrated and described as a 
seemingly inevitable, unstoppable force.486 For such deterministic ultra- 
progressives, the march of progress has primacy. Optimism is certainly laudable in 
principle – but the accompanying obstinacy betrays a risk. Ultra-progressive 
historical materialists are not only illustrating the strength of the progressive 
model which I have sought problematise as a pervasive issue of just redress. 
They are also illustrating the risks of domination and destruction that I have 
identified in the imperial expansion of Liberal Time. In this sense, the Marxist 
model, which may look to some like an attractive alternative to progressive 
Liberalism, is actually similarly problematic. The difference in vocabulary and 
vigour should not deceive us. The general aim of the ultra-progressives is to 
promote progress at all cost – including the loss of valuable forms of life and 
conceptual frameworks that do not fit ideological moulds. 
 
486 A prime example is E. Bloch’s Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1985). 
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Nonetheless, hope seems to persist even within the prison created by that hope of 
universal progress. Can that endure even once we have realised it is a prison? The 








If Liberal Time is so problematic, what are the alternatives? How can we 
decolonise time? In looking for alternatives to our dominant temporal order, I 
attempt to find clues in the writings of (1) critics from within the European 
tradition and (2) critics from the colonies, but perhaps there is also (3) a third 
way of thinking about time that is totally unrelated to European notions of it. In 
this regard, the recent publication of alternative histories written from the 
viewpoint of indigenous people (e.g. Hämäläinen’s Lakota America) could open up 
new perspectives. Nonetheless I should point out that none of these options 
necessarily lead to solutions. I am merely exploring possible options in the 




The first option focuses on non-linear visions of time that originated in the 
Western tradition. It was precisely at the peak of European history-making (in 
theory and practice), at the turn of the nineteenth century, that some of the most 
imaginative proposals to free ourselves from hegemonic History arose. 
Nietzsche, Benjamin, Bergson, Heidegger, to name only a few, questioned the 
linear shape of time and proposed various ways of undoing the trinity of past, 
290  
present and future.487 Benjamin, for instance, criticised this genteel order directly, 
since, for him, it left little room for deviation or radical human agency. The 
opening simile of his Theses on the Philosophy of History goes to the heart of the 
problem: “There was once, we know, an automaton constructed in such a way 
that it could respond to every move by a chess player with a countermove that 
would ensure the winning of the game. A puppet […] sat before a chessboard 
placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created the illusion that this table 
was transparent on all sides. Actually, a hunchbacked dwarf—a master at 
chess—sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by means of strings. […] The 
puppet, called "historical materialism," is to win all the time.”488 The historical 
process is not only artificially staged as automatic and rational, but most of all, it is 
self-centred and self-deceiving, imprisoning its actors in a “system of mirrors” that 
refuses access to any external truth. It should be acknowledged that Benjamin is 
focused on Marxist time, but insofar as teleological Marxist time is a child of the 
Enlightenment just like other versions of European teleology, including Liberal 
Time, this critique is pertinent for the whole project of problematising the 
European temporal order.489 For Benjamin, truth cannot be produced by an all-
encompassing narrative. Instead, historical truth is fundamentally unpredictable. 
Most days, “the true image of the past flits by”, he writes. Sometimes, however, 
the past speaks to the present “as an image that flashes up at the moment of its 
recognisability, and is never seen again”490. The 
 
 
487 F. Nietzsche, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Geschichte (Leipzig, 1893) W. Benjamin, Thesen über den Begriff der 
Geschichte (1940), via https://www.uzh.ch/cmsssl/suz/dam/jcr:00000000-36d7- 41d4-ffff-
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489 See Chakrabarty, Subrahmanyam & Trüper (eds.), Historical Teleologies in the Modern World. 
490 Benjamin, Thesen über den Begriff der Geschichte, thesis V. 
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traditional boundaries of historical time melt away as “images” flash up like a 
memory in a psychoanalytical session to illuminate the meaning of the present.491 
Benjamin even suggests that there could be ‘”secret agreement between past and 
present generations”492 according to which real, fragmented, unexpected acts 
across time have to be saved from the greed of larger systems. If that non- 
oppressive history can be saved from the systematising of Great Powers, critical 
thinkers like Benjamin might help. 
The most important argument against this solution, however, is that these 
European thinkers were still products of their circumstances. Although the 
modernist and (post)structuralist critique of historical time unsettled and 
refocused the thinking of Western intellectual elites, they never managed to 
dethrone the original conception entirely. Why not? I think there are two 
possible answers: First, critical social theory from the Fin de siècle onwards 
never made it into the heart of power. For some reason, however successful in 
select social circles, they remained a view of outsiders and dissidents. Those in 
power generally benefit from the current arrangement. For them, the modernist 
adventures are exactly that – adventurous thought experiments that have little 
connection to how the world is (and should be) run. But there is also a less realist 
problem: Never having experienced alternatives to Liberal Time, even the most 
critical thinkers can only imagine by mental contortions what these alternatives 
might be. It takes intellectual audacity and imagination to imagine a world 
without Liberal Time, but without the lived experience of alternatives, the critical 
modernists might remain imprisoned in the progress paradigm.493 
 
491 On temporal fragmentation and memory see, for example, H. Bergson, Matière et mémoire 
(Paris, 1896). 
492 Benjamin, Thesen über den Begriff der Geschichte, thesis II. 




The second option to find alternative, non-Western times, then, are people who 
have actually experienced the arrival of Liberal Time through colonisation. 
Recent historical reconstructions of how Western timekeeping and Western 
historiography were imposed on colonised peoples suggest that this (still 
understudied) practice was an essential component of Western imperialism.494 The 
main aim was to “synchronise” the “natives” with European economic rhythms 
while simultaneously “desynchronising" the political relationship by relegating non-
Westerners to the past. Dipesh Chakrabarty famously protested against being 
relegated to “the waiting room of history”, while Partha Chatterjee sought to 
rethink “the nation in heterogenous time”, rather than accept “the dominant 
strand in modern historical thinking that imagines the social space of modernity as 
distributed in homogeneous empty time.” This European vision of time should be 
rejected since, for him, it is inherently oppressive: “Empty homogeneous time 
is the time of capital. Within its domain, capital allows for no resistance to its free 
movement. When it encounters an impediment, it thinks it has encountered 
another time--something out of pre-capital, something that belongs to the pre-
modern.”495 Achille Mbembe offers another vision of what he calls “black time”. 
In contrast to (seemingly) well-ordered European time, “Black time is always 
arbitrary and provisional. It changes all the time and its forms are uncertain.”496 
That uncertainty stems from the fact that the Black experience – of the labour 
market, the justice system – is not predictable. In contrast to Europeans, who 
enjoy the luxury of looking into the future with 
 
 
494 Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time. 
495 P. Chatterjee, “The nation in heterogenous time”, Futures, Vol. 37, No. 9 (2005), 925f. 
496 Mbembe, Critique de la raison nègre, 179. 
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confidence, Blacks live in a framework of precarity that even translates into their 
very way of conceptualising time. The colonised did see that the Western 
promise of progress was not accompanied by tangible progress on the ground. 
But the response, for the most part, was surprisingly similar to that of the 
European modernists. Instead of going in search of lost time – suppressed 
visions of time – they responded to the coloniser in his own language. The 
language of the imperial capitals, but also the language of historicism, 
modernism, psychoanalysis, existentialism. The same theories of history which have 




If neither European nor extra-European alternatives to Liberal Time seem 
satisfactory – precisely because they reproduce some of the conceptual patterns 
and power asymmetries inherent in the Western conception of history - what 
should we do? If Liberal time became dominant through a series of historical 
contingencies, it should be possible to contest, even replace it with competing 
models. These models might be unearthed if we go in search of lost time (lost in 
the sense of hidden from view rather than gone forever), temporal schemes lost 
to the power of the coloniser. Pekka Hämäläinen, for instance, has offered an 
alternative history of the North American continent which is “decidedly a 
history of the Lakotas, written from sources that seek to convey their 
perspectives”. Those indigenous sources are remarkable. Hämäläinen’s primary 
sources are the indigenous waníyetu iyáwapi (“winter counts”) collected at the 




497  https://www.si.edu/object/lakota-winter-counts%3Ayt_V8aCRM9TtlE . accessed 
26/06/21. 
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illustrated by figure 5 below, these counts are buffalo hides on which every year is 
commemorated by a single pictogram drawn every winter. The pictograms 
overlap like layers of a snail’s house to form a line that also emphasises the 
interaction between layers of time.498 The two ways of seeing any winter as a 
moment in time or as part of a cross-section that cuts through Koselleck’s 
“sediments of time” gives a view on historical development that is 
underestimated in Western approaches to history and historicity. In structural 
terms, the narrative mode of the winter counts could still convey some form of 
linearity, but the mere possibility to imagine and experience historical time 
through the experience of non-Western actors is already very important. 
 
 
Figure 5: Lone dog winter count, Sioux (N.A.702.5) 
 
These winter counts, Hämäläinen sustains, “uncover how Lakotas shaped their 
histories through selective narration and how their understanding of the past 
and themselves changed over time. They most emphatically do not adhere to 
 
498  https://centerofthewest.org/2015/12/05/treasures-lone-dogs-winter-count/, accessed 
26/06/21. 
500 P. Hämäläinen, Lakota America, 7. 
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Euro-American accounts of major historical events and developments. They 
open an alternative, counterhegemonic window into the American past, allowing us 
to observe native motives and meanings directly, without a foreign filter.”499 The 
archive of winter counts might be free of foreign filter (even though held at the 
Smithsonian), but I am not entirely sure that Hämäläinen’s account is free of such 
a filter. 
In focusing on his target audience, who presumably only knows the dominant 
story of brave American men “opening” the “Wild West” through the relentless 
westward push of civilisation, Hämäläinen (inadvertently?) recycles some of the 
terminology and assumptions of that target audience. The justification for his 
alternative history, for example, is phrased as follows: 
“It is only in the last few decades that Native Americans have entered history as fully - fledged protagonists. 
Earlier, for centuries, Native people lingered in the recesses of the American imagination as a kind of 
dark matter of history. Scholars tended to look right through them into peoples and things that mattered 
more, that seemed to move history: conquistadors, monarchs, founding fathers; settler Empires, nation-states, 
global capitalist markets. The Indians were a hazy frontier backdrop, the necessary ‘Other’ whose menacing 




Of course, it is courageous to argue, as Hämäläinen does throughout the book, 
that the Lakotas are the real Americans, that instead of foreign kings and 
conquistadors, the native tribes of the Great Plains actually ran the show. 
 
499 P. Hämäläinen, Lakota America, 8. 
501 P. Hämäläinen, Lakota America, 10. 
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Nonetheless, he presents the historical meta-project of the book in terms that 
might undermine the unique features of the Lakota story – by phrasing it like 
many other demands for recognition of historically marginalised groups: Native 
Americans should go from “hazy frontier backdrop” to “fully-fledged 
protagonists”. The status as real historical agents would allow them to enter the 
Western vision of history, in which Man moves in time and consciously moves 
history forward through action. Although his position in the (post)imperial 
hierarchy is very different, Hämäläinen uses the orthodox vocabulary employed by 
European (post-)imperial politicians, like Nicolas Sarkozy, who – as we saw in 
chapter 3 – invited young Africans to “enter history”. In important ways, the 
Lakota historian is underlining the dominance of the orthodox story. The 
existence and agency of Lakota Americans should be shown and valued in public 
– but why such recognition should follow dominant patterns is not immediately 
clear. Could there be a way of demanding and receiving recognition outside of the 





Perhaps this hopeful question itself betrays my persistent desire to progress 
beyond progressive time. Could there be more ways of thinking about alternative 
temporal orders? Should there be? If we do identify them, it still remains to be 
seen whether these alternative temporal orders would themselves become 
oppressive. We should also face the possibility, however, that there might be 
nothing left in some parts of the world, because the colonisers were particularly 
“effective” in imposing their temporal order.501 In that case, there is either no 
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solution to be found or we haven’t found it yet – that “yet” itself betraying the 
entrenched hope of progress. Could it be that we have reached a dead end? If 
so, can we accept that we are stuck? If not, we have a problem that proves my 




And yet, there might be one more way of thinking about the temporal trap of 
Liberalism. When historically disadvantaged groups phrase their demands for 
rectification in terms of Western progress, is this Liberal Time fighting back? Is this Liberal 
Time turning against its makers, the machine escaping the control of the scientists 
who carefully ordered our universe? It is difficult to gauge whether the overtly 
progressive campaigns for historical rectification are progressive by choice or 
not. If the language and conceptual framework is a choice, we should ask: Is the 
strategic use of the liberal framework acceptable if it leads to the desired result? It is tempting to see the 
strategic appropriation of Liberal Time by the oppressed as a path to more 
recognition and even historical rectification. As we have seen in the case of the 
American 1619 Project, the movement to revise standardised conceptions of 
progressive US history became incredibly influential. It reoriented the 
discussion on History, race and identity in America and some states have 
incorporated the 1619 Project into their curricula. Nevertheless, this utilitarian 
framework might not be enough. 
It might not be enough since the strategic use of the progress paradigm in turn 
confirms the power of that paradigm. The strategic use of the progress paradigm 
opens up very significant problems of conceptual imprisonment. Let us remind 
ourselves that the liberal notion of progress has a dark history in which calls for 
liberation were accompanied by systematic oppression and exclusion. Why 
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should the oppressive features of Western progress disappear now? If the terms of 
the liberal emancipation from historical injustice are already defined in advance, 
can we actually address historical injustice in all its specificities and fullness? What 
gets lost if we need to put the case in such restricted terms? What words, concepts 
and experiences are inarticulable in the language of Liberal Time? The rigid 
legal frameworks of the West might miss something, or force their constraints on 
justice claims that could be independently powerful in their own right. 
Simon Hope’s revelation about the Māori conception of rights comes to mind. 
“Post-contact history reveals a number of at times ingenious Māori attempts at 
casting their claims of right into modes of legitimation that might gain better 
traction with European audiences: monarchical and biblical modes in the 
nineteenth century; more liberal modes in more recent times”, Hope writes. “Yet 
there is an increasingly audible sense among Māori that they should not have to do 
this, that the assertion of Māori special rights should be accepted as legitimate on its 
own terms.”502 Hope then offers a useful example of international claim- making, 
which uses the international legal architecture only strategically: “When, for example, 
Māori appeal to the Treaty of Waitangi […], they resist the common Pākehā 
assumption that the Treaty creates special contractual rights for Māori. Māori view the 
Treaty as simply protecting whakapapa rights that would exist even if the Treaty 
had never been signed, and in doing so bend the Treaty mode to the shape of the 
whakapapa mode. Māori do the same on those occasions when they appeal to 
UN indigenous rights, detaching those rights from the universal grounding the 
UN language gives them.”503 The growing confidence in 
 
502 Hope, Human Rights: Sometimes One Thought Too Many?, 118. 
503 Hope, Human Rights: Sometimes One Thought Too Many?, 118. 
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a distinctively Māori mode of legitimation is a persistent and significant feature of 
modern Māori political argument. In that strategic form of argument, they lose 
something of their own linguistic heritage, but can – covertly – keep their 
underlying conception of rights. That might be effective for now, but if we really 
care about justice for historically marginalised peoples, we cannot but wonder: what 
would it be like if they did not have to switch codes to cloak their demands for 






The main aim of this intertemporal and international journey has been to 
highlight to the promoters and pilgrims of progress that their vision is successful, but 
historically compromised. Liberal Time, driven by the ostentatious promise of 
emancipation and empowerment, is deeply linked to the hierarchical geopolitics 
of European expansionism. Section I has highlighted the pervasiveness of 
Liberal Time from academia to policy-making and legal reasoning. Section II 
has sought to demonstrate that Liberal Time’s imperial history matters for 
theorists of justice because its assumptions and terminology inform the Western 
legal system, which therefore remains temporally biased. Section III has 
explored possible alternatives to Liberal Time proposed by European and non-
European critics, but found them wanting. The West can no longer justify its 
monopoly on history-making. And yet, any solution to the problem must 
grapple with the extraordinary success of a temporal framework that still 
structures our courts, our classrooms and – it seems – even the critiques that set 
out to expose the hollowness of the basic premise of Liberal Time: perpetual 
progress. 
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Having arrived at the end of our journey through the history of the West 
and the Western idea of history, we mustn’t discard time travel altogether. 
This conclusion will offer three parts in which we will be able to return to 
the past, imagine alternative histories for the present and even design the 
future. I will first provide a summary of the main findings of this doctoral 
dissertation; then comparisons and connections between my work and the 
existing literature, highlighting the distinctiveness of my contribution to the 








This thesis has tried to show that it is our very idea of progress, codified in 
law, which obstructs real progress when it comes to postcolonial 
reconciliation. Drawing on the diverse methods of historical archival 
research, legal analysis and normative critique, I have provided a 
comparative analysis of how different countries deal with their colonial past in 
order to find out why full historical reconciliation is so difficult to achieve. In 
Part I, I searched for the origins of our conception of progress and located 
them firmly within the history of the West. Chapter 1 argued that the 
international debate on historical injustice is stuck because both 
proponents and opponents of redress rely on the same conception of time: 
Liberal Time. This is particularly visible in Jeremy Waldron’s famous 
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Supersession Thesis, which posits that injustices can be superseded by 
changes in circumstances, changes in the historical context. Crucially, 
however, that implies that the new context must in some way be an 
improvement on the old. Historical change is all too often equated with 
progress. This is the core feature of the liberal conception of time which is 
biased towards a better future and discards the past. Chapter 2 traces the 
emergence of this inherently progressive Liberal Time back to key 
developments in European political and intellectual history. Three themes 
– the might of organised Christianity, the rise of the bourgeoisie, and the 
spectacle of the French Revolution – shaped European conceptions of time 
and history in a lasting manner. Instead of following the common 
conception of time as universal, I revealed the relatively provincial origins of 
World Standard Time. Chapter 3 went a step further to show how Liberal 
Time spread worldwide when it became a justification and tool of European 
imperial expansion. I identified an important tension, however, between 
diachronic orders of subjection – placing non-Europeans in distant stages of 
historical time – and synchronic systems of coordination, which were 
required to harmonise imperial trade and warfare. That tension leads to 
polychronic visions of progress, in which different historical times coexist in 
different geographical spaces to justify imperial intervention in the first place, 
while clock time promises equality for all. The risk of universal 
modernisation (which would obliterate imperial “trusteeship”) is managed by 
Europe fashioning itself as the guardian of the gate of progress. Inequality 
is perpetuated through time. The conclusion of part I was thus that the 
same time that built Empire now impedes its dissolution. 
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Part II switched gear and method. We moved back to the present for a 
comparative discourse analysis of three recent trials in which the Western ideal of 
progress is challenged. These trials, opportunities for public contestation and 
recognition, exposed a shared imaginary of progress across major imperial powers 
- but they also revealed differences in how national timescapes shape historical 
reconciliation. Chapter 4 showed that Britain’s establishment subscribes to a 
cult of continuity which makes the public acknowledgement of colonial wrongs 
comparatively easy. Chapter 5 advanced that France’s case is radically different. 
The revolutionary rupture at the foundation of modern France makes an 
honest, productive dialogue about the past virtually impossible. Archives are 
closed and dissident voices are silenced with the higher aim of preserving the 
myth of the enlightened revolution. The third case study in Chapter 6 suggested 
that the United States presents a synthesis between rupture and continuity. 
On the one hand, there is the powerful founding myth of a people breaking 
radically with all preceding historical patterns and, on the other hand, the 
promise of perpetual progress keeps the American public alert to the risk of 
historical “backsliding”. The institutional practice of constantly measuring 
American progress against the ideals of the American Revolution is surprisingly 
effective at absorbing inevitable historical shocks. This left us with a final chapter 
7 which distilled these findings into a progress paradox and drew out its 
implications for the future rectification of historical wrongs. In the end, my 
main finding is this: The time that built Empire impedes its dissolution - in 
the mind, on the street, in the courtroom. The legal systems which could 
empower marginalised groups are orienting their work along a fictional linear 
axis of time that can be as harmful as the original historical harm itself. We 
are thus imprisoned in the paradox of 
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progress: the Western promise of progress cannot be fulfilled so long as our 










I believe to have made three distinctive contributions to the interdisciplinary 
literature which examines the problem of historical injustice. These 
contributions are both theoretical and methodological. 
 
 
First, I have gone below the surface of the historical injustice debate to 
uncover its unacknowledged assumptions. In particular, I have attempted to 
show that most of the current historical injustice debate is based on 
specifically European assumptions about the nature and structure of time, 
history and historical action. This assumption is shared across the political 
spectrum and across national academic conventions. 
 
 
Second, I have taken a comparative approach to demonstrate more broadly 
that time is highly political and should never be taken as a given. The 
successive advances in modern timekeeping were accompanied by ever more 
fine-grained political rhythms which allowed for the synchronisation of 
modern life as well as the unjust hierarchies of the diachronic age of Empires. 
The common understanding of time as a neutral scientific unit significantly 
underestimates the power of this variable in politics. My comparative analysis 
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has shown that the temporal variable has different effects in different 
contexts. Overall, however, we should be cautious whenever time, or the 
passage of time, might be used as a quasi-scientific explanation for political 
(in)action or even as an argument for or against historical justice. 
 
 
Third and last, I am honoured to insert myself in the growing body of 
scholarship which questions rigid academic compartmentalisation and 
expands the purely abstract nature of Political Theory as a discipline.504 
Longo, Zacka and Herzog have extolled the beneficial effects of enriching 
Political Theory with ethnography,505 but I go beyond ethnographic fieldwork to 
encourage the methodical observation of struggles for recognition that 
surround us every day. They play out in archives, courtrooms, museums and 
television studios – all places outside the natural habitat of political theorists. It 
is crucial that we leave the office to rediscover our problem from different 
angles. In broadening our lens, we can see where our accepted terms actually 
come from, how intellectual history is inseparable from political strategy and 
how the struggles for recognition which we have theorised actually play out in 
court. I have made use of my prior training to combine the methods of 
history, law and philosophy and hope that this will encourage more 
researchers to venture across disciplines, individually and collectively. The aim 
was and continues to be a new grounded and applied political theory which 
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Of course, any academic endeavour has its limitations. This particular project 
was restricted not only by time constraints, but also by very limited access to 
state archives due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead of visiting the US 
National Archives, the National Museum of African American History and 
the French National Archives in person to experience the joys of archival 
immersion, I had to content myself with virtual tours and incompletely 
digitised files. A more exhaustive examination would not only reveal 
documents that facilitate the reconstruction of specific historical wrongs. 
Crucially, existing documents can also point towards missing documents. 506 
This could lead to more detailed reflection on how states build and guard, 
hide and reveal narratives about their national past. A deeper investigation 
into the national cultures of document preservation and information 
management could thus support historical redress in the future. 
 
A further limitation is that only three countries were the object of closer 
examination. As explained in the introduction, these countries were chosen 
because they (a) had a significant colonial history and (b) self-identified as 
liberal nations who, if necessary (c) spread liberal values and governance 
systems through imperial expansion. Still, comparative studies on a larger 
scale will hopefully be able to survey more countries, each with their history and 
their historically evolved legal system. In identifying new targets of 
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analysis, two groups of countries seem particularly important: First, states of the 
Global South, which, in many instances, were at the receiving end of 
European visions of history and often adopted (elements of) the coloniser’s 
legal system. Although some work has already been done in the framework of 
the debates on transitional justice, a lot remains to be done.507 Second, the 
interest in time should justify an examination of the memory politics of Early 
Modern Empires. While I have focused only on the second wave of 
European imperialism (roughly 1750-1950), the first wave of European 
imperialism (roughly 1450-1650), spearheaded by Spain and Portugal, also 
produced lasting disputes about responsibility and redress. Spain, for 
instance, celebrated the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s “discovery” of 
America with lavish nationwide ceremonies, while explicitly rejecting 
Mexico’s demand for an official apology for the conquest, colonisation and 
genocide in Central America.508 The most interesting questions here would ask 
(i) whether the longer passage of time since the commission of historical wrongs 
has a significant impact on reparation claims and (ii) whether Empires that 
explicitly justified expansion on the grounds of Christianisation (conversion 
of lost souls) rather than along the secularised argument about civilisational 
progress fare differently when uncomfortable historical truths are revealed. I 
hope that these suggestions will point the way towards more comprehensive 






507 See the Eurocentric stance taken in B. Cannon, D. Pkalya & B.Maragia, "The International 
Criminal Court and Africa: Contextualising the Anti-ICC Narrative", African Journal of International 
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Notwithstanding these necessary limitations, I hope I have been sufficiently 
clear about of the core claims of this thesis: We cannot fulfil the Western 
promise of progress as long as our institutions defend an idea of progress that is 
itself oppressive and exclusionary. It is the Western idea of progress, 
codified in law, which obstructs real progress when it comes to postcolonial 
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